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This thesis studies the effects of CEO succession gaps (differences in personal 
traits between the predecessor and successor) on subsequent firm performance (Chapter 
2), and firm future risk-taking (Chapter 3). Market reactions to the revelation of CEO 
succession gaps among S&P 500 firms spanning the period 1992 to 2016 are finally 
presented in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 2, I examine the effect of succession-induced gaps in CEO 
characteristics on subsequent firm performance. Findings in this chapter show that a gap 
index constructed using differences in CEO attributes resulting from the succession 
process leads to deteriorating subsequent firm performance when the succession event 
itself is characterized as disruptive. However, under non-forced succession and when pre-
succession performance has been good, a change in characteristics contributes positively 
to enhancing subsequent firm performance. Analysis of the channels through which value 
changes are affected suggest that radically different CEOs are more likely to bring with 
them a higher proportion of co-opted directors, make downsizing and business divesting 
decisions, and lead firms characterized by higher levels of post-succession strategic 
instability when there is a mandate for change. Overall, my findings demonstrate that 
tapping successors who bring in a new set of attributes that are markedly different from 
those of their predecessors may not always lead to value-enhancement. 
In Chapter 3, I investigate the relationship between succession-induced gaps in 
CEO risk-taking attributes and subsequent firm risks. Findings in this chapter show that 
the risk-taking gap index constructed using several CEO personal attributes is positively 
related to subsequent firm risk, especially under forced removal, poor pre-succession firm 
performance, and external succession. Furthermore, I find that under the aforementioned 
three circumstances, CEOs with risk-taking gaps increase firm risk through implementing 
riskier financing policies (higher financial leverage), operating policies (higher operating 
leverage), investment policies (higher R&D intensity and/ or lower capital expenditure) 
and diversification strategies (higher Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and/ or less business 
segments within which the firm operates). Overall, findings in this chapter suggest that 
CEOs’ personal risk-taking attributes in non-economic contexts have serious implications 
for firms’ risk-taking policies and overall risk profile. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine the price effect of succession-induced gaps in 
CEO characteristics. Results show that under forced removals and when pre-succession 
firm performance has been poor, market participants react favorably to successors with 
relatively high levels of succession gaps. The magnitude of CARs is 2.64% (4.35%) for 
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the High Gap group under forced succession (poor pre-performance) over the [-5,+5] 
event window. For firms tapping successors with relatively low levels of succession gaps 
under forced removals or successions following poor performance, however, the 
cumulative abnormal returns are neither economically nor statistically significant during 
the 11-day event window. This is because instead of affecting effective changes, tapping 
a successor sharing similar personal traits with his/ her predecessor will simply indicate 
organizational inertia and may fail to signal management quality improvements. 
Consistent with my hypothesis, for firms under non-forced successions or when pre-
succession performance has been good, the cumulative abnormal returns following the 
revelation of CEO succession gaps is not statistically different from zero during the [-
5,+5] event period for both incoming CEOs with high and low succession gaps, due to 
the fact that the event itself implies a continuation of firm policy and does not convey any 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1. Overview 
CEO successions have drawn significant attention in the past few decades. CEOs, 
unlike any other members of the senior management team in any organization, can impose 
their idiosyncratic styles on the firms they manage. Therefore, their personal traits and 
past experiences, which ultimately translate into corporate decisions, will not only shape 
the fate of their firms, but also the development of whole economies. As such, given the 
potential for far reaching social and financial implications such changes in top leadership 
entail, they deserve attention both in theoretical research and in practical operations. 
Arguably, any CEO succession entails some risk. Identifying a suitable successor 
is one of the most important decisions that a company’s board can make. Choosing 
successors with different personal backgrounds and/ or skillsets gives firms a competitive 
edge by ensuring a flow of fresh ideas and new perspectives to suit the ever-changing 
needs of today’s organisations and society. However, drastic changes in top leadership 
have the potential to disturb existing work patterns and/ or existing internal and external 
relationships, which could in turn affect employee morale and cause disruptions within 
the organisation. 
In this thesis, I undertake three empirical studies to investigate how CEO 
succession gaps affect future firm prospects where succession gaps are measured by the 
difference in attributes between the predecessor and the successor of the firm. To address 
the overall impact of changes in CEO characteristics brought about by a succession event, 
in Chapter 2, I examine whether CEO succession gaps have any impact on subsequent 
firm performance. Specifically, in this chapter, I investigate whether drastic differences 
between the predecessor and the successor are beneficial or harmful when the succession 
event itself is disruptive in nature. In Chapter 3, I adopt a more focused approach to study 
specific aspects of value-relevant firm attributes, such as firm-risk, that could be altered 
by an incoming CEO with radically different traits. Therefore, the focus of this chapter is 
to examine the relation between differences in personal risk-taking attributes of the 
incoming and outgoing CEOs and post-succession firm risk-taking. In a sense, this 
chapter implicitly examines whether boards use CEO successions as an opportunity to 
replace the outgoing CEO with one possessing a markedly different attitude towards risk 
that is tailored to deliver on the firm’s strategic imperatives. Finally, in Chapter 4, I study 
investors’ perceptions on CEO succession gaps by adopting an event study methodology. 
This chapter seeks to discover whether investors are rational when making decisions and 
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whether the price effect of CEO succession gaps is in line with firm future accounting 
performance. 
 
1.2. Past Literature on the Consequences of CEO Successions 
Past literature suggests that CEO successions affect subsequent firm policy 
choices such as strategic reorientation (Weisbach, 1995; Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; 
Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010; Barron et al., 2011; Weng & Lin, 
2014; Chiu et al., 2016; Schepker et al., 2017), risk-taking (Elsaid & Ursel, 2011; 
Cronqvist et al., 2012; Serfling, 2014; Faccio et al., 2016), and internationalisation 
(Herrmann & Datta, 2002; Lin & Liu, 2012). Boards worldwide seem to use CEO 
successions as a means to cater to their firms’ future development strategies (Westphal & 
Fredrickson, 2001) by selecting a suitable successor who plays a critical role in ensuring 
the successful implementation of strategic changes. For example, Serfling (2014) finds 
evidence that risk averse (seeking) firms generally hire CEOs who are older (younger), 
and award older (younger) CEOs with fewer (more) incentives in implementing riskier 
strategies to encourage them to take on less (more) risk.  
Nonetheless, the debate on the performance consequences of CEO successions 
remains largely inconclusive. Post-succession firm policies, performance, and market 
reactions may be influenced by several factors at different levels (Berns & Klarner, 2017). 
First, the effect of environmental factors should not be underestimated. Datta et al. (2003) 
argue that the positive relation between successor openness and post-succession strategic 
changes is stronger when firms belong to high-discretion industries. Zhang and 
Rajagopalan (2004) document the positive relation between relay succession and post-
succession firm performance to be stronger during an industrial turbulence. Likewise, 
Karaevli (2007) finds evidence that external successors generate better post-succession 
firm performance under an environment that has higher capability to allow organizational 
growth.  
Second, organizational contingencies, especially pre-succession firm 
performance, are of great importance in terms of affecting post-succession firm policies, 
performance, and market reactions. For instance, Friedman and Singh (1989) find that the 
market reacts positively when pre-succession performance has been poor and under the 
condition that the succession events are either board- or CEO-initiated, while a negative 
market reaction is observed when pre-succession firm performance has been good. 
Friedman and Saul (1991) argue that poor pre-succession performance is associated with 
more successor-induced changes (e.g. strategy, structure, personnel, enterprise culture 
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changes) and will cause disruptions within the organization. Lubatkin et al. (1989) find 
that investors react favorably to external successors when pre-succession performance 
has been poor. Similarly, Davidson III et al. (1993) assert that CEO successions close to 
firm bankruptcy are generally associated with positive abnormal returns, and the positive 
effect is more pronounced when the successor is an outsider. Karaevli (2007) documents 
the positive relation between CEO ‘outsiderness’ and subsequent firm performance to be 
stronger following poor pre-succession firm performance. In a related study, Karaevli and 
Zajac (2013) find that outsider successors are more likely to initiate strategic changes 
when pre-succession performance has been good. Collectively these studies suggest that 
pre-succession firm performance has a significant impact on the market’s reaction to the 
succession event. 
Third, from an agency theory perspective, conflicts of interest are inherent in all 
contractual arrangements involving delegation (Wright et al., 2002). The relation between 
CEO characteristics and firm outcomes is based on the notion that shareholders are unable 
to perfectly monitor CEOs. Consequently, CEOs are capable of pursuing policies which 
deviate from the sole objective of shareholder wealth maximization (Hutchinson & Gul, 
2004). Internal and external monitoring, therefore, will have an impact on post-succession 
firm prospects. For instance, Dunn (1987) asserts that firms with a larger percentage of 
outsider directors can better control and monitor management. Booth et al. (2002) state 
that CEO duality leads to less effective monitoring of the CEO and thus exacerbated 
agency problems. Lang et al. (2004) argue that more analyst following leads to increased 
corporate transparency, which can help reduce agency conflicts by inhibiting managerial 
opportunistic rent extraction. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) claim that compared to retail 
investors, institutional investors can monitor managers at a relatively lower cost given 
their expertise and resources, and have greater incentive to do so. Institutional investors 
are more able to constrain managers’ self-serving behaviours (Chung et al., 2002), 
influence proxy voting (Bhagat et al., 2004), and shape corporate policies (Baysinger et 
al., 1991; Cox et al., 2004; Desai & Jin, 2011). As a consequence, firms with more 
institutional holdings tend to perform better (Dharwadkar et al., 2008). When there is 
inadequate internal/ external monitoring and thus greater CEO discretion, one can expect 
CEOs personal characteristics to play a more prominent role in shaping firms’ strategic 
choices and overall outcomes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; 
Li & Tang, 2010). 
Fourth, board or TMT (top management team) composition and post-succession 
turnovers make a critical difference. Shen and Cannella (2002), for example, report post-
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succession top management team turnover following a contender succession will lead to 
enhanced subsequent operational performance, while top management team changes 
following an outsider succession contributes negatively to post-succession firm 
performance. Barron et al. (2011) documents a positive relation between CEO succession 
and discontinued operations in a contender succession context, only if other top 
executives also leave their posts when the CEO steps down. Tian et al. (2011) argues that 
higher board human and social capital has a strong positive price effect when appointing 
a CEO successor, and the market prefers internal successors chosen by boards with strong 
internal social capital above all others. Chen et al. (2015) finds that the probability of 
being engaged in income-increasing earnings management for interim CEOs is higher 
than that for non-interim CEOs. Further, effective internal governance such as board’s 
time commitment and financial expertise help mitigate the positive relation between 
earnings management and interim CEO promotion.  
Last but not least, a predecessor’s disposition and tenure also seem to matter. 
Friedman and Singh (1989) argue that predecessor disposition may have an impact on 
shareholder reactions to CEO successions. Insider promotion coupled with predecessor’s 
retention suggests that the successor would have less discretion in making far-reaching 
changes compare to if the predecessor had left the firm, and conveys no new information 
with regards to firm future structural and strategic changes. In sharp contrast, however, 
for external successions, predecessor’s retention in most cases hampers successor’s 
capability to affect strategic changes, and in some rare cases plays a guiding role and 
helps the successor get through the transition period smoothly. Quigley and Hambrick 
(2012) conclude that predecessor’s retention hampers successor’s discretion in affecting 
post-succession strategic changes and therefore suppresses successor’s influence on 
subsequent firm performance. Using U.S. airline and chemical industries’ data spanning 
the period 1972 to 2010,  Karaevli and Zajac (2013) claim that longer predecessor tenure, 
which serves as proxy for organizational stability, gives outsider successors greater 
latitude in making far-fetching strategic changes post-succession. 
Due to the fact that board/ top management team information, media coverage, 
analyst following and predecessor disposition data are not readily available, in this paper, 
I only control for environmental factors (by including year and industry fixed effects), 
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and distinguish between different organizational contingencies when conducting the 
empirical analysis.1  
 
1.3. Past Literature on the Relation between CEO Personal Traits and Firm 
Performance 
Not only would the event itself and the multilevel contingencies surrounding CEO 
successions affect post-succession firm prospects, but the ‘imprinting’ concept 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) suggests that managers can also impose their own idiosyncratic style 
on a company. Prior literature suggests that a CEO’s past experience and characteristics 
have significant influence on firm performance by implementing different investment 
policies, disclosure policies, capital structures, and organizational structures (Malmendier 
& Nagel, 2011; Malmendier et al., 2011; Benmelech & Frydman, 2015). Some scholars 
study how CEOs’ personal interests and hobbies may affect firm performance. For 
example, Biggerstaff et al. (2016) look into CEO golfing and find a negative relationship 
between the level of CEO golfing and firm operating performance, which supports that 
leisure consumption could serve as a signal of CEO shirking. Cain and McKeon (2016) 
assert that CEOs with private pilot licenses lead firms with riskier firm policies and 
elevated firm total risk. In a related study, Sunder et al. (2017) find evidence that CEOs 
with a private pilot’s license produce better innovation outcomes as measured by patents 
and related citations, and greater innovation efficiency.  
Focusing on CEO personal experience, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that 
‘depression babies’2 rely excessively on internal resources and are more conservative 
with debt as opposed to equity financing. Moreover, they assert that military CEOs act 
more aggressively. On the contrary, however, Benmelech and Frydman (2015) suggest 
that CEO military experience is negatively related to riskier investment and financial 
policies as indicated by lower capital expenditure/ R&D investments and lower leverage 
ratio. They also find evidence that firms led by military CEOs are less likely to be 
involved in fraudulent activities and tend to perform better during an industry downturn. 
Bernile et al. (2017) argue that CEOs who are exposed to natural disasters with moderate 
levels of fatalities are inclined to take more risk when making firm policies, while CEOs 
exposed to deadly natural disasters tend to lead firms with lower risk.  
                                                                
1 I split the sample into subsamples based on firms’ e-index. However, the coefficients on our main variables – CEO 
succession gap index and CEO risk-taking gap index are not statistically significant. Results are therefore not reported 
in the thesis.  
2 Individuals who have past experiences of macroeconomic downturns. 
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By looking into CEO career paths, Custódio et al. (2013) argue that firms value 
CEOs with general managerial skills: CEOs who have higher General Ability Index 
scores are associated with higher market pay, and firms generally pay more when they 
hire generalist CEOs to replace their specialist predecessors, especially when generalist 
successors are outsiders with the intention to perform highly complex tasks such as major 
restructuring or M&A. In a related study, Custódio and Metzger (2014) find evidence that 
CEOs who have financial experience are more likely to be selected by firms that are more 
mature, and CEOs with financial expertise tend to make more sensible financial decisions. 
Similarly, in a sample of listed companies in China,  Jiang et al. (2013) find that CEOs 
with financial experience are associated with less real earnings management, and thus are 
able to provide more reliable financial statements than CEOs who are less financially 
sophisticated. Gomulya and Boeker (2014) discover a positive relation between firm 
financial restatements and the probability of hiring successors with past CEO/ turnaround 
experience and/ or elite educational backgrounds. They argue that the hiring of CEOs 
with past CEO/ turnaround experience can lead to positive reactions from both financial 
analysts and market participants. In sharp contrast, Hamori and Koyuncu (2015) claim 
that successors with past CEO experience are associated with worse post-succession firm 
performance, especially for those with industry-specific experience or those previously 
led firms of similar size. Zhu and Shen (2016) assert that outsider CEO’s past experience 
working with demographically diverse boards reduces turbulence at the top and helps 
enhance firm performance. 
With the development of behavioural finance in recent years, many scholars have 
begun to explore the relationship between CEO psychological traits and firm decisions. 
For example, Datta et al. (2003) document a positive relationship between successor 
openness and post-succession strategic changes. Li and Tang (2010) assert that CEO 
hubris is positively associated with firm risk. They observe this positive relationship to 
be stronger when CEOs are offered greater managerial discretion. Tang et al. (2015) find 
evidence of a negative relationship between CEO hubris and corporate social 
responsibilities, and the negative relationship is moderated when firms are smaller in size, 
have lower levels of financial slack, or face higher levels of market uncertainty. 
Malmendier et al. (2011) study the relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
corporate financing decisions and observe an inverse relationship between 
overconfidence and external financing (especially equity financing). Galasso and Simcoe 
(2011) find evidence that overconfident CEOs have higher probability to pursue 
innovation, especially when industry competition is fierce. Huang et al. (2016) claim that 
7 
 
CEOs who are overconfident tend to shorten overall firm debt maturity by using a higher 
proportion of short-term debt compared to their non-overconfident counterparts. 
 
1.4. Research Objectives and Contributions 
The reason why a CEO predecessor is replaced by a successor with different 
characteristics and/ or personal backgrounds could be attributed to many distinct, and 
possibly contrasting, factors. First, the process of CEO succession is one of the board’s 
most important and challenging roles (Biggs, 2004; Berns & Klarner, 2017; Schepker et 
al., 2018). A board can decide for a relay CEO succession that includes a grooming period 
for an heir apparent to prepare him/ her to succeed the outgoing CEO (Shen & Cannella 
Jr, 2003; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). Alternatively, a board can set up a competitive 
context (e.g. a horse race) among inside managers to identify a successor. A board can 
also choose between candidates from within or outside the organization, as well as from 
the same industry or a different industry (Agrawal et al., 2006). The CEO succession 
planning by the board (or lack of) seems very relevant for shareholders value and firm 
performance (Shen & Cannella Jr, 2003; McConnell & Qi, 2018; Rivolta, 2018), and is a 
key determinant for CEO succession gaps, as one would expect CEO succession gaps to 
be smaller for a firm with a succession plan in place. Further, Zajac and Westphal (1996) 
argue while CEO predecessors tend to favor similar successors, boards prefer successors 
who are demographically similar to themselves. A board which is more powerful relative 
to the CEO predecessor would be more likely to make use of the succession event to 
change CEO characteristics in the direction of existing board member characteristics. 
Differences in personal traits between CEO predecessors and successors (‘succession 
gaps’ thereafter), therefore, can be seen as a reflection of a firm’s succession planning, 
CEO/ board relative power, and the changes in the profile of board member characteristics.  
Second, poor performance, the visibility of a scandal, or the public perception of 
mismanagement could create opportunities for appointment of CEOs with succession 
gaps. For instance, Skaggs (2009) finds that after a racial discrimination lawsuit, firms 
respond to external pressure by becoming disproportionately more likely to promote 
African-Americans into management positions. In addition, poor pre-succession firm 
performance will lead to a firm’s decreased bargaining power on the CEO labor market. 
Since a pattern of continuous poor performance is an indication of a mismanaged firm 
resisting improvements, an underperforming firm could have difficulty attracting viable 
successors with intensive human and social capital, and may therefore be forced to hire a 
successor who is younger, with less prior experience, and/ or with lower educational 
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attainment etc., which eventually leads to a larger CEO succession gap. Therefore, under 
turbulent conditions, any major changes in the characteristics between the predecessor 
and the successor could be considered as a reflection of the firm’s poor prospect. 
This thesis focuses on the value implications of a shift in corporate culture brought 
about by CEO succession. Specifically, this thesis studies the effect of CEO succession 
gaps on subsequent firm policy choices, firm post-succession performance, and investor 
reactions. While the cross-sectional association between CEO characteristics and future 
firm prospects has drawn great attention in the past few decades, the effect of CEO 
succession gaps on firm performance and policy choices under different organizational/ 
event contexts has surprisingly received scant attention. This study aims to fill in such 
gaps in the literature and provide invaluable insight to inform firm’s hiring process. 
This thesis contributes to at least two strands of the CEO succession literature. 
First, the study contributes to this literature by investigating the impact of CEO 
successions on future firm prospects.3 Second, this research adds to the literature that 
examines the influence of CEO personal characteristics and past experience on market 
reactions, firm subsequent performance, and post-succession policy choices.4 This thesis 
also provides a comprehensive analysis on the impact of the change in CEO personal 
traits and past experiences by combining different aspects rather than just focussing on a 
single perspective such as gender [see, e.g. Reskin and McBrier (2000); Lee and James 
(2007); Adams and Funk (2012); Huang and Kisgen (2013); Faccio et al. (2016)], age 
[see, e.g. Taylor (1975); Hambrick and Mason (1984); Chown (1961); Serfling (2014)], 
or others [see, e.g. Barker and Mueller (2002); Malmendier and Tate (2005); Giannetti 
(2011); Custódio and Metzger (2013); Graham et al. (2013); Jiang et al. (2013); Custódio 
and Metzger (2014); Mishra (2014); Henderson et al. (2017)]. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study that considers the combined effect of various differences 
in CEO characteristics between the predecessor and successor simultaneously in a 
succession context and examines whether such succession gaps have any influence on 
firm prospects. This is also the first paper that looks into the difference between the 
                                                                
3 Examples include: Grusky (1963); Dalton and Kesner (1983); Schwartz and Menon (1985); Friedman and Singh 
(1989); Friedman and Saul (1991); Cannella and Lubatkin (1993); White et al. (1997); Shen and Cannella Jr (2003); 
Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004); Karaevli (2007); Ballinger and Marcel (2010); Barron et al. (2011); Jalal and Prezas 
(2012); Gangloff et al. (2016); Schepker et al. (2017) 
4 Examples include: Taylor (1975); Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992); Helgesen (1995); Grable (2000); Reskin and 
McBrier (2000); Bertrand and Schoar (2003); Wolfers (2006); Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007); Lee and James (2007); 
Hackbarth (2008); Malmendier and Nagel (2011); Malmendier et al. (2011); Cronqvist et al. (2012); Custódio and 
Metzger (2013); Graham et al. (2013); Jiang et al. (2013); Custódio and Metzger (2014); Benmelech and Frydman 
(2015); Hamori and Koyuncu (2015); Kish-Gephart and Tochman Campbell (2015); Cain and McKeon (2016); Cline 
and Yore (2016); Faccio et al. (2016); King et al. (2016); Zhu and Shen (2016); Bernile et al. (2017); Sunder et al. 
(2017); Gopalan et al. (2018); Gounopoulos and Pham (2018) 
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predecessors’ and successors’ characteristics by differentiating between various types of 




Chapter 2 CEO Succession Gap and Firm Performance 
2.1. Introduction 
CEO succession and the associated implications for firm performance and value 
has been a topic of considerable interest among academics and practitioners alike; it has 
been the subject of intense scholarly research in both the finance and management 
literatures. Boards worldwide spend considerable time and effort ensuring that the 
succession process identifies and brings in a CEO with the right skill set that will help the 
firm going forward. Extant research has invested considerable effort in exploring the topic 
of CEO succession, seeking to underpin CEO succession planning, the reasons behind 
leadership changes, and whether such changes add value to the enterprise.5 For example, 
Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004) shows that the relay succession method allows the heir 
apparent the opportunity to learn firm and position-specific skills which leads to better 
post-succession performance, especially when performance leading up to the succession 
is poor and when firm and/ or industry strategic instability has been high. In a related 
study, Naveen (2006) finds that a firm’s probability of grooming an internal candidate is 
positively related to firm size and organizational complexity.  
I step back from the value-implications of the process of succession and focus 
instead on the outcome of succession planning, i.e. on the differences in personal traits of 
the person who is finally chosen relative to those of the outgoing CEO. In other words, I 
am interested in the value-implications of a shift in corporate culture brought about by 
CEO turnover. My interest in studying the impact of a turnover-driven shift in corporate 
culture is motivated by the recent burgeoning literature that links CEO personal 
characteristics to firm policy choices and performance.6 Given that boards scouting for 
talent look for indicators, any association between personal traits/ experiences and firm 
performance is likely to provide invaluable insight into hiring the right person to help take 
the firm forward. There is, however, a significant void in the CEO succession literature 
which has hitherto limited its attention largely to the cross-sectional association between 
CEO characteristics and future firm risk and performance. To the best of my knowledge, 
                                                                
5 See, for example the following: Friedman and Saul (1991); Denis and Denis (1995); Parrino (1997); Huson et al. 
(2004); Hermalin (2005); Agrawal et al. (2006); Naveen (2006); Karaevli (2007); Cucculelli and Micucci (2008); 
Ballinger and Marcel (2010); Inderst and Mueller (2010); Campbell et al. (2011); Mobbs and Raheja (2012); Eisfeldt 
and Kuhnen (2013); Schepker et al. (2017); Gao and Xie (2018); McConnell and Qi (2018); Merz and Weidemann 
(2018). 
6 There is a large volume of literature investigating how a CEO’s past experience and characteristics translate into 
corporate policy choices. Examples include: CEO military experience and firm risk-taking (Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; 
Benmelech & Frydman, 2015), CEO early-life experience and professional behaviors (Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; 
Custódio et al., 2013; Bernile et al., 2017), CEO fitness and firm profitability (Limbach & Sonnenburg, 2014), CEO 
golfing and firm performance (Biggerstaff et al., 2016), and pilot CEO and innovation (Cain & McKeon, 2016; Sunder 
et al., 2017).  
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almost no study has investigated how differences in a broad set of personal traits between 
the predecessor and successor (‘succession gaps’ hereafter) could affect firm 
performance.7  
However, notwithstanding the commonly held belief that change is good, the 
consequences of leadership change on firm performance have been reported as largely 
inconclusive in prior literature. As such, there is reason to believe that the performance 
of new CEOs with large succession gaps could either help or hurt firm performance. On 
the one hand, successors with large succession gaps may introduce different management 
philosophies and succeed, given that a shake-up is necessary to move the firm forward. 
Examples include the United States’ first female Fortune 500 CEO - Washington Post’s 
Katharine Graham and Xerox’s Ursula Burns, who in July 2009 became that country’s 
first Fortune 500 African-American female CEO and the first woman to succeed a female 
predecessor.8 Both these women serve as long-lasting role models for other top women 
executives in a predominantly male-dominated business world. Another example is Alan 
Mulally, who was tapped as CEO of Ford and ended speculation that an airplane expert 
could not lead an automobile manufacturing company.9  
On the other hand, the succession process could be fraught with risks of hiring the 
wrong person who could potentially do more harm than good. This can be particularly 
deleterious when the outcome of the hiring process cannot easily be reversed. For instance, 
some new CEOs bring with them their own management team when taking over the top 
leadership position and make efforts to shake up the, culture which may further 
exacerbate an already poor level of morale. Some are just not suitable for running a 
different business, such as Gap’s Paul Pressler, the Disney veteran who was ousted after 
failing to save the floundering business due to his lack of appreciation and creativity of 
the fashion industry. 10  Johnson & Johnson’s former CEO William Perez is another 
example, who resigned after a short stint at the world’s largest shoemaker Nike following 
disagreements with the firm’s founder over management philosophy.  
In this paper, I seek to identify the characteristics of succession events when the 
impact of hiring a CEO with radically different personal traits could benefit the firm and 
                                                                
7 Very few papers examine how the difference between the predecessor and the successor could affect a firm’s risk-
taking rather than firm value following a succession. For example, Huang and Kisgen (2013) document that a transition 
from male to female CEO is associated with a lower rate of asset growth, fewer acquisitions, lower leverage, and 
reduced debt issuance frequency. Recently, Serfling (2014) and Faccio et al. (2016) find that young-to-old and male-
to-female transitions lead to substantially reduced firm risk, respectively.  
8 See online news article: https://www.biography.com/news/first-female-ceos-in-history. 
9See Bloomberg Businessweek news article: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-03-04/alan-mulally-the-
outsider-at-ford. 




conditions when such differences could potentially be harmful to firm value. A natural 
subset of successions potentially more prone to adverse cultural shocks are the ones in 
firms already reeling under disruptive conditions while the reverse would be true for the 
complementary subset. These include successions where the outgoing CEO is forced out 
and when the succession was preceded by poor firm performance. Therefore, given this 
dichotomy in the possible outcome of the succession process, I add to this literature by 
examining whether succession-induced gaps in CEO characteristics have any influence 
on post-succession firm performance.11  
To test this hypotheses, I use data on a sample of S&P 500 companies spanning 
the period from 1996 to 2016. I construct an index of CEO characteristics comprising 
hand-collected data on CEO gender, age, career variety, cultural background, highest 
education level, and social status (‘eliteness’) of undergraduate school. Each of these 
characteristics has already been individually shown in the prior literature to impact on 
firm performance. To differentiate my study from the others that have considered the 
impact of a single CEO trait, I construct a gap index by adding one point for every 
difference between the predecessor and the successor with reference to the 
aforementioned six attributes. Index values therefore range from zero to six, with zero 
indicating close alignment between the personal traits/ experiences of the successor and 
the predecessor, while six suggests that the outgoing and incoming CEOs are totally 
different along these six dimensions. Future performance of the firm undergoing a 
succession (i.e., a treatment firm) is measured relative to those that do not experience 
such an event (i.e., a matched sample). To minimize the effect of any sample selection 
bias, I employ the propensity score matching methodology, where for every firm 
experiencing a leadership change (i.e., in the treatment group), five matching firms that 
did not go through such an event, but share similar pre-succession characteristics, are 
identified among the matched firms. In other words, the treatment and matched samples 
have similar pre-succession firm characteristics, with the only difference being that 
treatment firms have a change in top management.  
 Main findings in this study can be summarized as follows. For the full sample of 
CEO successions, I do not find evidence that the succession gap index impacts future firm 
performance. Shifts in cultural mores can be beneficial or harmful to performance, and in 
a portfolio, the positive effect in some firms is neutralized by the adverse effect in others. 
                                                                
11  Hereafter I use the terms ‘pre-succession’ and ‘post-succession’ to deal with the period before and after the 
predecessor is replaced by a new CEO, respectively. These terms are used in several papers, including Friedman and 
Singh (1989); Friedman and Saul (1991) and Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004). 
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To rule out this possibility, I next split the sample into firms that were the subject of 
disruptive changes leading up to the succession event and those that were not. 
Interestingly, I find that when the succession involves a forced removal of the CEO, or 
when pre-succession firm performance has been poor, an attempt to further shake up the 
status quo through a radical shift in the personal traits/ experiences of the CEO leads to 
subsequently worse firm performance. This outcome is even stronger in the long-term. 
Consistent with my earlier assertion, the adverse impact of the succession is limited only 
to the set of successions that are either disruptive or had poor pre-succession performance 
while firms in the complementary subsample (i.e. non-disruptive successions) showed 
significant improvement in performance in the years following the succession event. In 
further tests, I find that successor CEOs who differ considerably from their predecessors 
tend to co-opt a greater proportion of the board one year after assuming office, have 
greater discretion to make far-reaching changes regarding downsizing and business 
divesting, and lead firms characterized by higher levels of post-succession strategic 
instability.  
Overall, I find evidence that appointing a successor with a gap in characteristics 
is not always value-enhancing. In fact, it can be harmful when the succession event is 
disruptive in nature. Findings in this study have strong implications for how firms manage 
the succession process especially when the succession is forced or when a leadership 
change is preceded by poor firm performance. In particular, my findings suggest that 
under disruptive circumstances a firm should not appoint a new CEO who wants to stamp 
his/ her mark on the firm by being different (i.e., by having a high succession gap). Instead, 
what such firms truly need is a newcomer who possesses in-depth industry knowledge 
and has a good understanding and appreciation of the corporate culture. Such successors 
will be less likely to demand drastic changes and will experience less resistance within 
the organization thereby enhancing rather than disrupting the existing relationships. Such 
a successor can proactively seek help from incumbent board members and top managers 
to successfully implement value-adding reforms. 
This is the first paper that considers the combined effect of various differences in 
CEO characteristics between the predecessor and successor simultaneously in a 
succession context and examines whether such succession gaps have any influence on 
subsequent firm performance. This is also the first paper that looks into the difference 
between the predecessors’ and successors’ characteristics by distinguishing between 
different types of succession events. This research is associated with the growing body of 
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literature that examines the importance of a change in leadership on subsequent firm 
performance and the implications for firms’ hiring and firing decisions in the labor market. 
 
2.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
A neoclassical view of the firm is that top management is homogeneous and 
contributes to the production process at his/ her highest level. According to this view, 
different managers are considered to be highly fungible to one another (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2003). For two businesses specializing in similar industries, possessing similar 
technologies and with similar situation in today’s economy environment, any difference 
in their management structures will not affect firm choices (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). 
An even more extreme assumption is that top managers simply do not matter for the 
operational activities within a firm. Existing empirical studies typically rely on firm, 
industry, or market-level characteristics to explain corporate behavior and performance. 
Yet they largely ignore the role that individual managers could play in shaping these 
outcomes. While executives may differ in their preferences and levels of risk-aversion or 
skills, none of this will translate into actual corporate policy if individuals cannot easily 
influence these policies The Ritual Scapegoating Hypothesis (see, for e.g., Gamson and 
Scotch (1964)) supports this argument by stating that a succession event serves as a means 
to provide a target when a decline in a firm’s performance is evident. Therefore, rather 
than actually enhance post-succession performance, a succession event simply gives the 
public the illusion that a change in leadership could determine and improve the company’s 
fortune. Furthermore, in some circumstances, the hiring of incoming CEOs with 
succession gaps might be mere tokenism. For instance, a firm’s corporate social 
responsibility may be called into question following a scandal. In response to this, female 
executives may be installed strategically as a signal that the firm is attempting to become 
more ‘socially responsible’. Skaggs (2009) finds that after a racial discrimination lawsuit, 
firms respond to external pressure by becoming disproportionately more likely to promote 
African-Americans into management positions. The visibility of a scandal and the public 
perception of mismanagement should act as a threat to executive office holders, and thus 
create opportunities for appointment of CEOs with succession gaps. Under such 
circumstances, the effect of CEO succession gaps on subsequent firm performance would 
be inconclusive. 
In contrast, others insist succession is adaptive since CEO succession is an error-
correcting process serving as a response to sagging profitability. Therefore, a change in 
leadership is an indication of the firm’s effort to improve performance and bring about a 
15 
 
favorable shift in firm-environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Allen et al., 1979; Brown, 
1982). Other studies, however, argue that succession is a vicious circle whereby poor firm 
efficiency causes such events to happen in the first place (Grusky, 1963; Cannella & 
Lubatkin, 1993). Instead of improving efficiency, a change in leadership could in fact 
trigger more disruptions and further destabilize the firm (Ballinger & Marcel, 2010). As 
such, the consequences of CEO succession on post-succession firm performance remain 
an open empirical issue. 
From a radical ecological perspective, a succession is an event that indicates a 
more fundamental underlying structural/ strategic change which is substantial enough to 
result in a deleterious misalignment with a firm’s environment. From a bureaucratic 
theory point of view, successions could disturb internal stability, disrupt relationships and 
work patterns within a firm (Friedman & Singh, 1989). CEO succession gaps would be 
more disruptive than adaptive when the succession event is already disruptive in nature. 
Under such circumstances, when someone with succession gaps is tapped as CEO, 
reactions inside the organization could range from suspicion to outrage. Discontent in the 
management team could set in, especially in those who were fighting for the top executive 
job themselves. For companies that are bureaucratic, hostile to new ideas, and have a 
history of resisting external candidates, the incoming CEO with succession gaps is highly 
likely to be isolated. Besides, it takes time: (1) for the incoming CEO, especially with 
succession gaps, to learn about how the system works as well as his/ her roles and 
responsibilities in the new position; and (2) for internal and external stakeholders to get 
familiar and bond with the new leader (Karaevli, 2007). As such, a loss in firm value is 
expected because a succession event would not only result in the loss of firm-specific 
knowledge and human capital, but also due to the difficulty in managing internal and 
external relationships which make it harder for the successor to garner support from the 
top management team, build a power-base, and understand how to establish alliances with 
external forces (e.g. regulatory bodies, suppliers, customers) to achieve performance 
goals (Greiner et al., 2003; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). This is especially true when the 
incoming and outgoing CEOs differ widely in characteristics and backgrounds. Miller 
(1993) argues that a decline in firm integration would be expected following a succession 
and the incoming CEO’s ideas are less likely to be precisely articulated and converted 
into actions. This is more pronounced when the incoming CEO differs significantly from 
the previous one. 
Succession events serve as a means for breaking with the past regime and 
management styles, existing structures, as well as cultures, procedures and customs 
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within an organization. As a consequence, turnaround strategies would be expected 
(Schepker et al., 2017). From a personnel perspective, if the managerial succession rate 
is low and the original management team is left in place, it is possible that the existing 
management may romanticize the past (a strong conservative force influencing peoples’ 
behavior) and may be reluctant to accept radical changes, so that the new CEO would 
find it difficult to push through his/ her ideas (Schepker et al., 2017). The successor would 
face an uphill battle to overcome this handicap. In addition, the functional expertise could 
be quite different from the skill sets and background deemed essential in the traditional 
promotion channel, leading to negative reactions by employees for incoming CEOs with 
a succession gap. Company morale would also be adversely affected if radical changes 
are made by the incoming CEO (which is more likely in the existence of succession gaps). 
Such drastic changes may upset the perceived probability of company goals being reached, 
and a perception that employees’ efficiency may not improve. The complexities of the 
company, the sheer number of internal and external vested interests, and the various 
stakeholders involved could collectively prevent effective strategic changes (Dalton & 
Kesner, 1983). As a result, worse subsequent firm performance is likely to ensue under 
such circumstances. 
On the other hand, if successors with succession gaps bring with them a group of 
managers and the rate of executive turnover is high, existing managers might find it hard 
to accommodate new practices and policies introduced by the incoming CEO. For 
example, they might feel that opportunities for promotion have become unattractive under 
the new CEO, where he/ she will be highly likely to make drastic personnel changes in 
the top executive team, or the promotion channel would change if the leader possesses a 
skill set that is quite different compared to the traditional criteria (Friedman & Saul, 1991). 
The vacancies left by departing executives and the uncertainties created as new ones 
replace them lead to instability, insecurity, and disruptions in relations and work patterns 
within a firm, which would only exacerbate the existing disruptions. 
Prior literature suggests that more disruptions would be expected when: (1) the 
CEO is forced out, and (2) when firm performance is poor before the succession event. 
Forced succession reflects the board’s intention to engage in drastic organizational 
change (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012). Compared with non-
forced successions, a forced removal is more likely to result in more successor-induced 
changes and therefore more disruptions within the organization (Friedman & Saul, 1991), 
especially when the successor differs markedly from his/ her predecessor. In addition, it 
would be unlikely for the predecessor to offer suggestions and assistance for the successor 
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if the predecessor is forced out. In a similar vein, a ‘shock’ to the system in the wake of 
a new leader would be more likely to result in drastic changes following a poor pre-
succession performance. As a result, disruptions caused by structural or strategic changes 
introduced by the incoming CEO will be higher when performance has been poor. The 
aforementioned two circumstances not only indicate a mandate for change, but also allow 
the successor enough room and abundant discretion to affect drastic changes. This leads 
to my first hypothesis: 
H1: CEO succession gaps are disruptive under turbulent conditions (forced 
removal and when pre-succession firm performance has been poor) and will produce 
worse subsequent firm performance relative to an otherwise similar firm that does not 
experience a succession event.  
Conversely, under non-forced successions or when pre-succession financial 
performance has been good, there is a premium on continuity (Friedman & Singh, 1989; 
Shen & Cannella, 2002) and hence no obvious need to select a new CEO who is radically 
different. When company performance improves, traditional hiring and promotion norms 
that have historically tended to favor successors with similar characteristics would be 
expected. Zajac and Westphal (1996) developed an organizational demography model 
where they use age, functional background, and educational background as demographic 
similarity measures and conclude that boards tend to hire a ‘demographically similar’ 
CEO, indicating there is a mutual attraction between firms and employees sharing similar 
characteristics. Thus, in order to overcome ‘glass ceiling’ barriers and to attract the 
attention of director selectors, an incoming CEO with a succession gap when pre-
succession firm performance is good may be driven by the needs to acquire more 
extensive human capital than his/ her counterparts. Besides, the selection process is 
expected to be well-planned under such conditions, which gives the successor enough 
time to become familiar with the business and allows firms to leverage firm-specific 
knowledge and resource bases in determining post-succession organizational success.  
Moreover, Miller (1991) asserts that the fit between a firm’s structure and 
strategies with its environmental contingencies is a declining function of CEO tenure. 
CEOs are known to cling to policies and actions that were previously successful but 
would not probably be effective under current situations, commonly known as 
‘competency traps’ (Levitt & March, 1988). These ‘competency traps’ will lead to the 
incumbent CEO’s technical and political obsolescence (Ocasio, 1994). Incoming CEOs 
with succession gaps, however, would alter the firm’s strategies and directions that better 
suit environmental demands by giving rise to strategic and social novelty and bringing 
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about diverse social and professional networks. Such transformational strategies are more 
likely with succession gaps, resulting in strategic actions meant to address organizational 
challenges and improve performance. Non-forced succession and/ or good pre-succession 
firm performance provides a company with a stable internal environment that could serve 
better in capitalizing on environmental opportunities. This leads to my second hypothesis 
as follows: 
H2: Succession gaps are adaptive under non-forced turnover or when pre-
succession performance is good, and will display a positive relationship with firm 
performance when compared to an otherwise similar firm that does not experience a 
succession event. 
 
2.3. Research Design 
2.3.1. Data 
The starting sample comprises all S&P 500 firms between 1996 and 2016. CEOs’ 
basic information (including name, gender, age, stock ownership, compensation structure, 
and tenure) was extracted from Compustat’s ExecuComp database. Additional 
demographic information (including career history, educational background, and cultural 
background) was hand-collected from the S&P Capital IQ database, Bloomberg’s online 
executive profile webpage, NNDB.com, Ancestry, and Wikipedia in the last instance. The 
classification of succession events into forced and non-forced follows the method 
described in Parrino (1997),12 which has been widely adapted in recent CEO succession 
studies (Huson et al., 2004; Hazarika et al., 2012; Guo & Masulis, 2015; Jenter & Kanaan, 
2015). The demographic information on S&P 500 top executives was then merged with 
Compustat’s annual fundamental data and BoardEx’s Director and Director Legacy 
database, with the latter containing information on board size and board independence. 
Financial services firms and utilities (two-digit SIC Code 60-69 and 49) were dropped 
from the sample given that firms in these sectors are heavily regulated which may lead to 
differences in performance outcomes from those of non-regulated companies. I also 
                                                                
12 Related news articles, whether published in mainstream media or industry-specific journals and magazines, were 
retrieved through Factiva. The classification takes the following steps: (1) if the press clearly states that the outgoing 
CEO is forced out, being fired by the board of directors, or the departure is caused by policy differences or pressure 
imposed by stakeholders, then the succession event is classified as forced. (2) All other departures for CEOs above and 
including age 64, succession events caused by death or health-related disability and CEO-initiated successions are 
classified as non-forced. (3) Departures for CEOs under 64 are re-examined further and classified as forced if there are 
no signs of decease or health-related disability announced by the press, the press does not report an acceptance of 
another position (either external positions or chairmanship of the company’s board) by the outgoing CEO, or the press 
does not announce the retiring of the predecessor at least six months before the event. (4) If a CEO serves as interim 
CEO and is replaced later, I classify it as non-forced. (5) Cases classified as forced are reclassified if the reports 
convincingly state that the succession event has nothing to do with the company’s activities. 
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excluded all cases followed by merger & acquisition or spin-offs, since it is difficult to 
separate the impact of leadership change from a major organizational restructure on 
subsequent firm performance after the succession event. After dropping firms without the 
CEO’s full name in the given fiscal year, the final sample contains 7,141 firm-year 
observations to conduct the empirical analyses. 
 
2.3.2. Variables Construction 
The dependent variable, firm performance, is the return on total assets (ROA) over 
the year following the succession, which is measured as EBITDA over total assets. To 
construct the primary explanatory variable (a measure for the succession-induced gap in 
CEO characteristics), I draw upon prior literature that has demonstrated that a CEO’s 
gender, age, career variety, cultural background, highest education level, and social status 
(eliteness) of undergraduate school affect firm performance. First, as suggested by Adams 
and Funk (2012), women on boards of publicly listed companies emphasize different 
values in that female directors are more open to change and less conservative than both 
male directors and women in the general population. Moreover, female directors are 
particularly stakeholder-oriented (Adams et al., 2011; Matsa & Miller, 2013). Carol (1982) 
documents that men tend to address rules, justice, and individual rights when considering 
moral dilemmas whereas women are more likely to consider the impact of relationships 
when facing such issues. However, a feminine leadership style characterized by empathy, 
effective communication, and sharing of information and power that could be effective in 
mid-level management, may not necessarily work in large companies. Therefore, a 
change in gender in the top leadership assumes significance with regard to subsequent 
firm performance. GENDER_GAP is a dummy variable which takes the value one if there 
is a gender difference between the predecessor and the successor, and zero otherwise. 
Second, age difference between the predecessor and successor would greatly 
affect firm value since younger CEOs emphasize things differently when compared to 
older managers. Younger CEOs, being more energetic in physical and mental prowess 
(Child, 1974), are better able to grasp new ideas and learn new behaviors (Chown, 1961). 
Moreover, younger managers tend to be less risk-averse as they put less emphasis on 
career and financial security (Barker & Mueller, 2002). Innovative and risky strategies 
are more likely to be considered by young leaders (Serfling, 2014) leading to higher 
growth and variability in profitability when compared with their older counterparts in the 
same industry (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). On the other hand, younger leaders may be 
more conservative and may not deviate from industry benchmarks as they have greater 
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reputational and job concerns (Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992; Zwiebel, 1995; Holmström, 
1999). Chevalier and Ellison (1999), and Hong et al. (2000) find evidence that due to a 
more sensitive termination-performance relationship, younger managers are less inclined 
to take on unsystematic risk, and generally tend to exhibit higher levels of career concerns. 
Also, older CEOs may have higher intellectual skills and make corporate policies based 
on experience, skills, and knowledge gained from the position and/ or advanced education 
(Sitthipongpanich & Polsiri, 2015). I first calculate the standard deviation of the age 
distribution of all CEOs in the sample and then create a dummy variable AGE_GAP that 
takes the value one when there are at least two standard deviations of age difference 
between the predecessor and the successor, and zero otherwise.13 
Third, career variety can also impact on firm value since it represents personal 
biases favoring experimentation and change and is positively related to personality traits 
such as extraversion and openness to experience (Judge et al., 2002; Judge et al., 2004). 
A multi-industry career experience could possibly contribute to future feasible strategic 
and social novelty within a company thereby directing the firm down novel paths. 
However, replacing an ‘industry specialist’ with a ‘general manager’ might not 
necessarily be beneficial, since drifting from job to job could result in superficial 
cognitive breadth instead of being proficient in a certain area. In addition, career variety 
may be positively related to a person’s degree of anxiety, avoidance of commitment, and/ 
or lack of contentment (Mowday & Spencer, 1981; Barrick & Mount, 1996; Judge & 
Bono, 2001). I, therefore, create a dummy variable CAREER_VARIETY_GAP which 
takes the value one if either one of the outgoing and the incoming CEOs is a ‘general 
manager’ (i.e., had previously worked in another GICS14 sector and/ or moved across 
different functional areas), while the other one is an ‘industry specialist’ (had spent his/ 
her entire career in one industry and/ or even in just one company), and zero otherwise. 
Fourth, CEOs from different ethnicities or cultural backgrounds may see things 
differently when compared to CEOs born and raised in the U.S., especially regarding 
knowledge of global markets and the skills to target customers in different cultural 
settings. Similar to career variety, cultural variety helps to shape managers’ cognitive map 
and conveys a broad cognitive and experiential stock which the CEO could draw upon. 
In addition, multicultural experience has been shown to be positively associated with 
creativity (Maddux & Galinsky, 2009; Tadmor et al., 2009). On the other hand, Graham 
                                                                
13 In my case, there is an age gap if the predecessor is at least 13.84 years older or younger than the successor. My 
definition of age gap is consistent with Serfling (2014), who defines ‘successors are 13 to 40 years younger than 
incumbents’ as ‘much younger’ and ‘successors are 6 to 12 years younger than incumbents’ as ‘younger’. 
14 Global Industry Classification Standard 
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et al. (2013) argues that when compared to their US counterparts, non-US CEOs are more 
conservative with regard to sure losses, are less optimistic, and less willing to take 
chances. Furthermore, the potential clash between global economic interests and local 
political interests and a lack of connection to local political parties/ suppliers/ business 
partners could be challenging for a non-US CEO. I capture this through a dummy variable, 
CULTURAL_GAP, that equals one if the predecessor or the successor is a US CEO while 
the other is non-US CEO, and is set equal to zero otherwise.  
Finally, given that the last two attributes refer to educational quality, they serve 
as a component of a person’s cognitive ability and signal a person’s ability to persevere 
in challenging intellectual activities. I distinguish high education gap from the ‘eliteness’ 
education gap given that the former gap measure emphasizes the difference between the 
knowledge base and mind-set of the incoming and outgoing CEOs, while the latter 
measure emphasizes the CEO’s social capital. Kish-Gephart and Tochman Campbell 
(2015) postulate that for CEOs with highly placed parentage, an elite education makes 
them better connected to people across different industries, gives them more exposure to 
new business opportunities, and provides easier access to cutting-edge technologies 
which encourages risk-taking. Their assertion is consistent with Cao et al. (2015) who 
contend that while both internal and external social capital matters, CEOs’ outside 
connections (‘bridging capital’) function better than their internal network (‘bonding 
capital’) in promoting entrepreneurial innovation and strategic risk-taking. Moreover, 
wide connections create a safety net for potential failure, allowing CEOs to take on more 
risks. On the other hand, Antonakis et al. (2017) document that CEOs with high IQ tend 
to adopt less effective leadership methods, and generally exhibit lower levels of 
transformational and instrumental leadership skills. Furthermore, CEOs with lower 
educational qualifications over-compensate through superior performance when 
compared with their counterparts with more prestigious educational backgrounds. A 
higher educational profile may make it easier for someone to win a CEO slot due to a 
stronger social network and the board’s perception of a superior education as an 
appropriate proxy for managerial ability while executives with no advanced degree must 
work their way up through a hierarchy in a process that does better at weeding out good 
CEOs from bad ones than any other superior education ever could.  
As such, I create two dummy variables associated with CEO educational 
background: the first, HIGHEST_EDUCATION_GAP, takes the value of one if there is 
a difference in the level of educational qualifications between the predecessor and the 
successor. I set ‘level’ to zero if the CEO does not attend university or college, to one if 
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the CEO’s highest qualification is ‘LLB/ Bachelor’, to two if the CEO has a ‘LLM/ 
Master/ MBA’ degree and to three if he/ she has achieved a ‘Juris Doctorate/ PhD’ 
qualification. Any difference in the educational level between the incoming and outgoing 
CEO is regarded as a ‘highest education gap’. The second dummy, 
ELITE_EDUCATION_GAP, takes the value of one if either the predecessor’s or the 
successor’s undergraduate school is in the top-20 list of the Best National/ Global 
University rankings as defined by U.S. News & World Report’s 2016 rankings, while the 
other’s undergraduate school does not feature on the list.15  
Next, I construct a succession gap index (GAP_INDEX) to illustrate the aggregate 
measure of difference between the predecessor and successor by adding one point for 
every difference between the predecessor and the successor with reference to the 
aforementioned six attributes. The maximum value for the index is six if the outgoing and 
incoming CEOs are different in every one of the six attributes, and zero if the outgoing 
and incoming CEOs share similar characteristics in all those traits. The GAP_INDEX in 
my sample has a mean value of 1.817 and a median value of 2.16  
To examine the first and second hypotheses, I construct two additional 
independent variables. The first is a dummy variable, FORCED, that equals one if the 
predecessor was forced out (board-initiated succession) and zero otherwise (customary, 
CEO-initiated, or death/ health-related disability-initiated succession). A second variable, 
POOR_PRE_PERF, is a dummy that takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-succession 
performance is lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year and zero otherwise, 
with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code. Of the 659 succession events, 179 are 
forced turnovers (27.2%)17 and 309 are turnovers characterized by pre-succession firm 
performance that was below the industry median (46.9%). A negative coefficient on 
GAP_INDEX for forced succession and when performance leading up to the succession 
                                                                
15 I use the latest U.S. News & World Report university rankings, as top-20 national/ global university rankings largely 
remain stable over time. (e.g., U.S. News National University Rankings spanning the period 2008–2015 could be found 
at the following URL: http://publicuniversityhonors.com/2015/06/13/u-s-news-national-university-rankings-2008-
present/). 
16 Among all of the 659 succession events, 32 cases involve a gender gap (23 cases are female replacing male and 9 are 
male replacing female), 193 successions result in an age gap (185 cases involve younger successors replacing older 
predecessors and 9 cases where older successors replace younger predecessors), 275 cases involve a career variety gap 
(146 cases are generalists replacing industry specialists and 129 cases are industry specialists replacing generalists), 
106 are characterized as successions that lead to significant cultural gap (63 successors born or raised outside the U.S. 
replacing native Americans and 43 American CEOs replacing non-Americans), in 355 successions there was a 
significant education gap (193 successors with higher educational qualification replacing predecessors with lower 
qualification and 162 cases being the other way around), 178 successions are characterized by a significant shift in the 
‘eliteness’ of the CEOs’ undergraduate education (78 cases are successors with elite undergraduate degree replacing 
those without, and 100 cases where successors without elite undergraduate degree replace those with elite 
undergraduate degree). 
17 The forced turnover ratio is close to that reported by Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004) for all COMPUSTAT-listed 
manufacturing firms from 1993-1998 and Guo and Masulis (2015) for all listed firms in RiskMetrics database spanning 
the period 1996-2010. 
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is poor is expected, and a positive coefficient on GAP_INDEX for non-forced turnover 
and those with good pre-succession performance is expected, in accordance to my first 
and second hypotheses, respectively. 
I control for firm characteristics (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Frank & Goyal, 2009), 
corporate governance mechanism (Coles et al., 2006; Guest, 2009), and CEO 
characteristics (Boyd, 1995; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2009), since these 
variables have been shown to influence firm performance. For firm characteristics, eight 
variables are included: past firm performance (PRE_PERFORMANCE); the number of 
years since the firm was established (FIRM_AGE); leverage (LEV); firm size (SIZE); 
market-to-book ratio (MTB); capital expenditure ratio (CAPEX); free cash flow ratio 
(FCF); and fixed tangible assets (TANG). Corporate governance-related control variables 
include board size (BOARD_SIZE) and board independence 
(BOARD_INDEPENDENCE). Control variables that capture CEO characteristics 
include the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO (OWNERSHIP), the 
proportion of total annual CEO compensation that derives from option grants and stocks 
(EQUITY_INTENSITY), CEO-chairman indicator (DUALITY), founder-CEO indicator 
(FOUNDER), and family-member-CEO indicator (FAMILY_MEMBER). All control 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level to minimize the influence of 
potential outliers. The definitions of control variables are explained in Appendix A.  
 
2.3.3. Methodology – Propensity Score Matching (PSM)  
By comparing the outcome of firms that experienced succession with those that 
did not, I aim to isolate the actual effect of the succession on firm performance. This 
approach, however, can only work in a scenario where firms that go through a succession 
are randomly assigned, but this is not the case in my sample. Firms, for example, with 
worse past performance are more likely to replace their CEOs. Should the trend continue, 
‘treated’ firms (firms that experienced CEO successions) would be expected to produce 
worse subsequent performance than their counterparts, on average, regardless of whether 
they actually go through a change in their top executive or not. Under such circumstances, 
the estimated coefficient would be incorrect due to potential sample selection bias, which 
arises when the key determinants of why a firm goes through a succession are also related 
to firm performance. 
To address this potential sample selection bias, my identification strategy relies 
on the propensity score matching (PSM) method. I follow Malmendier and Tate (2009) 
by matching treated and untreated observations based on the estimated probability of 
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being treated where I match each firm that goes through a succession event with firms 
possessing otherwise similar characteristics but did not experience CEO turnover. Instead 
of matching one to one, I match each treatment firm to five nearest matched firms,18 so 
that the coefficient will be less sensitive to the matching criteria chosen. Once matches 
are made, the impact is then calculated by comparing the means of outcomes across 
treated observations and their matched pairs. 
Guided by economic theory and prior literature (Brown, 1982; Friedman & Singh, 
1989; Coles et al., 2014), several variables are used as matching criteria. This includes 
the conditions of the firm during pre-succession periods, such as performance, firm age, 
firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, tangibility, board size, board independence, 
industry sector, and fiscal year dummies. In addition, I include the characteristics of the 
predecessor, such as age, ownership, and CEO duality indicator. I also require that no 
leadership change occurs in the match firms within one year after the transition year. The 
PSM method then uses a logit model to estimate matching firms as a function of the 
aforementioned matching criteria.  
The following regression model was estimated for subsample analysis: 





𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑟
𝑅
𝑟=1 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                     
where PERFORMANCE is the difference in subsequent performance between the 
treatment firm and the average performance of the matching group i in year t+1, 
GAP_INDEX is succession gap index for firm i in year t, FIRM is a vector of N firm 
characteristics control variables, GOVERNANCE is a vector of K corporate governance 
control variables, and CEO is a vector of R CEO characteristics control variables.  
 Three separate models with different forms of fixed effects were estimated. The 
first includes two-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across different industries and firms. The second model incorporates 
industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the interactions between industry dummies 
and year dummies, as industry-specific fixed effects during a particular year could be the 
driving force behind the negative relationship between the interaction terms and 
subsequent firm performance. Including the interaction term makes the gap index and the 
measures of subsequent firm performance comparable across industries in any given year. 
The third model controls for year and firm-fixed effects due to a possibility that firms 
                                                                
18 Due to the fact that the propensity score matching is very sensitive to the matching dimensions, I repeat the matching 
process by using the two closest firms and the three closest firms, respectively. The overall results are largely consistent 
with the reported findings using five closest firms. 
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under crisis may favor successors with gaps or candidates with high levels of succession 
gaps might ultimately decide to take the leadership position. Thus, the negative 
relationship between the CEO gap measure and subsequent firm performance could be 
driven by time-invariant firm characteristics. 
 
2.4. Empirical Results 
2.4.1. Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2.1 displays the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics as well as CEO 
characteristics that can potentially influence firm performance after the succession. As 
shown in columns 1 to 3, subsequent performance of firms that experienced a succession 
do not differ much from those that did not go through such an event. Compared to their 
counterparts, treatment firms (i.e., succession firms) are more established as indicated by 
an older firm age, and have fewer growth opportunities as suggested by a lower market-
to-book ratio. For firms belonging to the succession group, incumbent CEOs have lower 
ownership but enjoy a higher proportion of equity-based compensation, suggesting better 
incentive alignment (Mehran, 1995). In addition, incoming CEOs in the succession group 
are less likely to be both the CEO and chairman of the board when compared to their 
counterparts, suggesting firms do make an effort to reduce potential agency problems and 
strengthen internal control (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). I also find evidence that firms led 
by founder- or family member-CEOs are less likely to experience a succession.  
However, when comparing firm-year descriptive statistics of forced and non-
forced succession firms (shown in columns 4 to 6), it is clear that firms experiencing 
forced succession are generally less profitable as evidenced by a lower ROA over the year 
preceding the succession. Such firms tend to pursue riskier financial but conservative 
investment policies as suggested by a higher leverage ratio and lower capital expenditure 
(Coles et al., 2006). Moreover, firms are more likely to hire an outsider to introduce 
strategic changes when the removals are board-initiated or the outgoing CEO departed 
due to pressure from shareholders. Results in columns 7 to 9 compare firms that have 
performed poorly in the past with those with financial performance above the industry 
average. These results show that poorly performing firms are larger in size and possess 
lower growth opportunities. Moreover, poorly performing firms are associated with 
higher leverage which confirms the assertion in March and Shapira (1987) that riskier 
policies are more likely to be introduced when the business falls into a decline than when 
firms are doing well. 
< Insert Table 2.1 here > 
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A correlations matrix of the key independent variables shows that most of the 
independent variables have correlation coefficients less than 0.15. Among all the 
variables, only the estimated coefficients between pre-succession firm performance and 
market-to-book ratio, and tangibility and capital expenditure have a correlation greater 
than 0.5. I further use a variance inflation factor (VIF) to evaluate multicollinearity which 
has an advantage over pairwise correlations as it simultaneously looks at the correlation 
between one variable and the rest of the independent variables used in the regression 
models. The highest value of VIF for each independent variable is 2.70, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a major concern.19  
 
2.4.2. Gap Index and Subsequent Firm Performance 
Table 2.2 presents the results from PSM regression examining the effect of 
succession-induced gaps on subsequent firm performance. For the full sample, I do not 
find any meaningful relationship between succession gaps across all three regression 
models. These results are not surprising given that the consequence of succession on firm 
performance has been reported as largely inconclusive in past literature, stating that shifts 
in cultural mores can be both beneficial as well as harmful to performance with the 
positive effect in some firms being neutralized by the adverse effect of the cultural shift 
in others. 
Most of the control variables in the baseline model display expected signs. For 
example, PRE_PERFORMANCE contributes negatively to subsequent performance at 
less than the 1% level of significance across all models. Indeed, prior performance 
indicates how efficiently a firm has used its resources. Good pre-succession performance 
suggests that the firm is able to actively seize environmental opportunities and overcome 
environmental constraints; hence a change in leadership is not desired. Consistent with 
this, results in this study show that firms with good pre-succession performance 
experience a performance decline following a CEO turnover relative to an otherwise 
similar firm that has not seen a change in leadership.  
Results also show that effective monitoring would be essential in adding value to 
subsequent firm performance in succession contexts. As shown in Table 2.2, LEV is 
positively related to subsequent firm performance at least at the 5% level of significance, 
which is consistent with the assertion in Jensen (1986) that pre-commitment of interest 
payments and the risk of potential bankruptcy due to debt financing could discipline 
                                                                
19 For brevity, I do not report the correlation matrix in this dissertation. 
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managers from shirking, appropriating perquisites, and/ or investing in value-destroying 
projects. Also, I find high market-to-book ratio to be negatively related with subsequent 
firm performance following a leadership change at least at the 5% statistical significance 
level across all three regression models, which confirms Boone et al. (2007)’s argument 
that firms with higher growth potential have high monitoring costs. I find that founder-
CEOs are associated with negative subsequent firm performance in model 1 at the 10% 
level. Adams et al. (2009) assert that founders are less likely to retain the CEO title when 
firm performance has been good. As such, founders are more likely to reassume office 
when the firm is experiencing a crisis. Furthermore, founder-CEOs concentrate more on 
employees and creditors than on shareholders, and are generally more reluctant to bring 
about strategic changes than their counterparts (Mullins & Schoar, 2016). Thus, the 
reengagement of founder-CEOs might not be ideal and could lead to subsequent 
performance declines in a succession context. 
Consistent with the monitoring role of incentive compensation, I find positive 
coefficients for both OWNERSHIP and EQUITY_INTENSITY in the firm-year fixed 
effect model. Aligning CEOs’ compensation to firm performance by giving them higher 
share ownership or making their compensation more equity-based could motivate top 
executives to make value-maximizing decisions.  
 < Insert Table 2.2 here > 
Given the commonly held belief that change is good, findings on the lack of 
association between change in CEO characteristics and firm performance for the full-
sample are intriguing. There is, however, the possibility that the value-implications of a 
radical shift in CEO characteristics differ across subsamples which get annulled in a 
portfolio setting. To test for this possibility, I next analyse the results by splitting the 
sample into firms that were the subject of disruptive changes leading up to the succession 
event and those that were not. Table 2.3 illustrates the effect of CEO gap index on 
subsequent firm performance when the succession is forced relative to firms that 
experienced a non-forced succession. Once again three separate regression models were 
estimated: models 1 and 4 controlling for year and industry fixed effects; models 2 and 5 
controlling for year, industry, and year-industry fixed effects; and models 3 and 6 
controlling for year and firm fixed effects. In sharp contrast to the full-sample results 
presented in Table 2.2, results for forced removal strongly suggest that the larger the 
difference in attributes between the outgoing and incoming CEOs, the worse the firm’s 
subsequent financial performance when compared to an otherwise similar firm that does 
not experience a succession event.  
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On the other hand, when the succession event is routine, CEO-initiated, or death/ 
health-related or disability-initiated, a radical shift in the personal traits/ experiences of 
the predecessor and the successor leads to better subsequent firm performance. These 
results are consistent with my first and second hypotheses and underscore the importance 
of avoiding a portfolio approach to analysis where countervailing effects can wash out 
otherwise strong economic impacts. Unlike non-forced removals, forced successions only 
allow a very limited time for the incoming CEO to conduct on-the-job training, digest the 
essence of the business, and bond with internal and external stakeholders. Besides, under 
forced succession, more successor-induced structural and strategic changes would be 
expected, which could disturb internal stability and disrupt relations and work patterns 
within a firm. Moreover, a company’s morale will go down when the incoming CEO’s 
characteristics and functional expertise differ widely from the skill sets and backgrounds 
that are deemed very important in the traditional promotion channel. 
As discussed earlier, subsequent firm performance depends largely on the ease of 
monitoring and CEO’s incentive alignment in succession contexts. Firms characterized 
by a higher total debt ratio and lower growth opportunities are easier to monitor, and 
therefore produce better firm financial performance following a leadership change. The 
use of equity-based compensation on the successor again proves to be essential in adding 
firm value. 
< Insert Table 2.3 here > 
CEO turnover following poor performance is another set of successions that could 
potentially destabilize the top management and internal order. Table 2.4 presents the sub-
sample results (i.e. Poor and Good Pre-Performance) from PSM regression of CEO 
succession-induced gaps on subsequent firm performance. Again, I adopt year and 
industry fixed effects for models 1 and 4; year, industry, and year-industry fixed effects 
for models 2 and 5; and year and firm fixed effects for models 3 and 6. Consistent with 
my hypotheses, I find that succession gaps lead to deteriorating subsequent firm 
performance when pre-succession firm performance is poor. In sharp contrast, a drastic 
difference in the personal traits/ past experience between the outgoing and incoming 
CEOs positively impacts on performance in firms that previously did well. Similar to 
forced removals, poor past performance indicates a need for a change in mission, vision, 
and strategy. Radically different successors are given the motivation and latitude of action 
to introduce drastic personnel and structural changes, which lead to more disruptions 
within the organization. Unlike when pre-succession performance is good, an incoming 
CEO with succession gaps under poor past performance may not be driven to acquire 
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more extensive human capital than their counterparts in order to overcome ‘glass ceiling’ 
barriers and to attract the attention of director selectors. The instability or scandal not only 
provides a chance for firms to break away from the traditional recruiting process and end 
up tapping a successor with a large characteristic-gap which might be mere tokenism, but 
for acceptable candidates with high competence the top leadership position might actually 
be less desirable. This allows those who are less capable to move ahead in the queue to 
fill these vacancies.20 
< Insert Table 2.4 here > 
 I acknowledge that by aggregating all differences together, I may ignore both the 
importance of each gap measure and the direction of the effect on subsequent firm 
performance, which may result in insignificant result as shown in table 2.2. Appendix D 
summarises the effect of each CEO attribute used in the gap index as a function of the 
relation being tested for full-sample and sub-sample analysis. Results in Panel A show 
that for the full-sample analysis, Gender Gap and Cultural Gap contributes positively to 
subsequent firm performance with a coefficient of 0.063 (at the 5% statistical significance 
level) and 0.030 (at the 5% statistical significance level), respectively. In sharp contrast, 
however, I find Highest Education Gap and Elite Education Gap to be negatively related 
to subsequent firm performance, with a coefficient of -0.021 (at the 5% significance level) 
and -0.049 (at the 1% significance level), respectively. Nonetheless, as shown in Panel B, 
C, D, and E, most of the individual gap measures move in the same direction as the 
aggregate succession gap index when the sample is split into subsamples based on the 
nature of the succession events. 
 
2.4.3. Robustness Tests  
2.4.3.1. CEO Gap index and subsequent long-term firm performance 
I next conduct a series of robustness tests to ensure stability of the primary results 
reported so far. First, all of the results presented relate the succession-gap measure to firm 
performance over the one-year period subsequent to the turnover. However, successor-
induced structural and strategic changes can take longer than a year and consequently 
their impact on firm value and financial performance may not show when performance is 
                                                                
20 As total pay may be a relevant motivator for succession outcome, I repeat my empirical analysis by adding an 
additional control variable, TOTAL_PAY, which is defined as the natural logarithm of CEO’s total annual 
compensation. As shown in Appendix C, the coefficients on the additional control variable TOTAL_PAY are neither 
economically nor statistically significant across all models. Overall, PSM results reported in Table 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 hold 




measured over the twelve months immediately post succession. I, therefore, re-estimate 
all the regression models using a three-year pre- and post-succession time frame 
(Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008) and present the results in Table 2.5. Panel A of this table 
reports estimates of the impact of gap index on long-term post-succession firm 
performance, Panel B reports results for sub-sample of forced/ non-forced successions 
and Panel C reports results for sub-samples when the pre-succession performance is good/ 
poor. Note that firms now belong to the poor pre-succession group if their three-year 
average pre-succession firm performance is lower than industry median in the given fiscal 
year in the full sample and zero otherwise. As shown in Table 2.5, results are largely 
consistent with findings reported earlier. Consistent with the expectation that changes can 
take time before results are visible, the coefficients on the GAP_INDEX become more 
significant both in economic and statistical significance compared to those when 
performance is measured over one year only. These results provide further support for 
my first and second hypotheses.  
< Insert Table 2.5 here > 
 
2.4.3.2. Alternative performance measures 
To test for the robustness of my findings with respect to the primary measure of 
performance, I next use the following alternative measures of performance: (1) ROA 
redefined as EBIT scaled by total assets (as opposed to EBITDA over total assets in the 
baseline tests); and (2) return on equity (ROE) measured as net income divided by total 
equity. Results using these alternative performance measures over the one-year and three-
year post-succession windows are reported in Table 2.6. Columns 1 and 3 report the 
estimates of treatment effect on performance over a one-year post-succession window 
while Columns 2 and 4 report similar results but over a three-year post-succession period. 
Results using these alternative performance measures are largely consistent with those 
obtained using ROA, my primary measure of performance, albeit being marginally 
weaker in statistical significance. For example, while the importance of succession gaps 
under forced turnover in explaining firm performance does not show up in the one year 
period following the succession event when using ROE as the performance measure, the 
negative relationship becomes economically and statistically significant for the longer 
three-year window. 
<Insert Table 2.6 here> 
 
2.4.3.3. Endogeneity  
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A limitation in the propensity matching approach is that even after accounting for 
selection bias by appropriately comparing treatment and matched firms, there is a 
potential endogeneity issue concerning a firm’s decision to choose a successor with 
different personal and professional backgrounds. As mentioned earlier, a crisis could give 
opportunities for firms to break away from the current enterprise habitus and alter hiring 
and promotion practices (Reskin & McBrier, 2000; Khurana, 2004), thereby creating 
opportunities for appointments of CEOs with succession gaps. If such a trend continues, 
the subsequent performance of firms with high succession gaps will be lower than firms 
with no succession gaps on average. Under such circumstances the PSM estimator will 
produce biased estimates.  
A mean-comparison test of pre-succession firm characteristics between firms with 
high relative to low succession gaps (as shown in Appendix B) demonstrates that the 
differences in pre-succession firm age, firm size, tangibility, and CEO duality between 
these two groups are statistically significant. Firms belonging to the high-gap group are 
generally younger in age and smaller in size, and that older and more established firms 
are more bureaucratic and resistant to change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Besides, firms 
belonging to the high-gap group have a lower predecessor duality ratio than their low-gap 
counterparts although the difference is negligible in scale. Other variables, especially pre-
succession firm performance, do not have a significant impact on the successor-selection 
process. Although firms with both high and low levels of succession gaps share similar 
pre-succession performance trends, the existence of potential endogeneity problems 
would still hamper the interpretation of results from the PSM regressions.  
To address such concerns, I adopt an instrumental variable approach using the gap 
index between potential candidates and the outgoing CEO as the main instrument.  To 
implement this, I calculate the average value for each of the six components of the 
Succession Gap Index of other CEOs in the same industry (defined by two-digit SIC code), 
state, and fiscal year, as they are potential candidates for the CEO position. I then 
calculate a Gap Index between the departing CEO and industry average characteristics 
(termed as Candidate Gap Index). The assumption here is that such a Candidate Gap Index 
will be related to the realized Succession Gap Index, while at the same time be reasonably 
exogenous to the firm’s performance. 
I first regress the gap index on the previously used set of control variables and the 
instrument: Candidate Gap Index (CANDIDATE_GAP). Next, I use the instrumented 
GAP_INDEX (i.e., the fitted value of the succession gap index from the first-stage 
regression for firm i in year t) in the second-stage regressions and then test both my first 
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and second hypotheses by using this two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. In Table 
2.7, the dependent variable for the second stage regressions in panel A is peer-adjusted 
subsequent firm performance (i.e., the difference in subsequent performance between the 
treatment firm and the average subsequent performance of the matching group of each 
firm i in year t+1) and in panel B is peer-adjusted subsequent long-term performance. I 
find that the regression coefficients of the CANDIDATE_GAP variable in the first-stage 
OLS regression are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
the Candidate Gap Index has a strong explanatory power on the incoming CEO’s level of 
succession gaps. As shown in Table 2.7, the GAP_INDEX consistently leads to worse 
subsequent performance when the predecessor is forced out or when pre-succession 
performance has been poor. In contrast, when pre-succession performance has been good, 
successors with drastically different personal traits and past experience from their 
predecessors lead to enhanced subsequent performance. However, there is not much 
evidence on GAP_INDEX affecting subsequent firm performance when firms experience 
non-forced successions. Overall, PSM results reported earlier hold and remain robust 
after accounting for potential endogeneity issue. 
< Insert Table 2.7 here > 
 
2.4.4. Further Tests 
2.4.4.1. Gap Index and Post-Succession Board Co-option 
In this section, I examine some channels through which gaps in CEO traits may 
lead to worse subsequent firm performance. An often touted reason for poor post 
succession performance is board co-option that has the potential to significantly weaken 
governance quality (see, for e.g., Coles et al. (2014)). Given this as an obvious channel 
through which an incoming CEO could impact firm performance, I examine whether the 
destructive impact of co-option is systematically related to the gap in personal traits of 
the incoming and outgoing CEOs. To test this, I employ in my models a dependent 
variable, CO_OPTED, denotes the proportion of board members appointed within a year 
after the predecessor CEO is replaced.21 In my further tests, I am interested in examining 
the channels through which GAP_INDEX leads to worsening firm performance between 
firms with high succession gaps (HIGH_GAP = 1) versus firms with low succession gaps 
                                                                
21 I gather board co-option data from Lalitha Naveen’s personal website: https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/.  The 
original co-option variable ranges from zero to one. It remains at a constant level/ increase within a CEO's tenure, and 
starts from zero again when the next person assumes office. I changed the original co-option variable from accumulated 
proportion of board changes to the annual proportion of board changes to make the value comparable across both 
succession and non-succession firms. 
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(HIGH_GAP = 0). My main independent variable, HIGH_GAP, is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the firm has a GAP_INDEX greater than the sample mean of 
1.82 and zero otherwise. Guided by Linck et al. (2008) among others, control variables 
include firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), number of business segments 
(NUM_SEGMENTS), firm age (FIRM_AGE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), research 
and development expense (RND), annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return 
over the year (STKVOL), firm profitability (ROA), free cash flow ratio (FCF), board size 
(BOARDSIZE), successor origin (OUTSIDER), CEO share ownership (OWNERSHIP), 
CEO age (AGE), and CEO duality (DUALITY). I also control for firm and year fixed 
effects. Results presented in Table 2.8 show that higher levels of GAP_INDEX and/ or 
HIGH_GAP contribute significantly to a higher fraction of co-opted directors one year 
after the succession event. Results show that the incoming CEOs with larger gaps would 
have more discretion in shuffling the firms’ personnel and bring with them newcomers 
from their previous contacts (Friedman & Saul, 1991). Not only can those CEOs exert 
influence on the management shake-up, they are also able to affect the selection of board 
members, even independent directors (Coles et al., 2014). Such a practice not only 
intensifies disruptions within the organization (Shen & Cannella, 2002), but also 
undermines board independence if board co-option increases in the wake of a new leader 
(Coles et al., 2014). 
< Insert Table 2.8 here > 
 
2.4.4.2. Gap Index and Structural Change 
Next, I examine the relationship between gap index and successor-induced 
structural changes following Denis and Serrano (1996) approach in determining firm 
structural change after a leadership change. The first dependent variable, 
STRUCTURE_CHANGE, takes the value of one if an asset sale is announced and a 
firm’s book value of total assets is reduced by more than 10% during the two-year period 
after the CEO is replaced and zero otherwise. I also test whether there is a difference in 
post-succession employee reduction for the high-gap group and their low-gap 
counterparts. This is captured through a dummy variable, EMPLOYEE_REDUCTION 
which is set equal to one if a firm’s number of employees is reduced by more than 10% 
during the two-year period after the CEO is replaced and zero otherwise. 
I estimate a logit regression by controlling for successor origin (OUTSIDER), 
firms’ industry-adjusted debt capacity (LOW_DEBT_CAPACITY), interest coverage 
(INTEREST_COVERAGE), dividend coverage (DIV_COVERAGE), dividend cut 
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indicator (DIV_CUT), return on assets (ROA), size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), market-to-
book ratio (MTB), number of business segments (NUM_SEGMENTS), and sales-based 
Herfindahl Index (HERF). These variables have been documented in the prior literature 
as determinants of asset sales (Kruse, 2002; Yang, 2008). I further control for the median 
industry sales growth rate within which the firm operates (IND_SALES_GROWTH) 
(Kruse, 2002).  
Table 2.9 illustrates the effect of gap index on subsequent structural changes after 
the CEO is replaced. Panel A reports the results when STRUCTURE_CHANGE is the 
dependent variable, and Panel B reports the results when EMPLOYEE_REDUCTION is 
used as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 2.9, the HIGH_GAP variable does not 
have any explanatory power on post-succession structural change measures. However, 
the positive and significant coefficients on the interactions between FORCED and 
HIGH_GAP as well as POOR_PRE_PERF and HIGH_GAP in columns 2 and 4 indicate 
that successors with high gap levels have a higher probability of making post-succession 
downsizing decisions under forced successions and/ or when pre-succession performance 
has been poor. The findings confirm Lang et al. (1995) assertion that poorly performing 
firms are more likely to make the decision to downsize and divest, since the proceeds 
from selling existing assets could be used as a cheap way of financing. They argue that 
managers would be reluctant to divest the firm’s business if they have a vested interest in 
the firm. In addition, successors, especially those with high succession gaps, might sell 
some of the firm’s business just to make their mark on the firm so that it is different when 
there is a mandate for change (i.e., under the circumstances of forced successions and 
poor prior firm performance), even if such moves are value-destructive (Miller, 1993). In 
such cases, restructuring is conducted to meet the incoming CEO’s personal ambitions 
rather than enterprise interests, and therefore would be detrimental to subsequent firm 
performance. 
< Insert Table 2.9 here > 
 
2.4.4.3. Gap Index and Strategic Instability 
Finally, I examine the relationship between gap index and post-succession firm 
strategic instability by following Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) method in constructing 
the Strategic Instability (SI) variable by using only four individual strategic dimensions 
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given missing data in advertising intensity and R&D intensity.22 The individual strategic 
measures used are as follows: (1) plant and equipment newness (net PPE/gross PPE), (2) 
nonproduction overhead (selling, general and administrative expenses/sales), (3) 
inventory level (inventories/sales), and (4) financial leverage (total debt/common equity). 




 for each of the 
aforementioned strategic dimensions. I then standardize the variance for each dimension 
by industry at the four-digit SIC code level, using data points from sample firms only. 
Finally, the strategic instability measure is generated by summing the four standardized 
variance scores. Guided by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) and others, I control for pre-
succession firm strategic instability (PRE_SI), size (SIZE), firm age (FIRM_AGE), 
market-to-book ratio (MTB), free cash flow (FCF), return on assets (ROA), board size 
(BOARD_SIZE), board independence (BOARD_IND), CEO age (AGE), CEO share 
ownership (OWNERSHIP), CEO duality (DUALITY) and CEO origin (OUTSIDER). 
Firm and year fixed effects were also included.  
As shown in Table 2.10, the HIGH_GAP variable does not have explanatory 
power on post-succession firm strategic instability. However, the interaction terms 
between HIGH_GAP and FORCED and HIGH_GAP and POOR_PRE_PERF 
significantly contribute to a higher level of firm strategic instability one year after the 
succession event. These empirical results suggest that under forced succession and/ or 
when pre-succession firm performance has been poor, successors with high gaps are more 
likely to make decisions that would lead to an elevated level of subsequent firm strategic 
instability. Prior literature shows that the effect of strategic change on firm performance 
is the net effect of both its adaptive (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Haveman, 1992; Zajac 
& Kraatz, 1993) and disruptive side (Jauch et al., 1980; Singh et al., 1986; Kor & 
Leblebici, 2005). Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010) assert that firm performance increases 
when the level of strategic change rises from low to moderate but decreases when the 
level of strategic change increases from moderate to high. Compared to successors with 
low succession gaps, those with high gaps can amplify either the adaptive or disruptive 
effect of strategic change when the succession event itself signals underlying strategic 
and structural changes. As the ever-changing business environment makes inaction the 
riskiest strategy (Farjoun, 2007) and demands change within an organization, a moderate 
level of strategic change that a successor with high gaps could bring in is highly 
                                                                
22 Koh and Reeb (2015) show that the percentage of missing R&D firms which file and receive patents is 14 times 
greater than firms with zero R&D, and missing R&D firms are more likely to report R&D after an exogenous auditor 
change. As such, it would be inappropriate when conducting the empirical analysis to treat missing value as zero. 
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appreciated under non-forced successions and/ or when past performance has been good. 
However, successors are more motivated to make drastic changes under forced succession 
and/ or when pre-succession firm performance has been poor (Friedman & Singh, 1989; 
Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012; Schepker et al., 2017). This scenario leads to greater 
organizational disturbance when successors with gaps have limited understanding of their 
firms’ external conditions and internal capabilities. The changes induced by successors 
with high gaps, which are built on new competencies rather than relying on existing 
competencies, will lead to worse immediate performance and a greater chance of business 
failure (Haveman, 1992; Sastry, 1997).  
< Insert Table 2.10 here > 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
Value-implications of a shift in corporate culture brought about by CEO turnover 
are examined in this study. I employ an evaluation technique that examines the potential 
interactions between the effect of both the succession event itself and the shift in CEO 
characteristics it engenders. By employing a propensity score matching approach, the 
partial effect of succession gaps on the performance of firms experiencing a CEO 
succession could be analysed relative to their matched peers. 
Focusing on the nature of the succession event and the differences between the 
personal traits/ experiences of the outgoing and incoming CEOs in large S&P 500 
companies over the period 1996-2016, I do not find any relationship between succession 
gap and firm performance for the full sample. Results, however, are dramatically different 
when a similar association is examined for subsamples of the data. For example, under 
forced succession and when pre-succession performance of the firm has been poor, 
succession gaps are disruptive and lead to worse subsequent firm performance, and this 
result becomes stronger in the long-term. In stark contrast, however, when the succession 
itself is not forced or when the pre-succession performance has been good, a drastic 
change between the predecessor and the successor’s personal traits and past experience 
contributes towards stability or enhanced subsequent performance. Consistent with the 
prediction that more successor-induced personnel and structural alterations would be 
expected when the event itself signals a change in firm policy or post-succession 
redirection, I find that successors who considerably differ from their predecessors co-opt 
a greater proportion of the board one year after assuming office. Furthermore, they have 
greater discretion to make far-reaching changes regarding business downsizing and 
strategic business shift.  
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Overall, the findings in this study suggest that appointing a successor with gaps 
in characteristics is not value-enhancing when the succession event is disruptive in nature. 
These findings have strong implications for how firms manage the succession of CEOs, 
particularly when dealing with either forced succession or a leadership change under poor 
pre-succession firm performance. Especially, firms should avoid appointing new CEOs 
who are likely to stamp their authority on the firm in order to signal a change or simply 
just to be different (more likely to occur when the succession gap is high). Instead, what 
such firms truly need is a newcomer who possesses an in-depth industry knowledge and 
has a good understanding of the corporate culture. In doing so, successors will be less 
likely to demand drastic changes and suffer less resistance within the organization which 
would minimize the disruption on the firm’s structure and existing relationships. 
Consequently, the successor is able to first, figure out the exact cause and appropriate 
treatment for the organization, and second, could proactively seek help from incumbent 
board members and top managers instead of only giving lip service to reforms. 
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Table 2. 1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of the variables used in this paper spanning the period 1996-2016. Columns 1 to 3 provide comparisons of descriptive statistics between succession group and non-succession 
group. Columns 4 to 6 report comparisons of descriptive statistics between forced succession and non-forced succession group. Columns 7 to 9 report comparisons of descriptive statistics between poor pre-
performance and good pre-performance group. The dependent variable, PERFORMANCE, is defined as ROA (return on total assets) in the year following the succession event. The state variable GAP_INDEX 
is constructed as follows. For every difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one 
point is added to the index. Forced (Non-forced) Succession group is defined if the predecessor of the firm is forced out (not forced out) during the succession event. The classification of succession events into 
forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). Poor (Good) Pre-Performance groups are defined if the firm’s pre-succession firm performance is lower (higher) than its industry median in the 
given fiscal year in my sample, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Firm Characteristic control variables include: past firm performance (PRE_PERFORMANCE), the number of years since 
the firm was established (FIRM_AGE), leverage (LEV), firm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), capital expenditure ratio (CAPEX), free cash flow ratio (FCF) and fixed tangible assets (TANG). Corporate 
Governance control variables include: board size (BOARD_SIZE), and board independence (BOARD_IND). CEO characteristics control variables include: CEO total annual compensation (TOTAL_PAY), the 
percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO (OWNERSHIP), the proportion of total annual CEO compensation that comes from option grants and stocks (EQUITY_INTENSITY), CEO-chairman 
indicator (DUALITY), founder-CEO indicator (FOUNDER), family-member-CEO indicator (FAMILY_MEMBER), and successor origin (OUTSIDER). Definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix 
A. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Succession (S) vs Non-Succession (NS) Group  
Forced Succession (F) vs Non-forced Succession 
(NF) Group 
 
Poor Pre-Performance (PP) vs Good Pre-















Variable Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
PERFORMANCE  0.164  0.165  -0.001  0.147  0.170  -0.023***  0.122  0.199  -0.076*** 
GAP_INDEX  1.817  0.000  1.817***  1.940  1.776  0.165  1.810  1.823  -0.013 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  0.166  0.166  0.000  0.148  0.173  -0.025***  0.113  0.213  -0.100*** 
FIRM_AGE  4.020  3.840  0.180***  3.882  4.071  -0.189**  4.024  4.016  0.008 
LEV  0.245  0.235  0.010  0.267  0.236  0.031**  0.261  0.231  0.030** 
SIZE  9.032  8.742  0.290  9.293  8.943  0.350***  9.195  8.887  0.309*** 
MTB  1.953  2.061  -0.108*  1.854  1.991  -0.137  1.427  2.411  -0.984*** 
CAPEX  0.056  0.059  -0.003  0.049  0.058  -0.009***  0.045  0.065  -0.021*** 
FCF  0.039  0.037  0.002  0.036  0.040  -0.004  0.034  0.043  -0.009 
TANG  0.437  0.414  0.023**  0.441  0.434  0.007  0.413  0.459  -0.045** 
BOARDSIZE  10.67  10.36  0.311***  10.60  10.69  -0.093  10.65  10.69  -0.035 
BOARD_IND  0.734  0.744  -0.010  0.770  0.721  0.049***  0.746  0.725  0.021 
TOTAL_PAY  8.601  8.571  0.031  8.624  8.607  0.016  8.636  8.571  0.065 
OWNERSHIP  0.023  0.080  -0.057***  0.023  0.023  0.000  0.021  0.025  -0.004 
EQUITY_INTENSITY  0.566  0.494  0.072***  0.588  0.560  0.028  0.566  0.565  0.001 
DUALITY  0.346  0.696  -0.350***  0.341  0.350  -0.009  0.404  0.295  0.109*** 
FOUNDER  0.029  0.142  -0.113***  0.039  0.025  0.014  0.029  0.029  0.001 
FAMILY_MEMBER  0.023  0.056  -0.033***  0.039  0.017  0.022  0.029  0.017  0.012 
OUTSIDER  0.188  0.168  0.020  0.296  0.149  0.147***  0.233  0.149  0.084*** 
Observations  659  6482    179  475    309  350   
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Table 2. 2 PSM Regression of Gap Index on Subsequent Firm Performance 
Table 2.2 presents the results from PSM regression of CEO succession gaps on subsequent firm performance. The dependent variable, 
PERFORMANCE is the difference in subsequent performance between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the average 
subsequent performance of the matching group (non-succession matched peers), where subsequent performance is defined as ROA 
(return on total assets) in the year following the succession event. The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows. For every 
difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest education level 
and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. FORCED is a dummy variable equals to one if the predecessor 
is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino 
(1997). Firm Characteristic control variables include: past firm performance (PRE_PERFORMANCE), the number of years since the 
firm was established (FIRM_AGE), firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MTB), capital expenditure ratio 
(CAPEX), free cash flow ratio (FCF) and fixed tangible assets (TANG). Corporate Governance control variables include: board size 
(BOARD_SIZE), and board independence (BOARD_IND). CEO characteristics control variables include: the percentage of 
outstanding shares owned by the CEO (OWNERSHIP), the proportion of total annual CEO compensation that comes from option 
grants and stocks (EQUITY_INTENSITY), CEO-chairman indicator (DUALITY), founder-CEO indicator (FOUNDER), family-
member-CEO indicator (FAMILY_MEMBER), and successor origin (OUTSIDER). Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the estimates of 
treatment effect on subsequent performance controlling for industry and year fixed effects, for industry, year and industry-year fixed 
effects and for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Firm Performance 
Variable  1  2  3 
GAP_INDEX  0.000  0.004  -0.002 
  (0.01)  (1.13)  (-0.53) 
FORCED  -0.004  -0.011  0.006 
  (-0.32)  (-0.83)  (0.46) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.401***  -0.419***  -0.164*** 
  (-10.88)  (-11.98)  (-3.02) 
FIRM_AGE  0.006*  0.006*  -0.102*** 
  (1.67)  (1.93)  (-2.73) 
SIZE  0.004*  0.003  0.029** 
  (1.84)  (1.58)  (2.51) 
LEV  0.038**  0.038***  0.088** 
  (2.32)  (2.65)  (2.38) 
MTB  -0.014***  -0.015***  -0.011** 
  (-4.98)  (-5.68)  (-2.44) 
CAPEX  0.091  -0.043  0.513** 
  (0.66)  (-0.32)  (2.58) 
FCF  -0.078*  -0.141***  0.013 
  (-1.74)  (-3.14)  (0.25) 
TANG  -0.046***  -0.039***  0.057 
  (-3.01)  (-2.79)  (1.25) 
BOARDSIZE  -0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  (-0.90)  (-0.80)  (0.47) 
BOARD_IND  0.025  0.031  0.040 
  (0.98)  (1.30)  (0.90) 
OWNERSHIP  -0.025  -0.048  0.103* 
  (-0.70)  (-1.56)  (1.69) 
EQUITY_INTENSITY  0.038***  0.029***  0.036** 
  (3.46)  (2.81)  (2.51) 
DUALITY  -0.002  -0.003  -0.014 
  (-0.42)  (-0.60)  (-1.50) 
FOUNDER  -0.030*  -0.017  -0.022 
  (-1.71)  (-1.11)  (-0.59) 
FAMILY_MEMBER  0.011  0.015  0.023 
  (0.75)  (1.16)  (0.55) 
OUTSIDER  -0.008  -0.009*  -0.001 
  (-1.44)  (-1.67)  (-0.08) 
Constant  0.071  0.106  0.056 
  (1.15)  (1.05)  (0.33) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
R-Squared  0.377  0.426  0.508 





Table 2. 3 PSM Regression of Gap Index on Subsequent Firm Performance 
Sub-Sample: Forced vs. Non-Forced 
Table 2.3 presents the sub-sample results from PSM regression of CEO succession gaps on subsequent firm performance for forced 
and non-forced succession firms. The dependent variable, PERFORMANCE is the difference in subsequent performance between the 
treatment firm (succession firm) and the average subsequent performance of the matching group (non-succession matched peers), 
where subsequent performance is defined as ROA (return on total assets) in the year following the succession event. The state variable 
GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows. For every difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ 
age/ cultural background/ highest education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. Forced (Non-
Forced) subsample is defined if the predecessor of the firm is forced out (not forced out) during the succession event. The classification 
of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). Firm Characteristic control variables include: 
past firm performance (PRE_PERFORMANCE), the number of years since the firm was established (FIRM_AGE), firm size (SIZE), 
leverage (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MTB), capital expenditure ratio (CAPEX), free cash flow ratio (FCF) and fixed tangible assets 
(TANG). Corporate Governance control variables include: board size (BOARD_SIZE), and board independence (BOARD_IND). 
CEO characteristics control variables include: the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO (OWNERSHIP), the proportion 
of total annual CEO compensation that comes from option grants and stocks (EQUITY_INTENSITY), CEO-chairman indicator 
(DUALITY), founder-CEO indicator (FOUNDER), family-member-CEO indicator (FAMILY_MEMBER), and successor origin 
(OUTSIDER). Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the estimates of treatment effect on subsequent performance for forced succession firms 
controlling for industry and year fixed effects, for industry, year and industry-year fixed effects and for firm and year fixed effects, 
respectively. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the estimates of treatment effect on subsequent performance for non-forced succession firms 
controlling for industry and year fixed effects, for industry, year and industry-year fixed effects and for firm and year fixed effects, 
respectively. Definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Firm Performance 
  Forced  Non-Forced 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6 
GAP_INDEX  -0.010**  -0.010**  -0.011**  0.007*  0.013***  0.005 
  (-2.36)  (-2.19)  (-2.27)  (1.85)  (3.10)  (1.31) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.422***  -0.455***  -0.152***  -0.380***  -0.420***  -0.073 
  (-12.01)  (-13.61)  (-2.96)  (-10.26)  (-12.14)  (-1.33) 
FIRM_AGE  0.005  0.004  -0.108***  0.005  0.005  -0.081** 
  (1.45)  (1.48)  (-3.06)  (1.30)  (1.54)  (-2.15) 
SIZE  0.003  0.002  0.027**  0.005*  0.004*  0.033*** 
  (1.42)  (0.88)  (2.48)  (1.93)  (1.67)  (2.97) 
LEV  0.024  0.025*  0.089**  0.040**  0.039***  0.079** 
  (1.50)  (1.79)  (2.55)  (2.36)  (2.64)  (2.21) 
MTB  -0.019***  -0.019***  -0.012***  -0.015***  -0.015***  -0.013*** 
  (-7.12)  (-7.72)  (-2.96)  (-5.25)  (-5.92)  (-3.07) 
CAPEX  0.043  -0.096  0.482**  0.002  -0.140  0.303 
  (0.32)  (-0.74)  (2.56)  (0.01)  (-1.06)  (1.56) 
FCF  -0.109**  -0.138***  -0.005  -0.071  -0.147***  0.041 
  (-2.53)  (-3.22)  (-0.10)  (-1.58)  (-3.31)  (0.81) 
TANG  -0.037**  -0.027*  0.054  -0.048***  -0.040***  0.074 
  (-2.49)  (-1.95)  (1.23)  (-3.05)  (-2.84)  (1.64) 
BOARDSIZE  -0.002  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  0.000 
  (-1.33)  (-1.02)  (-0.06)  (-1.03)  (-0.77)  (0.24) 
BOARD_IND  0.033  0.036  0.045  0.021  0.027  0.034 
  (1.31)  (1.57)  (1.06)  (0.78)  (1.16)  (0.77) 
OWNERSHIP  -0.036  -0.049*  0.028  -0.016  -0.042  0.120* 
  (-1.06)  (-1.66)  (0.46)  (-0.43)  (-1.38)  (1.93) 
EQUITY_INTENSITY  0.037***  0.028***  0.035**  0.036***  0.027***  0.021 
  (3.49)  (2.79)  (2.50)  (3.26)  (2.61)  (1.43) 
DUALITY  -0.004  -0.005  -0.018*  -0.001  -0.001  -0.012 
  (-0.81)  (-1.10)  (-1.88)  (-0.13)  (-0.23)  (-1.27) 
FOUNDER  -0.022  -0.011  0.013  -0.028  -0.015  -0.016 
  (-1.26)  (-0.73)  (0.32)  (-1.58)  (-0.95)  (-0.45) 
FAMILY_MEMBER  0.021  0.023*  0.045  0.013  0.016  0.029 
  (1.53)  (1.91)  (0.94)  (0.84)  (1.29)  (0.73) 
OUTSIDER  -0.006  -0.007  0.004  -0.007  -0.007  -0.004 
  (-1.12)  (-1.33)  (0.40)  (-1.19)  (-1.38)  (-0.38) 
Constant  0.129**  0.110  0.124  0.086  0.119  -0.047 
  (2.21)  (1.05)  (0.76)  (1.39)  (1.21)  (-0.28) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R-Squared  0.458  0.495  0.553  0.408  0.460  0.521 




Table 2. 4 PSM Regression of Gap Index on Subsequent Firm Performance 
Sub-Sample: Poor vs. Good Pre-Succession Performance 
Table 2.4 presents the sub-sample results from PSM regression of CEO succession gaps on subsequent firm performance for firms 
with poor past performance and firms with good pre-succession performance. The dependent variable, PERFORMANCE is the 
difference in subsequent performance between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the average subsequent performance of the 
matching group (non-succession matched peers), where subsequent performance is defined as ROA (return on total assets) in the year 
following the succession event. The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows. For every difference between the 
predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest education level and eliteness of 
undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. FORCED is a dummy variable equals to one if the predecessor is forced out 
and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). Poor 
(Good) Pre-Performance groups are defined if the firm’s pre-succession firm performance is lower (higher) than its industry median 
in the given fiscal year in my sample, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Firm Characteristic control variables 
include: past firm performance (PRE_PERFORMANCE), the number of years since the firm was established (FIRM_AGE), firm size 
(SIZE), leverage (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MTB), capital expenditure ratio (CAPEX), free cash flow ratio (FCF) and fixed 
tangible assets (TANG). Corporate Governance control variables include: board size (BOARD_SIZE), and board independence 
(BOARD_IND). CEO characteristics control variables include: the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO 
(OWNERSHIP), the proportion of total annual CEO compensation that comes from option grants and stocks (EQUITY_INTENSITY), 
CEO-chairman indicator (DUALITY), founder-CEO indicator (FOUNDER), family-member-CEO indicator (FAMILY_MEMBER), 
and successor origin (OUTSIDER). Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the estimates of treatment effect on subsequent performance for forced 
succession firms controlling for industry and year fixed effects, for industry, year and industry-year fixed effects and for firm and year 
fixed effects, respectively. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the estimates of treatment effect on subsequent performance for non-forced 
succession firms controlling for industry and year fixed effects, for industry, year and industry-year fixed effects and for firm and year 
fixed effects, respectively. Definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, 
and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Firm Performance 
  Poor Pre-Performance  Good Pre-Performance 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6 
GAP_INDEX  -0.022***  -0.021***  -0.024***  0.014***  0.020***  0.012*** 
  (-3.79)  (-3.48)  (-4.00)  (3.20)  (4.53)  (2.65) 
FORCED  0.002  -0.002  0.006  0.050***  0.042**  0.069*** 
  (0.10)  (-0.09)  (0.33)  (2.71)  (2.30)  (3.59) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.407***  -0.449***  -0.137***  -0.403***  -0.445***  -0.079 
  (-11.59)  (-13.63)  (-2.73)  (-11.02)  (-13.09)  (-1.45) 
FIRM_AGE  0.004  0.003  -0.085**  0.005  0.005  -0.086** 
  (1.02)  (0.90)  (-2.45)  (1.32)  (1.61)  (-2.28) 
SIZE  0.004  0.002  0.027**  0.005**  0.004*  0.034*** 
  (1.45)  (0.76)  (2.51)  (2.02)  (1.83)  (3.02) 
LEV  0.015  0.016  0.075**  0.039**  0.039***  0.078** 
  (0.94)  (1.14)  (2.19)  (2.39)  (2.76)  (2.19) 
MTB  -0.019***  -0.020***  -0.011***  -0.015***  -0.016***  -0.014*** 
  (-7.03)  (-7.85)  (-2.75)  (-5.52)  (-6.19)  (-3.34) 
CAPEX  -0.040  -0.203  0.345*  0.008  -0.129  0.333* 
  (-0.29)  (-1.57)  (1.87)  (0.06)  (-1.01)  (1.73) 
FCF  -0.115***  -0.157***  -0.003  -0.069  -0.140***  0.043 
  (-2.69)  (-3.73)  (-0.06)  (-1.57)  (-3.22)  (0.86) 
TANG  -0.038**  -0.026*  0.048  -0.044***  -0.035***  0.073 
  (-2.49)  (-1.89)  (1.13)  (-2.87)  (-2.58)  (1.62) 
BOARDSIZE  -0.001  -0.000  0.000  -0.002  -0.002  0.000 
  (-0.80)  (-0.23)  (0.11)  (-1.32)  (-1.24)  (0.05) 
BOARD_IND  0.029  0.031  0.054  0.019  0.026  0.023 
  (1.14)  (1.39)  (1.30)  (0.72)  (1.12)  (0.53) 
OWNERSHIP  -0.017  -0.042  0.100*  -0.022  -0.048  0.104* 
  (-0.51)  (-1.44)  (1.68)  (-0.64)  (-1.60)  (1.69) 
EQUITY_INTENSITY  0.038***  0.027***  0.035***  0.032***  0.024**  0.010 
  (3.63)  (2.73)  (2.63)  (2.88)  (2.32)  (0.69) 
DUALITY  0.001  -0.000  -0.011  -0.004  -0.005  -0.015 
  (0.11)  (-0.09)  (-1.19)  (-0.71)  (-0.97)  (-1.55) 
FOUNDER  -0.022  -0.009  0.005  -0.027  -0.014  -0.017 
  (-1.28)  (-0.61)  (0.12)  (-1.53)  (-0.95)  (-0.46) 
FAMILY_MEMBER  0.015  0.019  0.020  0.015  0.020  0.007 
  (1.09)  (1.56)  (0.52)  (1.05)  (1.64)  (0.16) 
OUTSIDER  -0.004  -0.005  0.002  -0.008  -0.008  -0.006 
  (-0.79)  (-0.91)  (0.21)  (-1.29)  (-1.57)  (-0.53) 
Constant  0.131**  0.180*  0.030  0.099  0.067  -0.008 
  (2.25)  (1.91)  (0.19)  (1.64)  (0.63)  (-0.05) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R-Squared  0.465  0.504  0.561  0.426  0.480  0.529 




Table 2. 5 PSM Regression of Gap Index on Subsequent Long-Term Firm Performance 
Table 2.5 presents the results from PSM regression of CEO succession gaps on subsequent long-term firm performance using sub-
samples. The dependent variable, PERFORMANCE is the difference in subsequent long-term performance between the treatment 
firm (succession firm) and the average subsequent performance of the matching group (non-succession matched peers), where 
subsequent long-term performance is defined as the three-year average subsequent ROA (return on total assets). The state variable 
GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows. For every difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ 
age/ cultural background/ highest education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. FORCED is 
a dummy variable equals to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ 
non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s three years average 
pre-succession firm performance is lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, with 
industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Panel A reports estimates of gap index on long-term post-succession firm performance. 
Panel B reports sub-sample estimates of gap index on long-term post-succession firm performance for forced/ non-forced succession 
firms while Panel C reports sub-sample estimates of gap index on long-term post-succession firm performance for poor pre-succession 
performance/ good pre-succession performance firms. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the estimates of treatment effect on subsequent 
performance controlling for industry and year fixed effects, for industry, year and industry-year fixed effects and for firm and year 
fixed effects, respectively. The models include all control variables from Table 2.2 (suppressed). Definitions of control variables are 
provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Long-Term Firm Performance 
Variable   1   2   3 
Panel A: PSM Regression of Gap Index on 





               
GAP_INDEX  -0.000  0.000  -0.003 
  (-0.11)  (0.01)  (-0.71) 
FORCED  -0.009  -0.008  -0.008 
  (-0.63)  (-0.55)  (-0.59) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.233***  -0.233***  -0.009 
  (-6.02)  (-6.11)  (-0.14) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
R-Squared  0.424  0.475  0.510 
Observations  439  439  439 
Panel B: PSM Regression of Gap Index on 
Subsequent Long-term Firm Performance – 
Forced vs. Non-Forced 
 Forced  Non-Forced 
 1  2  3  1  2  3 
GAP_INDEX   -0.019***   -0.018***   -0.023***   0.007*   0.008**   0.005 
  (-3.65)  (-3.56)  (-4.34)  (1.88)  (2.15)  (1.37) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.219***  -0.230***  0.044  -0.252***  -0.257***  0.084 
  (-5.71)  (-6.10)  (0.72)  (-6.69)  (-6.88)  (1.31) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R-Squared  0.482  0.533  0.575  0.467  0.518  0.552 
Observations  120  120  120  319  319  319 
Panel C: PSM Regression of Gap Index on 
Subsequent Long-term Firm Performance – 
Poor Pre-Succession Performance vs. Good 
Pre-Succession Performance 
 Poor Pre-Succession Performance  Good Pre-Succession Performance 
 1  2  3  1  2  3 
GAP_INDEX   -0.025***   -0.026***   -0.029***   0.018***   0.021***   0.017*** 
  (-4.25)  (-4.31)  (-4.81)  (4.42)  (4.88)  (3.97) 
FORCED  -0.035  -0.033  -0.037*  0.044***  0.039**  0.054*** 
  (-1.60)  (-1.47)  (-1.71)  (2.82)  (2.50)  (3.28) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.214***  -0.232***  0.087  -0.267***  -0.277***  0.050 
  (-5.71)  (-6.31)  (1.52)  (-7.19)  (-7.56)  (0.80) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R-Squared  0.504  0.554  0.589  0.491  0.547  0.576 




Table 2. 6 PSM Regression of Gap Index on Subsequent Alternative Performance Measures 
Table 2.6 presents the results from PSM regression of CEO succession gaps on subsequent firm performance. The dependent variable, PERFORMANCE is the difference in subsequent performance between the treatment firm (succession 
firm) and the average subsequent performance of the matching group (non-succession matched peers). Alternative performance measures include: (1) ROA redefined as EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) scaled by total assets as opposed 
to EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) over total assets, and (2) return on equity (ROE), defined as net income divided by total equity. The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows. For every 
difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. FORCED is a dummy variable equals 
to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-succession firm 
performance is lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Panel A reports estimates of gap index on subsequent firm performance. Panel B 
reports sub-sample estimates of gap index on subsequent firm performance for forced/ non-forced succession firms while Panel C reports sub-sample estimates of gap index on subsequent firm performance for poor pre-succession performance/ 
good pre-succession performance firms. Columns 1 and 3 report the estimates of treatment effect on subsequent performance using a one-year post-succession window, while Columns 2 and 4 report the estimates of treatment effect on 
subsequent performance by adopting a three-year post-succession time frame. The models include all control variables from Table 2.2 (suppressed). All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Definitions of control variables are 
provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable  ROA (EBIT/ Total Assets)  ROE 
Panel A: PSM Regression of Gap Index on Subsequent Firm 
Performance 
  1  2  3  4 
GAP_INDEX  -0.003  0.002  0.005  0.007 
  (-0.54)  (0.59)  (0.25)  (0.40) 
FORCED  -0.019  -0.019  0.024  -0.018 
  (-1.37)  (-1.46)  (0.31)  (-0.28) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  0.006  0.050  0.060  0.274*** 
  (0.11)  (0.81)  (1.39)  (4.16) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.504  0.509  0.465  0.472 
Observations  605  439  605  439 
Panel B: PSM Regression of Gap Index on Subsequent Firm Performance 
– Forced (F) vs. Non-Forced (NF) 
 F  NF  F   NF  F  NF  F  NF 
 1  1  2  2  3  3  4  4 
GAP_INDEX  -0.016***  0.003  -0.017***  0.005  0.001  0.018  -0.047**  0.025 
  (-3.55)  (0.70)  (-3.25)  (1.49)  (0.04)  (0.73)  (-1.99)  (1.43) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  0.014  0.073  0.111**  0.075  0.067  0.051  0.272***  0.320*** 
  (0.29)  (1.37)  (2.18)  (1.26)  (1.60)  (1.09)  (4.70)  (4.84) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.521  0.503  0.546  0.523  0.488  0.470  0.496  0.481 
Observations  175  430  120  319  175  430  120  319 
Panel C: PSM Regression of Gap Index on Subsequent Firm Performance – 
Poor Pre-Succession Performance (PP) vs. Good Pre-Succession Performance 
(GP) 
 PP  GP  PP  GP  PP  GP  PP  GP 
 1  1  2  2  3  3  4  4 
GAP_INDEX  -0.031***  0.012***  -0.031***  0.019***  -0.049  0.048*  -0.045*  0.034* 
  (-5.01)  (2.80)  (-5.81)  (4.97)  (-1.56)  (1.67)  (-1.67)  (1.68) 
FORCED  0.005  0.010  -0.010  0.005  0.041  0.020  -0.069  0.035 
  (0.26)  (0.58)  (-0.58)  (0.36)  (0.34)  (0.20)  (-0.61)  (0.47) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  0.027  0.056  0.139***  0.034  0.053  0.047  0.283***  0.299*** 
  (0.56)  (1.07)  (2.68)  (0.62)  (1.20)  (1.06)  (4.91)  (4.53) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.546  0.511  0.560  0.531  0.491  0.472  0.502  0.479 
Observations   298  307  202   237  298  307  202   237 
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Table 2. 7 Two-Stage Least Square Regression 
Table 2.7 presents the results from two-stage least squares regression of CEO succession gaps on subsequent firm performance using sub-samples. The dependent variable, PERFORMANCE is the difference in 
subsequent performance between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the average subsequent performance of the matching group (non-succession matched peers), where subsequent performance is defined 
as ROA (return on total assets) in the year following the succession event. Panel A performs the one-year subsequent firm performance and panel B illustrates three-year average subsequent firm performance. 
The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows. For every difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest education level and 
eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. Instrumented GAP_INDEX is the fitted value of GAP_INDEX from the first-stage regression. Potential candidates’ average gap index 
(CANDIDATE_GAP) serves as the instrumental variable. FORCED is a dummy variable equals to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ 
non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-succession firm performance is lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my 
sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. The models include all control variables from Table 2.2 (suppressed). Definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix 
A. Regressions include year and firm fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 































Panel A: PSM Regression of Gap Index on 
One-Year Subsequent Firm Performance 
                    
GAP_INDEX    -0.000    -0.012**    0.007    -0.032***    0.017*** 
    (-0.08)    (-2.24)    (1.48)    (-4.00)    (3.44) 
CANDIDATE_GAP  0.854***    0.966***    0.869***    0.745***    0.907***   
  (52.83)    (62.40)    (64.09)    (35.75)    (44.48)   
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared     0.839  0.098  0.835  0.112  0.759  0.092  0.806  0.127  0.880  0.128 
Observations  605  605  175  175  430  430  298  298  307  307 
Panel B: Treatment Effect on Three-Year 
Average Subsequent Firm Performance 
                    
GAP_INDEX    -0.003    -0.014**    0.001    -0.044***    0.020*** 
    (-0.73)    (-2.44)    (0.24)    (-6.00)    (4.39) 
CANDIDATE_GAP  0.852***    0.927***    0.866***    0.660***    0.969***   
  (44.46)    (56.66)    (49.36)    (32.11)    (61.96)   
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.835  0.495  0.869  0.525  0.818  0.504  0.834  0.547  0.886  0.523 
Observations  439  439  120  120  319  319  202  202  237  237 
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Table 2. 8 OLS Regression of Gap Index on Post-Succession Board Co-option 
Table 2.8 presents the results from panel data regression of CEO succession gaps on post-succession board co-option. The dependent 
variable, CO_OPTED is the difference in proportion of board changes one-year after the CEO assumed office between each treatment 
firm (succession firm) and its matching group (non-succession matched peers). The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as 
follows. For every difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest 
education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. HIGH_GAP is a dummy equal to one if the 
firm has a GAP_INDEX greater than the mean value of 1.82 and zero otherwise. FORCED is a dummy variable equals to one if the 
predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used 
by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-succession firm performance is lower than its industry 
median in the given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. OUTSIDER 
takes the value of one if the successor was employed by the firm for less than one year before he/ she assumed office and zero 
otherwise. Control variables include: firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), number of business segments (NUM_SEGMENTS), firm age 
(FIRM_AGE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), research and development expense (RND), annualized standard deviation of monthly 
stock return over the year (STKVOL), firm profitability (ROA), free cash flow ratio (FCF), board size (BOARDSIZE), CEO share 
ownership (OWNERSHIP), CEO age (AGE), and CEO duality (DUALITY). Regressions include year and firm fixed effects. 
Definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Board Co-option 
  1  2 
GAP_INDEX  0.025*   
  (1.81)   
HIGH_GAP    0.079*** 
    (2.70) 
FORCED  0.062  0.054 
  (1.39)  (1.38) 
OUTSIDER  0.031  0.021 
  (0.70)  (0.60) 
POOR_PRE_PERF  -0.020  -0.021 
  (-0.76)  (-0.88) 
SIZE  -0.076  -0.045 
  (-1.31)  (-0.86) 
LEV  0.180  0.153 
  (1.17)  (1.13) 
NUM_SEGMENTS  0.000  0.000 
  (0.10)  (0.02) 
FIRM_AGE  -0.326  -0.283 
  (-1.60)  (-1.61) 
MTB  -0.002  0.006 
  (-0.09)  (0.38) 
RND  -0.023  -0.039 
  (-0.14)  (-0.25) 
STKVOL  0.030  -0.037 
  (0.11)  (-0.14) 
ROA  0.240  0.163 
  (1.07)  (0.81) 
FCF  -0.310*  -0.218 
  (-1.65)  (-1.24) 
BOARD_SIZE  0.022***  0.016** 
  (3.07)  (2.42) 
OWNERSHIP  0.240  0.297 
  (0.84)  (1.20) 
AGE  0.016***  0.012*** 
  (4.72)  (4.56) 
DUALITY  0.042  0.043 
  (1.27)  (1.47) 
Constant  0.799  0.592 
  (0.95)  (0.82) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.134  0.116 





Table 2. 9 Logit Regression of High Gap on Subsequent Structural Changes 
Table 2.9 presents the results from logit regression of CEO succession gaps on post-succession structural changes. Panel A reports 
the results of subsequent structural change and panel B represents the results of subsequent employee reduction. The dependent 
variables illustrate the structural change in panel A, STRUCTURE_CHANGE is a dummy variable taking the value of one if asset 
sale is announced and a firm’s book value of total assets is reduced by more than 10% during the 2-year post-succession period. For 
the dependent variable that demonstrate the employee reduction in panel B, EMPLOYEE_REDUCTION is a dummy equal to one if 
a firm’s number of employees is reduced by more than 10% during the 2-year post-succession period. The state variable GAP_INDEX 
is constructed as follows. For every difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural 
background/ highest education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. HIGH_GAP, is a dummy 
equal to one if the firm has a GAP_INDEX greater than the mean value of 1.82 and zero otherwise. FORCED is a dummy variable 
equals to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced 
follows the method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-succession firm performance 
is lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC 
code level. Control variables include: CEO origin (OUTSIDER), industry-adjusted debt capacity (LOW_DEBT_CAPACITY), 
interest coverage (INTEREST_COVERAGE), dividend coverage (DIV_COVERAGE), dividend cut indicator (DIV_CUT), return on 
assets (ROA), size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MTB), number of business segments (NUM_SEGMENTS), sale-
based Herfindahl Index (HERF) and median industry sales growth rate within which the firm operates (IND_SALES_GROWTH). 
Regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Dependent Variable – 
Subsequent Structural Change 
        
Variable  1  2  3  4 
HIGH_GAP  0.155  0.059  0.160  -0.307 
  (0.74)  (0.27)  (0.77)  (-1.03) 
FORCED  0.095  -1.207  0.073  0.042 
  (0.25)  (-1.37)  (0.19)  (0.11) 
FORCED*HIGH_GAP    1.733*     
    (1.76)     
POOR_PRE_PERF      0.183  0.062 
      (0.99)  (0.32) 
POOR_PRE_PERF*HIGH_GAP        0.894** 
        (2.34) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.189  0.191  0.190  0.193 
Observations  2,316  2,316  2,316  2,316 
         
Panel B: Dependent Variable – 
Subsequent Employee Reduction 
        
HIGH_GAP  0.125  -0.025  0.146  -0.149 
  (0.61)  (-0.12)  (0.70)  (-0.53) 
FORCED  0.711**  -0.520  0.688*  0.672* 
  (1.96)  (-0.81)  (1.89)  (1.84) 
FORCED*HIGH_GAP    1.939**     
    (2.47)     
POOR_PRE_PERF      0.522***  0.440** 
      (2.90)  (2.35) 
POOR_PRE_PERF*HIGH_GAP        0.584 
        (1.58) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.125  0.129  0.130  0.131 





Table 2. 10 PSM Regression of High Gap on Subsequent Strategic Instability 
Table 2.10 presents the PSM regression of CEO succession gaps on subsequent firm strategic instability. The dependent variable, SI 
is the difference in subsequent firm strategic instability between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the matching group (non-
succession matched peers), where subsequent strategic instability is defined the variance in firm strategy a year following the 
succession event. The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows. For every difference between the predecessor and the 
successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one 
point is added to the index. HIGH_GAP, is a dummy equal to one if the firm has a GAP_INDEX greater than the mean value of 1.82 
and zero otherwise. FORCED is a dummy variable equals to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification 
of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if 
the firm’s pre-succession firm performance is lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, 
with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Control variables include: pre-succession firm strategic instability (PRE_SI), 
size (SIZE), firm age (FIRM_AGE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), free cash flow (FCF), return on assets (ROA), board size 
(BOARD_SIZE), board independence (BOARD_IND), CEO age (AGE), CEO share ownership (OWNERSHIP), CEO duality 
(DUALITY) and CEO origin (OUTSIDER). Regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the effect of 
High Gap, the interaction effect of High Gap and forced turnover, and the interaction effect of High Gap and Poor pre-succession firm 
performance on subsequent firm strategic instability, respectively. Definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix A. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Strategic Instability 
  1  2  3 
HIGH_GAP  -0.039  -0.276  -0.312 
  (-0.12)  (-0.79)  (-0.89) 
FORCED  0.065  -0.875  -0.054 
  (0.15)  (-1.36)  (-0.12) 
FORCED*HIGH_GAP    1.690**   
    (1.97)   
POOR_PRE_PERF  0.011  0.014  -0.159 
  (0.06)  (0.07)  (-0.75) 
POOR_PRE_PERF*HIGH_GAP      1.158** 
      (2.25) 
PRE_SI  0.044  0.045  0.051 
  (0.86)  (0.88)  (1.00) 
SIZE  -1.656***  -1.644***  -1.654*** 
  (-4.11)  (-4.08)  (-4.11) 
FIRM_AGE  3.990**  3.843**  4.031** 
  (2.14)  (2.07)  (2.17) 
MTB  -0.259  -0.275  -0.256 
  (-1.52)  (-1.62)  (-1.51) 
FCF  0.193  -0.011  -0.218 
  (0.09)  (-0.00)  (-0.10) 
ROA  0.669  0.446  0.524 
  (0.30)  (0.20)  (0.24) 
BOARD_SIZE  0.022  0.021  0.028 
  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.35) 
BOARD_IND  -0.848  -0.738  -0.934 
  (-0.49)  (-0.43)  (-0.55) 
AGE  -0.029  -0.029  -0.025 
  (-1.11)  (-1.13)  (-0.97) 
OWNERSHIP  -0.295  0.206  -0.377 
  (-0.11)  (0.08)  (-0.14) 
DUALITY  0.230  0.181  0.212 
  (0.71)  (0.56)  (0.66) 
OUTSIDER  0.665  0.671  0.728 
  (1.49)  (1.51)  (1.64) 
Constant  2.188  2.547  1.568 
  (0.29)  (0.34)  (0.21) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.048  0.053  0.055 
Observations  425  425  425 
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Chapter 3 CEO Succession Gap and Firm Risk-taking 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I focus my attention on the policy implications of a change in top 
management especially when the incoming CEO is markedly different on personal traits 
when compared to the one outgoing. As mentioned in the previous chapter, while CEO 
succession has received significant attention both in the academic literature and the 
popular press, the role of broad differences in CEO personal characteristics in affecting 
both firm value and related policy choices has surprisingly received scant attention. Since 
stakeholders of every hue are exposed to the consequences of CEO succession, such 
events are keenly watched with both hope and caution given the scale and scope of 
changes that usually accompany in a shake-up of top management. Boards use such 
opportunities not only to right previous wrongs but also to help steer the company along 
a path that fulfils the strategic goals and aspirations of shareholders.  
While boards have a range of options at their disposal to incentivise and shape the 
behavior of CEOs and top management, the literature is increasingly focusing on the role 
of CEO’s personal traits in shaping corporate policies. Supplementing overt contractual 
arrangements that shape incentives with choice of a CEO who has the personal traits that 
match the company’s strategic imperatives seems to be increasingly used by boards in 
planning and implementing the succession process. In this chapter, I examine whether 
differences in the risk-taking personal attributes of the incoming and outgoing CEOs 
influence future firm risk. 
However, the interest in the relationship between CEO personal attributes and 
firm risk is not entirely new. For example, Huang and Kisgen (2013) assert that male 
executives are associated with higher debt issuance frequency. The authors also find that, 
consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis, male CEOs, relative to their female 
counterparts, tend to engage more in acquisitions. Findings in Benmelech and Frydman 
(2015) show that CEO military experience is negatively related to riskier investment and 
financing policies. Faccio et al. (2016) assert that female CEOs generally lead firms that 
are characterized by lower volatility in earnings, lower financial leverage, and have a 
higher chance of survival than otherwise similar firms led by their male counterparts. In 
addition, Cain and McKeon (2016) argue that CEOs who possess private pilot’s licenses 
are associated with higher leverage and engage in operations that eventually lead to 
greater stock return volatility. Barring a sprinkling of studies, there is however a visible 
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absence of work that focuses on how differences in personal traits between the 
predecessor and successor affect risk-taking.23  
I contribute to this literature by examining the role of an index that captures the 
differences in personal risk-taking attributes of the incoming and outgoing CEOs in 
explaining post-turnover firm risk. In a sense, I implicitly examine whether boards use 
the CEO turnover as an opportunity to replace the outgoing CEO with one possessing a 
markedly different attitude towards risk that is tailored to deliver on the firm’s strategic 
objectives. Specifically, I am interested in the risk implications of a shift in corporate 
culture brought about by CEO turnover. Given that boards look for indicators that would 
help them pick the right person to fulfil the firm’s objectives, observed associations 
between differences in personal attributes/ experiences of the incoming and outgoing 
CEOs and firm risk are likely to provide invaluable insights to inform the hiring process. 
It would, however, be naïve to expect a uniform impact of the risk index across 
all treatment firms since characteristics of succession events can differ in ways where the 
impact of hiring a CEO with radically different risk-traits could be beneficial under 
certain conditions and less effective or even harmful at other times. A subset of 
successions that are likely to present adverse cultural shocks include ones where firms 
are already reeling under disruptive conditions, for example in successions where the 
outgoing CEO is forced to quit, or when the succession is preceded by poor firm 
performance. Therefore, given this dichotomy in the potential outcome of the succession 
process, I not only examine whether succession-induced gaps in CEO risk characteristics 
influence post-succession firm risk but also identify conditions when such associations 
are more/ less effective.24 In other words, I investigate whether the effect of the risk-
taking gap index on subsequent firm risk is more pronounced when firms are subject to 
disruptive changes leading up to the succession, given the diametrically opposite 
undertones that usually characterize succession events. 
My sample comprises all firms in the S&P 500 index spanning the period 1992 to 
2016. I take CEO gender, age, cultural background, career variety, and educational 
expertise into consideration when constructing the risk-taking gap index given their 
                                                                
23 Very few papers investigate how differences between the predecessor and the successor could affect firm value and 
risk following a succession event. One exception is Huang and Kisgen (2013), who document that a transition from 
male to female is associated with a lower rate of asset growth, fewer acquisitions, lower leverage, and reduced debt 
issuance frequency. Other studies include Serfling (2014) and Faccio et al. (2016), who find that young-to-old and 
male-to-female transitions lead to substantially reduced firm risk, respectively.  
24  Hereafter, I use the terms ‘pre-succession’ and ‘post-succession’ to deal with the period before and after the 
predecessor is replaced by a new CEO, respectively. These terms are used in several papers, including Friedman and 
Singh (1989); Friedman and Saul (1991) and Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004). 
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importance in affecting firm policies and overall firm risk. Since future performance of 
firms undergoing a succession is measured relative to others that do not experience such 
an event, a random selection of matching firms could potentially suffer from sample 
selection bias. To minimize the effect of such bias, I use the propensity score matching 
(PSM) methodology where for every firm experiencing a leadership change (i.e. in the 
treatment group), five matching firms that did not go through a succession but share 
similar pre-succession characteristics, are identified among the match firms. In other 
words, the treatment and match samples have similar pre-succession firm characteristics 
with the only difference being that treatment firms have a change in top management. 
Instead of examining the role of overt motivations through compensation contracts, I 
explore whether differences between predecessor and successor characteristics affect 
subsequent firm risk.25  
Primary findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows. In the baseline 
regression model, I find that the risk-taking gap index contributes positively to firm total 
risk and its idiosyncratic component after controlling for firm and year fixed effects. 
However, the risk-taking gap index does not substantially lead to higher systematic risk. 
Analysis of the channels through which disruptions happen suggests that when the: (1) 
turnover is forced; (2) pre-succession firm performance is poor; and (3) successor is an 
outsider; the incoming CEOs with higher risk-taking gap index generally lead to both 
higher firm total risk and its systematic and idiosyncratic components in the subsequent 
one-year when compared to their non-succession matched pairs. Furthermore, the 
explanatory power of the CEO risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk holds after 
controlling for CEO compensation incentives and CEO psychological traits (CEO 
overconfidence). In addition, I also find an increased risk-taking gap associated with 
greater financial and operating leverage (i.e. higher systematic risk), higher R&D 
intensity, lower capital expenditure, and increased firm focus (i.e. higher idiosyncratic 
risk). Collectively, the findings in this chapter suggest that the association between the 
differences in personal risk preferences of the incoming and outgoing CEOs is 
particularly strong when the succession event indicates a mandate for change. This 
subsequently gives the successor greater latitude in imprinting his/ her personal risk 
preferences on subsequent firm policy choices.  
                                                                
25 For example, Coles et al. (2006) find that firms led by managers with higher vega (therefore greater incentives to 
take on risks) tend to implement riskier firm strategies. 
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My research is associated with a growing literature in both corporate and 
behavioral finance that stresses the importance of a change in leadership on firms’ 
subsequent risk-taking and related corporate policies. This paper contributes to at least 
two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the CEO successions literature by 
investigating the impact of CEO characteristics on firm risk-taking in a CEO succession 
context.26 Second, it contributes to the literature that examines the influence of CEO 
personal characteristics and past experience on firms’ subsequent risk-taking choices.27 
By acknowledging that individuals are a sum of native traits and past experiences, I 
consider differences between the predecessor and successor characteristics rather than 
looking at a single perspective such as gender (see, e.g. Huang and Kisgen (2013); Faccio 
et al. (2016)), age (see, e.g. Taylor (1975); Hambrick and Mason (1984); Serfling (2014), 
or others (see, e.g. Barker and Mueller (2002); Malmendier and Tate (2005); Giannetti 
(2011); Graham et al. (2013); Mishra (2014); Henderson et al. (2017)). This paper 
provides a comprehensive analysis on the impact of the change in CEO risk propensity 
on subsequent firm risk-taking. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that 
takes various aspects of CEO personal characteristics and considers the predecessor and 
the successor’s risk-taking gaps when examining subsequent firm policies and risk. 
 
3.2. Hypothesis Development 
There is a large body of literature that examines how CEO past experience and 
personal traits translate into firm financing and investment choices. Some find evidence 
that manager fixed effects have strong explanatory power over firm policy choices (see 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Frank and Goyal (2007)) while others study the relationship 
between CEO psychological traits and firm risk-taking and show that narcissistic/ 
overconfident/ hubristic CEOs are more likely to make risky policy decisions and that the 
firms they manage tend to have a higher overall risk (see, e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007), Hackbarth (2008), Li and Tang (2010), Malmendier et al. (2011), and Hirshleifer 
et al. (2012)). Others try to understand the relationship between CEO past experience (see, 
e.g. Benmelech and Frydman (2015); Cain and McKeon (2016); Bernile et al. (2017); 
Sunder et al. (2017); Duchin et al. (2018)) and personal characteristics (see, e.g. Huang 
                                                                
26 Examples include: Friedman and Saul (1991); Miller (1993); Frank and Goyal (2007); Schepker et al. (2017).  
27 Examples include: Grable (2000); Bertrand and Schoar (2003); Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007); Hackbarth (2008); 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011); Malmendier et al. (2011); Benmelech and Frydman (2015); Kish-Gephart and Tochman 
Campbell (2015); Cain and McKeon (2016); Faccio et al. (2016); Bernile et al. (2017); Sunder et al. (2017); Gopalan 
et al. (2018). 
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and Kisgen (2013); Serfling (2014); Cain and McKeon (2016); Faccio et al. (2016)) and 
firm risk-taking. 
Recent studies take a step further in examining the influence of CEO risk-taking 
traits on firm risk with some suggesting that boards choose managers because of their 
specific attributes. For example, Serfling (2014) documents that firms with a less (more) 
risky profile tend to hire older (younger) CEOs. They argue that an increase in CEO age 
is also associated with a decline in the convexity of CEO compensation incentives, 
indicating that CEOs and firm risk preferences are aligned in order to reward older 
(younger) CEOs with fewer (more) incentives when implementing risk-related strategies 
(i.e., risk averse firms tend to hire CEOs who are older). In addition, Cronqvist et al. 
(2012) finds that firm leverage largely mimics CEO’s personal mortgage debt after 
controlling for past capital structure and other CEO characteristics known to be correlated 
with risk-taking decisions. Furthermore, they document that changes in a CEO’s personal 
leverage following succession events has explanatory power on the changes in firm 
leverage. Faccio et al. (2016) find evidence that female CEOs not only display greater 
levels of risk-avoidance with regard to firm financing policies, but that a top leadership 
change from male to female is associated with a significant reduction in the propensity 
for risk-taking. 
In this study, I examine the relationship between CEO personal characteristics and 
professional risk-taking in succession contexts by using a risk-taking gap index that 
comprises not one but several aspects of the CEO’s observable characteristics. I postulate 
that managers can impose their idiosyncratic style/ preferences on the companies they 
manage and hence their professional disposition would reflect their personal traits. 
Therefore, in a change in leadership where the successor exhibits higher levels of risk-
taking attributes, this will lead to higher subsequent firm risk. My main hypothesis to test 
this contention is as follows: 
H1: An increase in the level of the risk-taking gap between the incoming and 
outgoing CEOs will lead to elevated overall firm risk. 
Forced succession reflects the intention of the company’s board to engage in 
adaptive organizational change (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012). 
It is also an indication of an intent to break with the past with reference to regime, 
management styles, existing structure, as well as cultures and customs within an 
organization. As a consequence, turnaround strategies would be expected (Schepker et 
al., 2017).  
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Similarly, when pre-succession performance has been poor, drastic strategic and 
structural changes are desired (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Friedman & Saul, 1991) and 
expected. As such, appointing a person with a higher risk preference could reflect the 
board’s intention to implement riskier business policies. Moreover, riskier policies are 
more likely to be introduced when a business is doing poorly or when the manager’s job 
is in jeopardy, while managers would be less encouraged to take on risks when their firms 
are doing well (March & Shapira, 1987). In other words, under non-forced succession 
and/ or good pre-succession firm performance, there is a premium on continuity.  
Furthermore, the successor’s origin may play an important role in determining the 
degree to which he/ she could successfully impose his/ her idiosyncratic style on a 
company’s operations. Outside successors are less likely to be influenced by the existing 
culture and therefore more able to operate the firm from a new perspective. Besides, 
tapping an external candidate is the most explicit way in conveying the board’s intention 
to redirect subsequent firm policies, mission statements, and vision (Friedman & Saul, 
1991). As such, external hires are generally given greater latitude of action in affecting 
subsequent policy changes and are often pressured into taking immediate action 
(Friedman & Saul, 1991; Shen & Cannella, 2002). As such, I hypothesize that the positive 
relationship between risk-taking gap index and firm risk-taking would be more 
pronounced when the underlying nature of the succession event implies a mandate for 
change. Hence, I test the following hypothesis: 
H2: The positive relationship between CEO risk-taking gaps and subsequent firm 
risk is more pronounced in: (a) firms with forced CEO removal; (b) firms with poor pre-
succession performance; and (c) firms with outside successors. 
 
3.3. Research Design 
3.3.1. Data 
My starting sample comprises all S&P 500 firms between 1992 and 2016. I focus 
on CEOs since they are the main decision-makers regarding firm investment (Bennedsen 
et al., 2017) and financing policies (Frank & Goyal, 2007; Graham et al., 2015). CEO 
basic information (including name, gender, age, stock ownership, compensation structure 
and tenure) was extracted from Compustat’s ExecuComp database. Additional 
demographic information (including career history, educational background, birthplace, 
family background, and cultural diversity) was hand-collected from S&P Capital IQ 
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database, Bloomberg’s online executive profile webpage, NNDB.com, Ancestry, and 
Wikipedia in the last instance. The classification of succession events into forced and 
non-forced follows the method used in Parrino (1997),28 which is widely used in recent 
CEO succession studies (see, for e.g., Guo and Masulis (2015), Hazarika et al. (2012), 
Huson et al. (2004), and Jenter and Kanaan (2015)). The demographic information on 
S&P 500 top executives was then merged with Compustat’s annual fundamental data and 
BoardEx’s Director and Director Legacy database, with the latter containing information 
on board size and board independence. The construction of CEO delta (pay-performance 
sensitivity) and vega (risk-taking incentives) are in line with the method in Core and Guay 
(2002) and Coles et al. (2006).29 I excluded financial services firms and utilities (two-
digit SIC Code 60-69 and 49), given that firms in these sectors are heavily regulated 
which may lead to risk outcomes very different from those of non-regulated companies. 
I also excluded all successions followed by M&As or spin-offs given the difficulty in 
separating the impact of leadership change from that of a major organizational restructure. 
After dropping firms without CEOs’ full names in the given fiscal year, I arrive at a final 
sample of 7,141 firm-year observations to conduct the empirical analysis. 
 
3.3.2. Variables Construction 
3.3.2.1. Firm Risk-Taking Dependent Variables 
Guided by Low (2009), Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012), Cain and McKeon 
(2016) and others, the dependent variables in this analyses are: (1) total risk (STKVOL), 
defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns,30 (2) systematic 
risk (SYSVOL), defined as the standard deviation of the product of the firm’s beta 
(calculated by using the market model and regressing the firm’s monthly stock return on 
CRSP value-weighted market return over the previous 36 months) and market monthly 
                                                                
28 Related news articles, whether published in the mainstream media or industry-specific journals and magazines, were 
retrieved through Factiva. The classification takes the following steps: (1) If the press clearly states that the outgoing 
CEO is forced out, being fired by the board of directors, or the departure is caused by policy differences or pressure 
imposed by stakeholders, then the succession event is classified as forced. (2) All other departures for CEOs above and 
including age 64, succession events caused by death or health-related disability, and CEO-initiated successions are 
classified as non-forced. (3) Departures for CEOs under the age of 64 are re-examined further and classified as forced 
if there are no signs of death or health-related disability announced by the press, the press does not report an acceptance 
of another position (either external positions or chairmanship of the company’s board) by the outgoing CEO, or the 
press does not announce the retiring of the predecessor at least six months before the event. (4) If a CEO serves as 
interim CEO and is replaced later, I classify it as non-forced. (5) Cases classified as forced are reclassified if the reports 
convincingly state that the succession event has nothing to do with the company’s activities. 
29 I gather executive delta and vega from Lalitha Naveen’s personal website: https://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/.  
30 Daily returns produce qualitatively similar results, albeit all the coefficients on the main variables are smaller in 
economic magnitude and the interaction effect of FORCED/ POOR_PRE_PERF and GAP_INDEX_RISK on 




returns,31 and (3) idiosyncratic risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard 
deviation of monthly stock return residuals, all of which mirror the overall risk profile of 
a firm. For all firms in the sample, the average total risk and idiosyncratic risk for the 
subsequent one-year (three-year) period are 8.99% (9.01%) and 8.21% (8.18%), 
respectively. The average systematic risk is 4.22% for the subsequent one-year period 
and 4.24% for the three-year post-succession period. I use the subsequent one-year risk 
measures in the main regression models and the subsequent three-year average risk 
measures for robustness check since managerial propensity for risk is associated with a 
faster decision-making process (Taylor & Dunnette, 1974; Papadakis & Barwise, 2002). 
 
3.3.2.2. Risk-taking Gap Index 
In a survey of 1,075 participants on personal characteristics, Grable (2000) 
provides evidence that males, those in younger age cohorts, people who are married, those 
who are professionally employed with higher incomes and greater economic expectations, 
as well as people with better education and/ or higher levels of finance literacy are 
generally associated with higher levels of risk tolerance. Similarly, a CEO’s observable 
demographic, behavioral and socioeconomic characteristics play an important role in 
indicating managerial risk propensity and therefore influence firm risk-taking. I construct 
my risk-taking gap index by considering the CEO’s gender, age, cultural background, 
career variety, and educational expertise since these attributes have been shown to 
influence risk and risk-taking behavior. I next discuss each of these five CEO personal 
traits. 
First, male CEOs tend to be associated with higher levels of firm risk compared 
to their female counterparts. Huang and Kisgen (2013) document that male executives 
are more likely to adopt risky financial and investment policies as suggested by their 
higher debt issue frequency and a higher level of engagement in acquisition activities as 
opposed to female executives, which is consistent with prior literature stating that males 
exhibit more confidence than females (Barber & Odean, 2001; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). 
Faccio et al. (2016) find evidence that firms led by female CEOs favor conservative-
oriented corporate strategies, maintain lower overall leverage and enjoy less volatile 
                                                                
31 Instead of just looking at beta, I follow Low (2009) and Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) by taking the standard 
deviation of the product of the firm’s beta times market monthly returns as the systematic risk measure, which makes 
systematic and idiosyncratic risk comparable in terms of scale.    
56 
 
earnings when compared to otherwise similar firms led by male CEOs. In addition, they 
find a decrease in firm risk-taking when females succeed male CEOs.  
Second, compared to older CEOs, younger CEOs tend to be bolder and more risk 
tolerant (Taylor, 1975; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Barker & Mueller, 2002; Serfling, 
2014). Younger leaders tend to be less concerned about financial and job security since 
they have a longer time horizon (Barker & Mueller, 2002) and hence are more likely to 
support business innovations and bring about market and technological breakthroughs as 
opposed to older CEOs. Prendergast and Stole (1996) argue that younger managers are 
more likely to pursue aggressive investment strategies in order to signal their ability and 
talent. Serfling (2014) documents that older CEOs are more likely to be hired by firms 
with low risk profiles, are associated with lower operating leverage, lower R&D 
investment, and an increase in diversifying acquisitions. Furthermore, firms encourage 
older CEOs to pursue low risk policies by tying a smaller portion of their compensation 
to stock return volatility. 
Third, I argue that a US CEO succeeding a non-US CEO will result in increased 
firm risk. Graham et al. (2013) argue that US CEOs are more tolerant to losses, more 
optimistic, and more willing to take chances compared to their non-US counterparts. They 
also assert that CEOs more tolerant of risk are likely to be involved in higher levels of 
acquisition activities and that the level of CEO optimism is positively related to firm 
leverage, especially in the use of short-term debt.  
Fourth, past literature suggests that compared to industry specialists, general 
managers have more favorable employment and job-hopping opportunities (Giannetti, 
2011; Mishra, 2014). Therefore, generalists are often too myopic to see beyond current 
interests and tend to take on more risks, as their personal wealth is less tied to long-term 
firm performance and thus they are less committed to the longevity of the firm (Mishra, 
2014). While industry specialists favor a continuation of existing policies (Giannetti, 
2011), they tend to diversify and reduce firm risks as their tenure within the firm increases 
(May, 1995). In addition, May (1995) finds evidence that CEO tenure is negatively related 
to equity volatility and firm leverage, which corroborates the argument that job-hoppers 
are more likely to pursue risky strategies because they value job security less. Moreover, 
career variety represents personal biases favoring experimentation and change and is 
positively related to personality traits such as extraversion and openness to experience 
(Judge et al., 2002; Judge et al., 2004). A multi-industry career experience could possibly 
contribute to future feasible strategic and social innovation within a company, directing 
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the firm down novel paths.32 As such, I argue that generalists are associated with higher 
levels of risk appetite when compared to industry specialists. 
Finally, I postulate that a CEO’s educational expertise does matter with regard to 
firm strategic risk-taking, and that CEOs with a technical educational background are 
more likely to engage in risk-taking. Henderson et al. (2017) document that lawyer CEOs 
are associated with a lower level of firm litigation risk. They further conclude that this 
negative relationship is partly due to a reduction in the firm’s risk-taking activities which 
could potentially lead to lawsuits and adoption of more conservative corporate policies. 
Several academics argue that some finance programs (especially MBAs) put too much 
emphasis on bottom-line performance and personal welfare maximization while 
overlooking some important aspects such as strategic management, critical and creative 
thinking, enterprise innovation, adaptation, and flexibility within today’s ever-changing 
business environment (Mintzberg, 2004; Rubin & Dierdorff, 2009; Almog-Bareket, 
2011). Tyler and Steensma (1998) and Barker and Mueller (2002) assert that CEOs with 
technical educational backgrounds are more committed to research funding and are 
generally less cautious in risky R&D investment as opposed to those with a business or 
law degree. Consistent with this, Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that firms led by CEOs 
with technical educational backgrounds have higher investment-cash flow sensitivities 
when compared to those majoring in finance areas. 
Based on the above arguments, I construct a risk-taking gap index 
(GAP_INDEX_RISK) as a composite measure of the difference in personal risk-taking 
attributes between the incoming and outgoing CEOs as follows: 
𝐺𝑎𝑝_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
= 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝐺𝑎𝑝_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒_𝐺𝑎𝑝_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙_𝐺𝑎𝑝_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
+ 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦_𝐺𝑎𝑝_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝐸𝑑𝑢_𝐺𝑎𝑝_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 
where Gender_Gap_Risk equals one if a male CEO takes over from a female predecessor. 
I calculate the standard deviation of the age of CEOs in my sample on a yearly basis, and 
set the dummy variable Age_Gap_Risk to equal one when the successor is at least two 
                                                                
32 One real life example of a risk-taking generalist is Ajay Banga, who chose to join Pepsi Co. after thirteen years’ 
service at Nestlé. Two years later, he left Pepsi Co. and spent his next thirteen years at Citi before ending up as CEO 
of MasterCard. He stated in an interview: “I, in truth, in my, my generation you stay in careers for a long time. 30 years 
in one company. You guys are different. And I think you’ve got the right approach to it, because if you don’t try out 
new things, if you’re not willing to take a risk, you will achieve very little reward out of the system the way it’s 
constructed today. And so, I have a big encouragement saying if you want to move jobs, or you want to move roles 
within the company, or you want to move companies or industries, think about it but go for it. Don’t, don’t, don’t 
procrastinate forever, and don’t hesitate forever” 
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standard deviations younger than the predecessor.33 Cultural_Gap_Risk is a dummy that 
equals one if a native-American replaces a non-US CEO and zero otherwise. 
Career_Variety_Gap_Risk is a binary variable that equals one if the incoming CEO is a 
general manager (i.e. had previously worked in another GICS sector and/ or moves across 
different functional areas) while the outgoing CEO is an industry specialist (had spent 
his/ her entire career in one industry and/ or even in just one firm) and zero otherwise. I 
follow the Malmendier and Tate (2005) approach in defining technical education 
background. Tech_Edu_Gap_Risk equals one if the incoming CEO has an undergraduate 
or postgraduate degree in engineering/ mathematics/ physics/ chemistry/ biology / 
pharmacy/ operations research/ other applied sciences while the outgoing CEO does not 
have any such degree specializations, and zero otherwise. For all the 659 succession 
events, 9 cases involve males replacing females, 185 cases involve younger successors 
replacing older predecessors, 146 cases involve generalists replacing industry specialists, 
43 cases involve US CEOs replacing non-US predecessors, and 91 cases are characterized 
by CEOs with technical educational backgrounds replacing those without one. To 
construct the risk index, I add one point to the risk-taking gap index if the successor 
exhibits more risk tolerance with regard to each of the aforementioned five personal traits. 
The overall index value ranges from zero to five.  
 
3.3.2.3. Control Variables 
Choice of control variables in my models is motivated by Faccio et al. (2016), 
Cain and McKeon (2016) among others. I control for firm profitability (return on assets, 
ROA), computed as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization scaled 
by total assets; firm size (SIZE), computed as the natural logarithm of total assets; firm 
age (FIRM_AGE), computed as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the 
firm was established; market-to-book ratio (MTB), computed as the market value of total 
assets scaled by book value of total assets, which serves as a proxy for firm investment 
and growth opportunity; sales growth (SALES_GROWTH), another growth proxy is 
computed as the annual percentage increase in sales; total book leverage (LEV_TDA), is 
the sum of the firm’s debt in current liabilities and long-term debt scaled by book value 
of total assets; research and development (RND), which is the research and development 
                                                                
33 In my case, there is an age gap if the successor is 13.84 years younger than the predecessor. My definition of age gap 
is consistent with Serfling (2014), who defines ‘successors are 13 to 40 years younger than incumbents’ as ‘much 
younger’ and ‘successors are 6 to 12 years younger than incumbents’ as ‘younger’.  
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expenditure scaled by sales; and capital expenditure ratio (CAPEX), which is capital 
expenditure scaled by total assets. 
In addition, I include several CEO incentive controls since these variables have 
been documented in past literature to impact on corporate policies and firm risk (Core & 
Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Armstrong & Vashishtha, 2012; Kini & Williams, 2012; 
Serfling, 2014; Cain & McKeon, 2016; Faccio et al., 2016): CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity (LOG_DELTA), computed as the natural log of dollar change in wealth 
associated with a one percentage change in firm’s stock price; and CEO risk-taking 
incentives (LOG_VEGA), defined as the natural log of dollar change in wealth associated 
with a one percentage change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns.34 All 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level to minimize the influence of 
outliers. Appendix E provides additional information on the construction of the 
abovementioned control variables. 
I further add a set of variables that indicate the underlying nature of the succession 
event. The first variable, FORCED, is a dummy variable equal to one if the predecessor 
is forced out (board-initiated succession) and zero otherwise (customary, CEO-initiated 
or death/ health-related disability-initiated succession). The classification of succession 
events into forced and non-forced follows the method used in Parrino (1997). The second 
variable, POOR_PRE_PERF, is a dummy that takes the value one if the firm’s pre-
succession financial performance and stock returns are both below its industry median in 
a given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at the same 
two-digit SIC code as the sample firm. The third variable, OUTSIDER, takes the value 
one if the successor was employed externally. Of the 659 succession events, 179 are 
forced turnovers (27.2%),35 309 are turnovers in circumstances where the pre-succession 
firm performance is below industry median (46.9%), and 124 cases are characterized by 
an outside successor (18.82%). I expect that under forced successions, poor pre-
succession firm performance, and/ or external successions, my risk-taking gap index will 
result in higher levels of subsequent firm risk. In other words, I expect the interaction 
term between GAP_INDEX_RISK and FORCED/ POOR_PRE_PERF/ OUTSIDER to 
be positive. 
 
                                                                
34 I follow prior literature and use the natural logarithm of delta and vega since both variables are highly skewed. 
35 The forced turnover ratio is close to that reported by Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004) for all COMPUSTAT listed 
manufacturing firms for the 1993-1998 period and Guo and Masulis (2015) for all listed firms in RiskMetrics database 
spanning the period 1996-2010. 
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3.3.3. Methodology - Propensity Score Matching 
By comparing the outcome of firms that experienced succession in a given fiscal 
year with those that did not, I could estimate the actual effect on firm risk resulting from 
the succession event and the associated risk-taking gaps resulting from the succession. 
This approach could only work in the scenario where firms that went through a succession 
are randomly assigned. However, this is not the case in my sample. Firms, for example, 
with worse past performance are more likely to replace their CEOs. As poor pre-
succession performance encourages firms to engage in more risk-taking activities (March 
& Shapira, 1987; Bromiley, 1991), ‘treated’ firms (firms that experienced CEO turnovers) 
are more likely to pursue riskier subsequent business strategies, regardless of whether 
they actually went through a change in their top executives or not. Under such 
circumstances, the estimated coefficient would suffer from potential sample selection bias, 
which arises when the key determinants of whether the firm went through a succession is 
related to subsequent firm risk-taking. 
To alleviate the impact of such biases, I adopt the propensity score matching 
approach (PSM) to pick the match firms. Guided by economic theory and prior literature 
(Brown, 1982; Friedman & Singh, 1989), I choose the following pre-succession firm 
characteristics as the matching criteria: firm performance (PRE_PERFORMANCE), firm 
age (PRE_FIRM_AGE), firm size (PRE_SIZE), leverage (PRE_LEV), market-to-book 
value (PRE_MTB), tangibility (PRE_TANG), industry sector (SECTOR), fiscal year 
dummies (FYEAR), board size (PRE_BOARDSIZE), and board independence 
(PRE_BOARDIND). I further include the predecessor’s personal and professional 
information such as age (PRE_AGE), ownership (PRE_OWNERSHIP), and CEO duality 
(PRE_DUALITY). I match each succession firm with five firms that did not experience 
a succession event but share similar pre-succession characteristics.36 The PSM approach 
then uses a logit model to estimate the probability of experiencing a succession event as 
a function of the aforementioned matching criteria. I impose two restrictions: first, there 
is no leadership change in the following year after the transition year for short-term 
analysis; and second, there is no leadership change three years after the transition year for 
long-term robustness check.  
The main regression model is as follows: 
                                                                
36 I repeat the matching process by using the two closest firms and the three closest firms, respectively. The overall 
results are largely consistent with the reported findings using five closest firms. 
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𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑟,𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where TE is the difference in subsequent firm risk between the treatment firm and the 
average subsequent firm risk of the matching group of each firm i in year t+1. 
GAP_INDEX_RISK is succession risk-taking gap index for firm i in year t. FIRM is a 
vector of N firm characteristics control variables and CEO is a vector of R CEO 
compensation incentive control variables. I also control for year and firm fixed effects in 
the empirical models. 
 
3.4. Empirical Results 
3.4.1. Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics of firm characteristics as well as CEO 
incentives that can potentially influence subsequent firm risk-taking following the 
succession event. As shown in Panel A, compared with those that did not go through such 
an event (i.e. non-succession group), firms that belong in the succession group are 
generally larger in size, are more established as indicated by an firm age, and have fewer 
growth opportunities as suggested by lower market-to-book ratio and sales growth. While 
succession firms do not differ much from non-succession firms with regard to subsequent 
firm leverage, they do tend to have smaller subsequent R&D investments. One possible 
reason could be that the incoming CEO takes a ‘big bath’37 in the transition year and 
utilize income-increasing accruals by cutting discretionary expenditures such as R&D 
and capital expenditure in subsequent years (see Murphy and Zimmerman (1993)). Apart 
from this, since new leaders generally enjoy a more sensitive termination-performance 
relationship, such career concerns may discourage them from taking on unsystematic 
risks. Another possible reason is that the incoming CEO’s lack of firm-specific 
knowledge will simply encourage him/ her to play it safe rather than substantially invest 
in long-term risky projects after assuming office. Moreover, for firms belonging to the 
succession group, incumbent CEO’s wealth is less tied to firm performance shortly after 
they are put in charge of the business.  
                                                                
37 Incoming CEOs manipulate the company’s income statement to make prior poor performance look even worse in 
order to make future performance look better. This is often implemented in a relatively bad year so that managers can 




By comparing firm-year descriptive statistics of forced against non-forced 
succession firms (as shown in Panel B), it is clear that firms experiencing a forced 
succession are generally less profitable and have less growth potential as evidenced by 
lower ROA, market-to-book ratio and sales growth. As well, forced succession firms tend 
to be less established. Moreover, compared with their non-forced counterparts, forced 
succession firms are characterized by higher financial leverage, higher R&D investments, 
lower capital expenditure, and higher total and idiosyncratic firm risks one year following 
the succession event. Interestingly, although firms are more likely to choose external 
candidates under forced removals, incoming CEO’s risk-taking gap index in forced 
succession firms does not differ much from that in non-forced succession firms.  
Panel C compares firms that have performed poorly in the past with those having 
a pre-succession financial performance above industry average. Findings suggest that the 
market responds negatively, causing poorly performing firms to have lower market-to-
book ratio on average. Similar to forced succession firms, poorly performing firms take 
on more risks in the period post-succession (as suggested by higher total risk, systematic 
risk and idiosyncratic risk), which confirms March and Shapira (1987) assertion that 
riskier policies are more likely to be introduced when the business declines than when 
things are going well. In addition, as indicated by a lower pay-performance sensitivity, 
incoming CEOs in poorly performing firms do not shoulder the responsibility for poor 
post-succession firm profitability if such a trend continues.  
Panel D compares firms hiring new CEOs from outside with those promoting 
internal candidates. Similar to forced succession, external succession firms tend to be 
smaller with lower growth potential. As suggested by the lower pay-performance 
sensitivity, outsiders tend to have less vested interest in the firm and therefore behave 
more aggressively with regard to risk-taking policy choices, which is ultimately reflected 
in higher subsequent idiosyncratic and total stock return volatility. 
< Insert Table 3.1 here > 
To check for the existence of potential multicollinearity, I also construct a 
correlations matrix of the key independent variables that are subsequently used in the 
regression models. The results show that most of the independent variables used in the 
regression models have a correlation coefficient less than 0.15. I further compute variance 
inflation factors (VIF) to check for multicollinearity; the highest value of VIF for each 
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independent variable is 2.44, 38  suggesting that multicollinearity is not a significant 
concern.39  
 
3.4.2. Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent Firm Risk 
Table 3.2 contains results from the propensity score matching analysis on 
subsequent firm risk measures. The dependent variables in models 1, 2 and 3 are 
subsequent firm total risk (STKVOL), systematic risk (SYSVOL) and idiosyncratic risk 
(IDIO_STKVOL), respectively. I take CEO compensation incentives into consideration 
by controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (LOG_DELTA) and pay-volatility 
sensitivity (LOG_VEGA) given the importance of CEO compensation wealth effects on 
firm risk-taking policy choices (John & John, 1993; Core & Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 
2006; Armstrong & Vashishtha, 2012; Serfling, 2014; Cain & McKeon, 2016; Faccio et 
al., 2016). I account for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in my empirical models, 
so that the impact of ignoring unobservable firm- and year-specific characteristics which 
may influence both the decision to change the firm’s top leadership and firm risk-taking 
policies can be mitigated (Faccio et al., 2016). 
As shown in Table 3.2, the variable of interest (GAP_INDEX_RISK) positively 
contributes to firm total risk and its idiosyncratic component at the 10% level after 
controlling for firm and year fixed effects. Although the sign of the coefficient is 
consistent with prediction, GAP_INDEX_RISK does not substantially lead to higher 
subsequent systematic risk in my sample. This may not be surprising since nearly 75% of 
the succession events in the sample are characterized by non-forced succession (475 out 
of 659 cases) / good past firm performance (492 out of 659 cases) / internal promotion 
(535 out of 659 cases). Consequently, the results from my main regression models 
(especially regarding subsequent systematic risk) may possibly be due to averaging over 
different types of succession events (i.e. forced vs non-forced, poor past performance vs 
good past performance, and/ or external succession vs internal promotion).  
<Insert Table 3.2 here> 
To test whether the significance of my primary finding is different for subsamples 
of the data, I include interaction terms to the baseline models in an effort to test whether 
the relationship between CEO risk-taking gaps and subsequent firm risk is conditioned 
on factors such as the nature of the succession event and/ or firm performance preceding 
                                                                
38 VIF score is often decided in order to show two variables having multicollinearity once it is over 10. 
39 To save space, I do not report the correlation matrix.  
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the succession. Results presented in Table 3.3 illustrate the impact of the interactions 
between a forced succession dummy and CEO risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm 
risk-taking. Results show that the interaction between FORCED and 
GAP_INDEX_RISK has a significant positive effect on subsequent firm total risk as well 
as its systematic and idiosyncratic components. Moreover, the coefficient of the 
interaction term on idiosyncratic risk is smaller than that of systematic risk. Specifically, 
a one point increase in risk-taking gap index will lead to a 2.3 percentage point increase 
in firm total risk, a 2.5 percentage point increase in systematic risk and a 2.0 percentage 
point increase in idiosyncratic risk, respectively. Given the mean value of firm total risk 
(8.99%) and its systematic (4.22%) and idiosyncratic (8.21%) components, the impact of 
CEO risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk under forced succession is non-trivial. 
Indeed, forced succession reflects the intention of the company’s board to engage in 
subsequent organizational change (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012) 
and therefore allows incoming CEOs with risk-taking gaps abundant discretion in 
affecting strategic changes and imprinting their personal traits on firm risk.  
<Insert Table 3.3 here> 
I next examine in Table 3.4 the impact of the interaction between poor past 
performance and CEO risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2 (b), the coefficients on GAP_INDEX_RISK and POOR_PRE_PERF are 
positive and statistically significant for all risk measures. Poor past performance not only 
gives CEOs characterized by higher levels of risk tolerance more mandate for change but 
also stimulate risk-takers to take on more risks to save the failing business. As such, 
tapping a successor with risk-taking gaps would result in a shift towards riskier policy 
choices, which will ultimately reflect in higher firm overall, systematic and idiosyncratic 
risk. The effect of CEO risk-taking gap index under poor past performance is more 
pronounced for idiosyncratic risk than its counterpart in the systematic risk equation. To 
be more precise, a one point increase in risk-taking gap index will increase a firm’s 
subsequent total risk by 6.6 percentage points, increase its systematic component by 1.9 
percentage points, and its idiosyncratic component by 6.4 percentage points after 
controlling for firm and year fixed effects. Moreover, compared with the coefficients on 
the interaction term of GAP_INDEX_RISK and FORCED in Table 3.3, the economic 
magnitude and statistical significance are larger for total risk and its idiosyncratic 
component across different risk measures. 
<Insert Table 3.4 here> 
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I next present results of the interactions between a dummy variable that captures 
external versus internal succession and CEO risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm 
risk. Results in Table 3.5 confirm my earlier contention that external successions would 
intensify the positive relationship between CEO risk-taking gaps and subsequent firm risk. 
Among all three sub-hypothesis under Hypothesis 2, the interaction between OUTSIDER 
and GAP_INDEX_RISK turns out to be the strongest in affecting subsequent firm risk, 
both economically and statistically. A one point increase in risk-taking gap index will 
lead to a 10.5 percentage point increase in firm subsequent total risk, a 4.8 percentage 
point increase in systematic risk and 10.2 percentage point increase in idiosyncratic risk. 
Overall, results show that, regardless of whether it is through the channel of imprinting 
(i.e. CEOs imposing their idiosyncratic styles on the firms they lead) or matching (i.e. 
CEOs are purposefully chosen by firms because of their specific attributes), the difference 
between the outgoing and the incoming CEO’s personal risk preference in non-economic 
contexts has strong explanatory power vis-à-vis subsequent firm risk under external 
succession. 
The results for the control variables are largely similar to those reported in Table 
3.3 and Table 3.4. Firm size positively correlates with firm systematic risk since larger 
firms tend to have higher leverage (Gruber & Warner, 1977; Ang et al., 1982) given less 
volatile earnings. Therefore, larger firms may have higher systematic risk, as the variation 
in firm beta could be largely explained by the degrees of its financial and operating 
leverage (Hamada, 1972; Rubinstein, 1973; Gahlon & Gentry, 1982; Mandelker & Rhee, 
1984). In keeping with Mazzucato and Tancioni (2008), I also find evidence that higher 
R&D intensity leads to higher levels of firm idiosyncratic risk. In Table 3.5, consistent 
with prior literature, I find that CEO delta contributes to an elevated level of firm total 
risk (Coles et al., 2006; Kini & Williams, 2012; Cain & McKeon, 2016) and its 
idiosyncratic component (Armstrong & Vashishtha, 2012). In my sample, the incentive 
to increase equity value prevails over CEO’s increased risk exposure that arises from a 
higher delta. Indeed, higher deltas may encourage CEOs to adopt riskier firm policies 
which lead to a wealth transfer from debtors to shareholders (John & John, 1993) and 
increase the probability for managers investing in risky positive NPV projects (Coles et 
al., 2006). Surprisingly, the compensation delta of firms in the sample dominates the 
effect of CEO incentives vis-à-vis firm risk-taking while vega seems to have no impact 
on subsequent firm risk. Overall, I find that the relationship between the 
GAP_INDEX_RISK variable and firm risk (total risk and its systematic and idiosyncratic 
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components) is positive and more pronounced when considering forced CEO succession, 
poor past performance, and when the successor is external. 
<Insert Table 3.5 here> 
 
3.4.3. Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent Risk-Taking Policies 
In this section, I examine the channels through which successors with risk-taking 
gaps can bring about changes in subsequent firm risk. Following Coles et al. (2006), Kini 
and Williams (2012), Serfling (2014) and others, I examine financial leverage 
(LEV_TDA/ LEV/_LDA/ LEV_TDM/ LEV_LDM), operating leverage (OPLEV), R&D 
investments (RND), capital expenditure (CAPEX), and firm diversification (HERF/ 
NUM_SEG) as potential channels, and hence treat these as dependent variables in my 
models. For firm financial leverage, I include four measurements: (1) book total leverage 
(LEV_TDA), defined as the sum of the firm’s debt in current liabilities and long-term 
debt scaled by book value of total assets, (2) book long-term leverage (LEV_LDA), 
defined as book value of long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets, (3) total 
market leverage (LEV_TDM), defined as sum of the firm’s debt in current liabilities and 
long-term debt scaled by market value of total assets, and (4) long-term market leverage 
(LEV_LDM), defined as the book value of long-term debt scaled by market value of total 
assets. Firm operating leverage (OPLEV) is defined as the percentage change in a firm’s 
EBIT scaled by percentage change in sales. Mandelker and Rhee (1984) argue that higher 
operating leverage and/ or financial leverage will lead to higher firm systematic risk.  
Low (2009) finds that book leverage is positively related to firm total risk as well 
as its idiosyncratic and systematic components. As such, I expect CEO risk-taking gaps 
to result in increased firm financial and/ or operating leverage following a leadership 
change, and here a positive relationship will be more pronounced under forced succession, 
poor prior firm performance, and external succession. As there is a trade-off between 
those two sources of systematic risk, i.e. firms with greater financial risk tend to have 
lower operating leverage and vice versa (Mandelker & Rhee, 1984), there is a chance that 
the positive relationship between risk-taking gaps and financial leverage (operating 
leverage) will be offset by the increase in operating leverage (financial leverage). 
The next two dependent variables reflect a firm’s risk in investment policies: (1) 
research and development (RND), defined as research and development expenditure 
scaled by total assets, and (2) capital expenditure (CAPEX), defined as total capital 
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expenditure scaled by total assets. R&D expenditures are usually accompanied by greater 
uncertainty and therefore are more risky compared to capital expenditures on property, 
plant, and equipment (Bhagat & Welch, 1995; Kothari et al., 2002; Coles et al., 2006; 
Serfling, 2014). Specifically, higher R&D intensity will contribute to higher firm total 
risk through its idiosyncratic rather than the systematic component. Low (2009) finds that 
firm R&D intensity is positively related to firm total and idiosyncratic risk and negatively 
related to systematic risk. Coles et al. (2006) documents that managers with higher risk 
incentives are more likely to shift their firms’ investments from capital expenditures to 
R&D spending. Similarly, I expect CEO risk-taking gap index leading to increased R&D 
intensity and reduced level of capital expenditure following a leadership change, 
especially when the predecessor was either forced out, the firm suffered poor past 
performance, or when the successor is an outsider. However, as higher capital 
expenditures tend to increase stock riskiness through an increase in the firm’s operating 
leverage (Lev, 1974), the relationship between risk-taking gap index and subsequent 
capital expenditure is not clear. 
For firm diversification, I include: (1) segment sales-based Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HERF), defined as the sum of square of business segment sales scaled by the 
square of firm total sales, and (2) number of business segments (NUM_SEG), defined as 
the number of business segments within which the firm operates. If annual segment data 
is not available, I assume that the firm operates in a single business segment and all sales 
are derived from one segment and set HERF and NUM_SEG to equal one (Cassell et al., 
2012; Kini & Williams, 2012; Serfling, 2014). 40  A higher segment sales-based 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and fewer business segments is an indication of high 
production concentration and consequently lower business diversification (Coles et al., 
2006; Kini & Williams, 2012; Serfling, 2014), which is likely to lead to higher firm-
specific risk (Serfling, 2014). I expect CEO risk-taking gap index to be associated with 
higher Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and fewer business segments within which the firm 
operates. Again, I expect the positive relationship between GAP_INDEX_RISK and 
subsequent firm focus to be more pronounced under forced succession, poor prior firm 
performance, and external succession.  
As shown in Table 3.6, successors with higher risk-taking gap index are 
associated with elevated levels of subsequent market and operating leverage. I next 
                                                                
40 Segment sales data are obtained from Compustat's annual historical segment database. 
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differentiate between the underlying nature of the various types of succession events. 
Panel B reports estimates for the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and forced 
removal, on subsequent firm risk. Consistent with my hypothesis, under forced 
succession, GAP_INDEX_RISK significantly contributes to higher subsequent firm 
financial leverage, higher R&D intensity, and lower capital expenditure. Although not 
statistically significant, the coefficient on the interaction between GAP_INDEX_RISK 
and FORCED suggests higher subsequent firm focus (as suggested by higher revenue 
concentration across segments and reduced number of business segments). Successors 
with higher risk-taking gaps tend to increase the firm’s operating leverage regardless of 
whether the predecessor was forced out or retired voluntarily (as suggested by a 
significant positive sign on GAP_INDEX_RISK while the interaction between 
GAP_INDEX_RISK and FORCED dummy is not statistically significant).  
Panel C reports estimates for the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and 
poor pre-performance on subsequent firm risk. Except for the regressions models for 
long-term book leverage (LEV_LDA), operating leverage (OPLEV) and capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), all of the coefficients on the interaction between 
GAP_INDEX_RISK and POOR_PRE_PERF correlate with subsequent risk-taking 
policy measures at the 1% level of significance with the expected signs. Again, successors 
with higher levels of risk-taking attributes are associated with subsequently higher 
operating leverage and there is no difference in operating risk between poor and good 
past performers. The quick shift towards riskier subsequent financing (higher financial 
leverage), investment (higher R&D intensity) and diversification (higher concentration 
ratio and fewer business segments) policy is ultimately reflected in higher systematic, 
idiosyncratic, and overall risk.  
Panel D reports estimates for the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and 
external succession on subsequent risk-taking. Instead of shifting into riskier investment 
policies, external successors who exhibit a higher risk propensity compared to their 
predecessors will substantially increase their firms’ financial leverage, which ultimately 
leads to higher overall risks for the firm. Indeed, external successions are generally 
associated with losses in firm-specific human capital (Greiner et al., 2003), as outsiders 
lack the in-depth understanding of the firm’s internal operations and its external 
relationships (Shen & Cannella, 2002). However, the successors’ knowledge and 
expertise wield an impact on both the availability of R&D strategies and the efficacy of 
implementing viable long-term risky investment strategies (Nelson, 1982). Without a 
69 
 
deep insight into the new firms they are running, implementing policies associated with 
elevated levels of R&D investments would be difficult for outsider successors. Moreover, 
as board members and employees of a company are not familiar with the incoming CEO 
appointed from outside, his/ her capability is harder to be accurately evaluated (Shen & 
Cannella, 2002) within a short period of time.  
The easiest way for outsiders to prove themselves and gain respect is through 
delivering enhanced post-succession firm performance. I do find evidence that outsiders 
with risk-taking gaps substantially reduce capital expenditure shortly after they assume 
office. However, they do not necessarily put those excess funds into subsequent R&D 
investment. As the increase in discretionary spending (such as R&D and capital 
expenditure) will lead to an immediate decrease in firm earnings (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; 
Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993), they are better off altering their firms’ post-succession 
risk via reduced financial leverage rather than increased R&D investments. In addition, I 
do not find evidence that outsiders with higher risk-taking propensity are associated with 
increased firm focus (i.e. higher concentration ratio and fewer business segments) after 
the succession event.  
<Inset Table 3.6 here> 
 
3.4.4. Robustness Tests 
3.4.4.1. Controlling for CEO Overconfidence 
Prior literature documents a strong relationship between CEO overconfidence and 
firm risk-taking policy choices (Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et 
al., 2012). To rule out the potential influence of CEO overconfidence on post-succession 
firm risk-taking, I re-run the analysis by adding CEO overconfidence as a control variable. 
I follow Campbell et al. (2011), Hirshleifer et al. (2012), and Cain and McKeon (2016) 
in constructing the CEO overconfidence variable by computing the average moneyness 
of CEO’s unexercised vested options as the per-option realizable value (defined as the 
estimated value of in-the-money unexercised exercisable options over the number of 
unexercised exercisable options) divided by the estimated average strike price (defined 
as the fiscal year-end stock price less per-option realizable value). The resulting dummy 
variable, OVERCONFIDENCE, is set equal to one if a CEO fails to exercise options 
when the average moneyness is over 100% in the succession year or in the fiscal year 
following the succession event. Panel A contains results from the PSM regression of risk-
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taking gap index on subsequent firm risk, while results from the interaction effect of risk-
taking gap index and forced CEO turnover on subsequent firm risk are presented in Panel 
B. Panel C reports the PSM regression results of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap 
index and poor past performance on subsequent firm risk, and Panel D reports results for 
the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and external succession on subsequent firm 
risk. All models include firm and year fixed effects.  
As shown in Table 3.7, the coefficients on the additional control variable 
OVERCONFIDENCE are neither economically nor statistically significant across all 
models. The positive effect of risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk continues to 
hold under forced succession, poor pre-succession performance, and external succession 
confirming that my primary findings are not driven by CEO unobservable psychological 
traits such as overconfidence. 
<Insert Table 3.7 here> 
 
3.4.4.2. Controlling for CEO Total Pay 
 Cheng et al. (2015) document a natural correlation between management total 
compensation and firm risk in a classical principal‐agent model. To rule out the possibility 
that my findings could be driven by CEO pay level, I re-estimate my empirical models 
by adding an additional control variable – TOTAL_PAY, which is defined as the natural 
logarithm of CEO annual total compensation. As shown in Table 3.8, the coefficients on 
TOTAL_PAY are neither economically nor statistically significant across all three 
regression models, and results are largely consistent with those obtained without 
controlling for CEO total pay. Overall, PSM results reported earlier hold and remain 
robust after adding this additional control variable. 
<Insert Table 3.8 here> 
 
3.4.4.3. CEO Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent Long-Term Firm Risk-Taking 
I re-estimate my models using a three-year pre- and post-succession time frame 
(Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008) since strategic changes do not happen overnight and a three-
year post-succession window seems to be appropriate for policy changes. Results from 
such analysis are shown in Table 3.9. Again, by employing the PSM methodology, Panel 
A contains results of the regression of risk-taking gap index on subsequent long-term firm 
risk, Panel B illustrates the regression results of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap 
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index and forced CEO turnover on subsequent long-term firm risk, Panel C reports the 
regression results from the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and poor past 
performance on subsequent long-term firm risk, and finally Panel D reports the regression 
outcome of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and external succession on 
subsequent long-term firm risk. All regressions models include firm and year fixed effects. 
The overall results are largely consistent with previous reported findings. The positive 
coefficients on GAP_INDEX_RISK, and the positive coefficients on the interactions 
between GAP_INDEX_RISK and FORCED/ POOR_PRE_PERF/ OUTSIDER become 
more apparent both in economic magnitude and statistical significance.41 As such, my 
primary findings are robust to adopting different post-succession time frames. 
<Insert Table 3.9 here> 
 
3.4.4.4. Endogeneity 
There are two forms of potential endogeneity concerns that need attention: reverse 
causality and omitted variable bias. Reverse causality emerges when the firm’s overall 
risk profile and risk-taking policy choices affect CEO risk-taking gap index. Fortunately, 
this is not a concern for this study as I mainly focus on CEO personal traits (gender, age, 
and nationality/ race) and life experiences (educational background and career path) to 
construct the CEO risk-taking gap index, which long predate and hence are not likely to 
be affected by the firm’s risk-taking policies and risk profile. Another concern is that 
some unobservable variables that simultaneously influence both firm risk and CEO risk-
taking gap index may hinder my interpretations. For example, Low (2009) documents a 
negative relationship between Delaware firms and firm risk after the regime shift (which 
offers greater takeover protection to firms incorporated in Delaware). Low (2009) also 
finds that firms gradually increase CEO vega in response to the increased protection, in 
order to provide managers with more incentives to maintain firm risk.  
As such, the positive relationship between CEO risk-taking gap index and 
subsequent firm risk could be explained by the endogenous matching of successors with 
a specific risk-taking propensity to firms based on omitted firm characteristics such as the 
state within which the firm is located. I address this potential concern by including firm 
                                                                
41 For example, a one point increase in risk-taking gap index will lead to a 2.0 (0.9) percentage point increase in firm 
long-term (short-term) post-succession total risk at the 1% (10%) statistical significance level, a 1.6 (0.3) percentage 
point increase in long-term (short-term) systematic risk at the 1% statistical significance level (with no statistical 
significance) and a 1.4 (0.8) percentage point increase in long-term idiosyncratic risk at the 5% (10%) statistical 
significance level, respectively. 
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and year fixed effects in my empirical models to rule out the possibility that my findings 
could be driven by time-invariant firm characteristics (e.g. industry sector, geographical 
location). Further, since I am interested in examining the effect of CEO risk-taking gap 
index on firm risk in a succession context, omitted variables if any, must not be 
economically related to CEO risk-taking gap index whilst substantially affecting 
subsequent firm risk in ways predicted by the difference between the predecessor and the 
successor’s observable personal traits. As such, omitted variables will not be a major 
concern in my regression analysis. 
However, the propensity matching process still has some drawbacks. Even if I 
account for selection bias for firms experiencing a succession event, the study is still 
complicated by the endogeneity of a firm’s decision to choose a successor with certain 
traits. More precisely, successors with risk-taking gaps are not randomly assigned and 
some omitted variables which simultaneously influence the selection process and 
subsequent firm risk-taking would hamper the interpretation of results from the PSM 
regressions. Further, firms demanding riskier policies may select successors with higher 
personal risk attributes, therefore, higher subsequent firm risk would be expected no 
matter who assumes office. To address such endogeneity concerns, I adopt the two-stage 
least squares approach. Inspired by Görlitz and Tamm (2015), who not only find that 
people with children are more risk averse, they also document a drop in personal risk 
preference even in the years preceding the birth of a child (especially for the first one). I, 
therefore, use the difference in the number of children between the predecessor and the 
successor (NUM_CHILDREN) as my main instrument.42 The assumption is that ceteris 
paribus, CEOs with more children are more risk averse. NUM_CHILDREN is a suitable 
instrument as it is plausibly related to the difference between the incoming CEO and 
outgoing CEO’s personal risk preference. However, one can hardly argue that it would 
have explanatory power on subsequent firm risk-taking policies and overall firm risk, 
except through its relationship with CEO risk-taking gaps. 
I first regress the risk-taking gap index on the selected instrument - the difference 
in the number of children between the predecessor and the successor (NUM_CHILDREN) 
- along with the previously used set of control variables. Next, I use the instrumented 
GAP_INDEX_RISK (i.e. the fitted value of risk-taking gap index from the first-stage 
                                                                
42 I do not have information on the number of children for all CEOs in my sample irrespective of whether they are 
predecessor or successor. The sample size drops significantly when performing the two-stage least squares regressions, 
largely due to missing information on the instrument (i.e. NUM_CHILDREN). 
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regression for firm i in year t) in the second-stage regressions to test my two main 
hypotheses, with the second one containing three sub-hypotheses. In Table 3.10, the 
dependent variables for the second stage regressions are the peer-adjusted subsequent 
firm risk (i.e. the difference in subsequent firm risk between the treatment firm and the 
average subsequent performance of the matching group of each firm i in year t+1). Panel 
A presents the results of the main outcomes from PSM regression of CEO risk-taking gap 
index on subsequent firm risk while Panels B, C, and D present results that include the 
interaction effect of CEO risk-taking gap index and forced removal, poor past 
performance, and external succession, respectively. All regressions also include firm and 
year fixed effects. It is clear from the results in Table 3.10, that the coefficients on 
NUM_CHILDREN in the first stage within (i.e. fixed effect) regression are all negatively 
related to GAP_INDEX_RISK at better than the 1% statistical significance level. This 
suggests that fewer children indeed has a strong explanatory power on increased CEO 
risk preference. Although results in Panel A reveal no relationship between risk-taking 
gap index and subsequent firm risks, I do however, find the hypothesized positive 
relationship to be more pronounced when considering disruptive environments such as 
forced turnover, poor pre-succession performance, and external succession. Overall, my 
main PSM results remain robust to the existence of any endogenous relationships that 
could render interpretation of results difficult. 
<Insert Table 3.10 here> 
 
3.4.5. Further Tests – Pre-Succession Firm-Level Determinant of CEO Risk-Taking Gap 
Index 
So far I have examined in the previous sections how differences in CEOs’ 
personality traits drive firm's risk-taking activities. An equally interesting question is, 
under what conditions would firms decide to employ successors with high risk-taking 
gaps in order to drive future risk-taking activities? For example, managers are more 
encouraged to adopt riskier policies when the business is in distress as opposed to when 
the firm is performing well (March & Shapira, 1987). Firms could also tap a risk-taker to 
overcome challenging circumstances such as intense market competition and/ or pre-
succession firm strategic instability. In doing so, firms would invest more in R&D and 
take up leveraging strategies to improve their market position. 
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I, therefore, employ a logit model to predict the circumstances under which firms 
are more likely to hire successors with risk-taking gaps. My dependent variable, 
HIGH_GAP_INDEX_RISK, equals one if the firm has a GAP_INDEX_RISK greater 
than the median value of one and zero otherwise. Control variables include: product 
substitutability (SUBSTITUTABILITY) 43  as a proxy for market competitiveness; 
strategic instability (SI) and strategic difference (SD),44 which measures pre-succession 
firm strategic conditions following Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) and Zhang and 
Rajagopalan (2004); poor past performance (POOR_PRE_PERF) which indicates a 
firm’s financial state prior to the succession event; total risk (STKVOL) to proxy for a 
firm’s overall risk profile; dividend coverage (DIV_COVERAGE) and interest coverage 
(INTEREST_COVERAGE) to proxy for the firm’s probability of experiencing a 
financial distress and potential bankruptcy; market-to-book (MTB) which represents a 
firm’s growth potential and signifies its investment opportunities; firm size (SIZE) and 
firm age (FIRM_AGE); industry-median adjusted firm leverage (LEV_TDA_ADJ), 
industry-median adjusted capital expenditure (CAPEX_ADJ) and industry-median 
adjusted R&D intensity (RND_ADJ), all of which captures a firm’s risk preference above 
its industry median that is captured by its current risk-taking policy choices. Last but not 
least, two corporate governance measures, board size (BOARDSIZE) and board 
independence (BOARD_IND) are included. The model includes firm and year fixed 
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across different firms and years.  
Consistent with my earlier conjecture, the negative coefficient on 
DIV_COVERAGE suggests that firms with better ability to cover dividends (available 
profit) are less likely to experience a leadership change and tap successors with higher 
risk preference. Besides, firms with higher levels of pre-succession strategic instability 
(SI) have a greater probability of replacing their CEOs with a risk-taker. As suggested by 
the positive coefficient on BOARDSIZE, firms with a larger board prior to the succession 
event are more likely to choose candidates with a higher risk-taking propensity than their 
predecessors as indicated by their observable personal traits. I do not find evidence of 
firms trying to match the incoming CEOs with their risk preference (i.e. riskier firms tap 
successors with higher risk preference), as the coefficients on past stock return volatility 
                                                                
43 I follow Karuna (2007) in using product substitutability as a proxy for market competition, since it gauges better the 
competition that an organization might face at the firm-specific level, rather than just at the industry level. 
44 I follow Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) by using only four dimensions (i.e. plant and equipment newness, non-
production overheads, inventory levels and financial leverage) to composite both strategic instability and strategic 
difference. This is due to a considerable amount of data missing in terms of advertising intensity and R&D intensity. 
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(STKVOL) and risk-taking policies (LEV_ADJ, CAPEX_ADJ and RND_ADJ) lack 
significance. These findings suggest that the increase in firm risk after appointing 
successors with higher risk-taking gaps occurs mainly through the act of imprinting (i.e. 
incoming CEOs imposing their idiosyncratic styles on the firms they lead) rather than 
matching (i.e. incoming CEOs are purposefully chosen by firms because of their specific 
attributes).  
<Insert Table 3.11 here> 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between CEO succession-induced 
risk-taking gaps and subsequent firm risk by taking into account both the underlying 
nature of the succession event and CEO personal risk-taking attributes. By using a PSM 
regression approach, the partial effect of succession-induced risk-taking gap index could 
be analysed by comparing post-succession firm risk with its matched peers (i.e. non-
succession firms). 
Focusing on a sample of S&P 500 companies spanning the period 1992 to 2016, 
this study finds that succession-induced risk-gap index leads to elevated levels of overall 
firm risk post-succession, especially when the succession was a forced turnover, was 
preceded by poor pre-succession performance, or when the incoming CEO was an 
external candidate. This suggests that the disruptive nature of succession provides those 
successors with risk-taking gaps to exercise greater discretion in imprinting their personal 
traits on subsequent firm risk. 
My empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that riskier 
successor-induced policy choices would be expected when the event itself signals a 
change in firm policy or post-succession redirection. In this study, I find that succession-
induced risk-taking gaps substantially lead to higher subsequent financial and operating 
leverage, higher R&D investments, lower capital expenditures, and increased firm focus 
when the succession is forced, past firm performance is poor, and when the incoming 
CEO is an outsider. These factors ultimately result not only in an increase in firm total 
risk but also an increase in systematic and idiosyncratic components of risk.  
For any company operating in today’s ever-changing business environment, it 
needs to take on risk in order to grow and develop. Risk management is often considered 
as an appendage to performance management and CEOs are increasingly assuming 
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powers and responsibilities that render them the most important individuals in driving an 
organization’s decision-making process. As such, it is important for a firm to increase 
risk awareness with the board of directors and management, and try to identify a suitable 
candidate for the top leadership job in a succession context. My findings suggest that 
CEOs’ personal risk-taking attributes in non-economic contexts have implications for 
business’ risk-taking policies and overall firm risk. Based on the above empirical analysis, 
one policy implication is that firms can identify CEOs’ risk propensity with a series of 
easily observable personal traits to supplement extrinsic contractually driven incentives 




Table 3. 1 Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in this paper spanning the period 1996-2016. Panel A provides comparisons of descriptive statistics between succession group and non-succession 
group, Panel B reports comparisons of descriptive statistics between forced succession and non-forced succession group, Panel C reports comparisons of descriptive statistics between poor pre-succession 
performance and good pre-succession performance group and Panel D reports comparisons of descriptive statistics between external succession and internal promotion group. The dependent variable, TE is the 
difference in subsequent firm risk-taking between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the matching group (non-succession matched peers) one year following the succession event. Firm risk-taking measures 
include: (1) total risk (STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns, (2) systematic risk (SYSVOL), defined as the standard deviation of the product of the firm’s beta 
(calculated by using the market model and regressing the firm’s monthly stock return on CRSP value-weighted market return) times market monthly returns, and (3) idiosyncratic risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined 
as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return residuals. The state variable — GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as follows: I add one point if the succession is characterized by male replacing 
female/ young replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 years age difference/ U.S. CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry specialist/ CEO with a technical educational background 
replacing one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to five, with the minimum value indicating a successor aligning closely to the predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as 
measured by personal traits and backgrounds, and the maximum value suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably higher than his/ her predecessor. FORCED is a dummy variable equals to one 
if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the 
firm’s pre-succession firm financial performance and stock return are lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. 
OUTSIDER takes the value of one if the successor was employed by the firm for less than one year before he/ she assumed office and zero otherwise. Firm Characteristic control variables include: profitability 
(ROA), firm size (SIZE), firm age (FIRM_AGE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), annual sales growth rate (SALES_GROWTH), book leverage (LEV_TDA), R&D (RND) and capital expenditure (CAPEX). CEO 
incentive control variables include: CEO pay-performance sensitivity (LOG_DELTA) and CEO risk-taking incentives (LOG_VEGA). Control variables definitions are provided in Appendix E. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Panel A: Succession (S) vs Non-
Succession (NS) Group 
 
Panel B: Forced Succession (F) vs 
Non-forced Succession (NF) Group 
 
Panel C: Good Pre-Performance (GP) 
vs Poor Pre-Performance (BP) Group 
 
Panel D: External Succession (O) vs 
Internal Promotion (I) Group 
  S  NS    F  NF    BP  GP    O  I   
Variable  Mean  Mean  Diff  Mean  Mean  Diff  Mean  Mean  Diff  Mean  Mean  Diff 
POST_STKVOL  0.086  0.090  -0.004**  0.094  0.084  0.011**  0.095  0.083  0.012**  0.094  0.084  0.010** 
POST_SYSVOL  0.041  0.042  -0.002  0.044  0.040  0.004  0.045  0.039  0.006*  0.043  0.040  0.003 
POST_IDIO_STKVOL  0.078  0.083  -0.004**  0.085  0.077  0.008*  0.087  0.076  0.011**  0.091  0.075  0.016** 
GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.768  0.000  0.768***  0.775  0.767  0.008  0.743  0.776  -0.033  0.753  0.772  0.019 
FORCED  0.274  0.000  0.274***        0.437  0.218  0.219***  0.427  0.238  0.190*** 
POOR_PRE_PERF  0.253  0.205  0.048***  0.408  0.198  0.210***        0.315  0.239  0.075 
OUTSIDER  0.188  0.000  0.188***  0.296  0.149  0.147***  0.234  0.173  0.061       
ROA  0.164  0.165  -0.001  0.147  0.170  -0.023***  0.120  0.178  -0.057***  0.145  0.168  -0.023** 
SIZE  9.071  8.806  0.265***  9.351  8.982  0.368***  9.098  9.062  0.035  8.828  9.131  -0.303** 
FIRM_AGE  4.042  3.859  0.184***  3.920  4.086  -0.166**  4.015  4.051  -0.036  3.938  4.068  -0.131 
MTB  1.913  2.064  -0.152**  1.658  2.006  -0.349***  1.357  2.091  -0.733***  1.735  1.957  -0.222* 
LEV_TDA  0.246  0.236  0.010  0.268  0.238  0.030**  0.257  0.242  0.015  0.262  0.242  0.020 
RND  0.062  0.071  -0.009*  0.085  0.054  0.031**  0.075  0.058  0.017  0.082  0.057  0.025 
CAPEX  0.055  0.058  -0.004*  0.048  0.057  -0.008**  0.044  0.058  -0.014***  0.047  0.057  -0.010** 
SALES_GROWTH  0.081  0.151  -0.070***  0.032  0.099  -0.067***  0.036  0.096  -0.061***  0.099  0.077  0.022 
LOG_VEGA  4.809  4.874  -0.065  4.982  4.772  0.210  4.804  4.811  -0.007  4.956  4.775  0.181 
LOG_DELTA  5.759  6.427  -0.669***  5.747  5.772  -0.026  5.510  5.834  -0.324***  5.508  5.817  -0.309*** 
Observations  659  6482    179  475    167  492    124  535   
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Table 3. 2 PSM Regression of Gap Index on Subsequent Firm Performance 
Table 3.2 presents the results from PSM regression of CEO succession risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk. The dependent 
variable, TE is the difference in subsequent firm risk-taking between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the matching group 
(non-succession matched peers) one year following the succession event. Firm risk measurements include: (1) total risk (STKVOL), 
defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns, (2) systematic risk (SYSVOL), defined as the standard deviation 
of the product of the firm’s beta (calculated by using the market model and regressing the firm’s monthly stock return on CRSP value-
weighted market return) times market monthly returns, and (3) idiosyncratic risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard 
deviation of monthly stock return residuals. The state variable — GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as follows. I add one point if 
the succession is characterized by male replacing female/ young replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 years age difference/ U.S. 
CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry specialist/ CEO with a technical educational background replacing 
one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to five, with the minimum value indicating a successor aligning closely 
to the predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as measured by personal traits and backgrounds, and the maximum value 
suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably higher than his/ her predecessor. Firm Characteristic control variables 
include: profitability (ROA), firm size (SIZE), firm age (FIRM_AGE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), annual sales growth rate 
(SALES_GROWTH), book leverage (LEV_TDA), R&D (RND) and capital expenditure (CAPEX). CEO incentive control variables 
include: CEO pay-performance sensitivity (LOG_DELTA) and CEO risk-taking incentives (LOG_VEGA). All regressions include 
firm and year fixed effects. Control variables definitions are provided in Appendix E. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and 
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable  Total Risk  Systematic Risk  Idiosyncratic Risk 
GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.009*  0.003  0.008* 
  (1.825)  (1.050)  (1.825) 
ROA  0.111  0.032  0.120* 
  (1.508)  (0.685)  (1.933) 
SIZE  0.014  0.022**  0.010 
  (1.004)  (2.564)  (0.855) 
FIRM_AGE  -0.012  -0.013  0.023 
  (-0.281)  (-0.466)  (0.646) 
MTB  -0.007  -0.002  -0.005 
  (-1.296)  (-0.500)  (-1.267) 
SALES_GROWTH  0.005  0.002  0.006 
  (0.872)  (0.590)  (1.319) 
LEV_TDA  -0.057*  -0.036*  -0.033 
  (-1.755)  (-1.752)  (-1.199) 
RND  0.268***  0.042  0.286*** 
  (2.601)  (0.650)  (3.304) 
CAPEX  -0.039  0.251**  -0.184 
  (-0.228)  (2.315)  (-1.276) 
LOG_VEGA  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
  (-0.140)  (-0.798)  (-0.295) 
LOG_DELTA  0.004  0.002  0.001 
  (1.179)  (0.874)  (0.446) 
Constant  -0.098  -0.163  -0.198 
  (-0.448)  (-1.190)  (-1.086) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 
R-squared  0.177  0.254  0.144 
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Table 3. 3 Interaction Effect of CEO Risk-Taking Gap Index and CEO Forced Removal 
on Subsequent Firm Risk-Taking 
Table 3.3 presents the results from PSM regression for the interaction effect of CEO risk-taking gap index and CEO forced removal 
on subsequent firm risk. The dependent variable, TE is the difference in subsequent firm risk-taking between the treatment firm 
(succession firm) and the matching group (non-succession matched peers) one year following the succession event. Firm risk 
measurements include: (1) total risk (STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns, (2) systematic 
risk (SYSVOL), defined as the standard deviation of the product of the firm’s beta (calculated by using the market model and 
regressing the firm’s monthly stock return on CRSP value-weighted market return) times market monthly returns, and (3) idiosyncratic 
risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return residuals. The state variable — 
GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as follows. I add one point if the succession is characterized by male replacing female/ young 
replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 years age difference/ U.S. CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry 
specialist/ CEO with a technical educational background replacing one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to 
five, with the minimum value indicating a successor aligning closely to the predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as 
measured by personal traits and backgrounds, and the maximum value suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably 
higher than his/ her predecessor. FORCED is a dummy variable equals to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The 
classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). Firm Characteristic control 
variables include: profitability (ROA), firm size (SIZE), firm age (FIRM_AGE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), annual sales growth 
rate (SALES_GROWTH), book leverage (LEV_TDA), R&D (RND) and capital expenditure (CAPEX). CEO incentive control 
variables include: CEO pay-performance sensitivity (LOG_DELTA) and CEO risk-taking incentives (LOG_VEGA). All regressions 
include firm and year fixed effects. Control variables definitions are provided in Appendix E. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable  Total Risk  Systematic Risk  Idiosyncratic Risk 
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.001  -0.004  -0.002 
  (-0.229)  (-1.011)  (-0.433) 
FORCED  0.006  -0.009  0.009 
  (0.444)  (-1.038)  (0.759) 
FORCED*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.023*  0.025***  0.020* 
  (1.683)  (2.892)  (1.712) 
ROA  0.102  0.020  0.112* 
  (1.377)  (0.429)  (1.811) 
SIZE  0.010  0.020**  0.007 
  (0.760)  (2.272)  (0.588) 
FIRM_AGE  -0.012  -0.013  0.023 
  (-0.288)  (-0.497)  (0.650) 
MTB  -0.007  -0.002  -0.006 
  (-1.349)  (-0.509)  (-1.336) 
SALES_GROWTH  0.006  0.003  0.007 
  (1.115)  (0.871)  (1.594) 
LEV_TDA  -0.055*  -0.035*  -0.031 
  (-1.698)  (-1.697)  (-1.133) 
RND  0.278***  0.047  0.295*** 
  (2.706)  (0.730)  (3.437) 
CAPEX  -0.030  0.255**  -0.174 
  (-0.172)  (2.371)  (-1.218) 
LOG_VEGA  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
  (-0.111)  (-0.787)  (-0.262) 
LOG_DELTA  0.005  0.002  0.002 
  (1.285)  (0.990)  (0.562) 
Constant  -0.066  -0.136  -0.170 
  (-0.305)  (-0.994)  (-0.939) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 




Table 3. 4 Interaction Effect of CEO Risk-Taking Gap Index and Poor Past Performance 
on Subsequent Firm Risk-Taking 
Table 3.4 presents the results from PSM regression for the interaction effect of CEO risk-taking gap index and poor past performance 
on subsequent firm risk. The dependent variable, TE is the difference in subsequent firm risk-taking between the treatment firm 
(succession firm) and the matching group (non-succession matched peers) one year following the succession event. Firm risk 
measurements include: (1) total risk (STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns, (2) systematic 
risk (SYSVOL), defined as the standard deviation of the product of the firm’s beta (calculated by using the market model and 
regressing the firm’s monthly stock return on CRSP value-weighted market return) times market monthly returns, and (3) idiosyncratic 
risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return residuals. The state variable — 
GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as follows. I add one point if the succession is characterized by male replacing female/ young 
replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 years age difference/ U.S. CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry 
specialist/ CEO with a technical educational background replacing one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to 
five, with the minimum value indicating a successor aligning closely to the predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as 
measured by personal traits and backgrounds, and the maximum value suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably 
higher than his/ her predecessor. POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-succession firm financial performance 
and stock return are lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at 
the two-digit SIC code level. Firm Characteristic control variables include: profitability (ROA), firm size (SIZE), firm age 
(FIRM_AGE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), annual sales growth rate (SALES_GROWTH), book leverage (LEV_TDA), R&D (RND) 
and capital expenditure (CAPEX). CEO incentive control variables include: CEO pay-performance sensitivity (LOG_DELTA) and 
CEO risk-taking incentives (LOG_VEGA). All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Control variables definitions are 
provided in Appendix E. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Variable  Total Risk  Systematic Risk  Idiosyncratic Risk 
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.002  -0.000  -0.003 
  (-0.430)  (-0.082)  (-0.690) 
POOR_PRE_PERF  -0.007  -0.006**  -0.001 
  (-1.529)  (-2.114)  (-0.319) 
POOR_PRE_PERF*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.066***  0.019**  0.064*** 
  (5.145)  (2.333)  (5.998) 
ROA  0.092  0.028  0.098 
  (1.268)  (0.597)  (1.642) 
SIZE  0.006  0.020**  0.002 
  (0.436)  (2.348)  (0.143) 
FIRM_AGE  -0.015  -0.014  0.021 
  (-0.356)  (-0.518)  (0.609) 
MTB  -0.008*  -0.002  -0.007* 
  (-1.666)  (-0.643)  (-1.718) 
SALES_GROWTH  0.006  0.002  0.008* 
  (1.095)  (0.593)  (1.691) 
LEV_TDA  -0.048  -0.034*  -0.024 
  (-1.513)  (-1.648)  (-0.892) 
RND  0.243**  0.033  0.263*** 
  (2.409)  (0.515)  (3.142) 
CAPEX  -0.036  0.240**  -0.165 
  (-0.214)  (2.220)  (-1.177) 
LOG_VEGA  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
  (-0.096)  (-0.775)  (-0.257) 
LOG_DELTA  0.006  0.002  0.003 
  (1.556)  (0.956)  (0.954) 
Constant  -0.009  -0.137  -0.113 
  (-0.043)  (-1.005)  (-0.638) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 




Table 3. 5 Interaction Effect of CEO Risk-Taking Gap Index and External Succession on 
Subsequent Firm Risk-Taking 
Table 3.5 presents the results from PSM regression for the interaction effect of CEO risk-taking gap index and external succession on 
subsequent firm risk. The dependent variable, TE is the difference in subsequent firm risk-taking between the treatment firm 
(succession firm) and the matching group (non-succession matched peers) one year following the succession event. Firm risk 
measurements include: (1) total risk (STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns, (2) systematic 
risk (SYSVOL), defined as the standard deviation of the product of the firm’s beta (calculated by using the market model and 
regressing the firm’s monthly stock return on CRSP value-weighted market return) times market monthly returns, and (3) idiosyncratic 
risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return residuals. The state variable — 
GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as follows. I add one point if the succession is characterized by male replacing female/ young 
replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 years age difference/ U.S. CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry 
specialist/ CEO with a technical educational background replacing one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to 
five, with the minimum value indicating a successor aligning closely to the predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as 
measured by personal traits and backgrounds, and the maximum value suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably 
higher than his/ her predecessor. OUTSIDER takes the value of one if the successor was employed by the firm for less than one year 
before he/ she assumed office and zero otherwise. Firm Characteristic control variables include: profitability (ROA), firm size (SIZE), 
firm age (FIRM_AGE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), annual sales growth rate (SALES_GROWTH), book leverage (LEV_TDA), 
R&D (RND) and capital expenditure (CAPEX). CEO incentive control variables include: CEO pay-performance sensitivity 
(LOG_DELTA) and CEO risk-taking incentives (LOG_VEGA). All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Control variables 
definitions are provided in Appendix E. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
  Total Risk  Systematic Risk  Idiosyncratic Risk 
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.003  -0.002  -0.005 
  (-0.609)  (-0.642)  (-1.171) 
OUTSIDER  0.012  0.008  -0.002 
  (1.370)  (1.372)  (-0.259) 
OUTSIDER*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.105***  0.048***  0.102*** 
  (7.984)  (5.570)  (9.356) 
ROA  0.121*  0.036  0.129** 
  (1.751)  (0.808)  (2.261) 
SIZE  0.008  0.020**  0.005 
  (0.653)  (2.347)  (0.480) 
FIRM_AGE  -0.004  -0.009  0.032 
  (-0.105)  (-0.351)  (0.953) 
MTB  -0.009*  -0.003  -0.008** 
  (-1.877)  (-0.853)  (-1.994) 
SALES_GROWTH  0.004  0.002  0.005 
  (0.752)  (0.474)  (1.266) 
LEV_TDA  -0.051*  -0.033*  -0.027 
  (-1.664)  (-1.660)  (-1.081) 
RND  0.293***  0.057  0.289*** 
  (3.006)  (0.900)  (3.599) 
CAPEX  -0.030  0.254**  -0.167 
  (-0.185)  (2.421)  (-1.258) 
LOG_VEGA  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
  (-0.263)  (-0.930)  (-0.336) 
LOG_DELTA  0.008**  0.004  0.005* 
  (2.280)  (1.622)  (1.661) 
Constant  -0.103  -0.165  -0.208 
  (-0.505)  (-1.244)  (-1.234) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 
R-squared  0.281  0.305  0.276 
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Table 3. 6 CEO Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent Firm Risk-Taking Policies 
Table 3.6 presents the results from PSM regression of CEO succession risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk-taking policies. The dependent variable, TE is the difference in firm risk-taking policies 
between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the matching group (non-succession matched peers) following the succession event. Firm risk-taking policy measurements include: (1) book leverage of total 
debt (LEV_TDA), defined as sum of the firm’s debt in current liabilities and long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets, (2) book leverage of long-term debt (LEV_LDA), defined as book value of long-
term debt scaled by book value of total assets, (3) market leverage of total debt (LEV_TDM), defined as sum of the firm’s debt in current liabilities and long-term debt scaled by market value of total assets, (4) 
market leverage of long-term debt (LEV_TDM), defined as book value of long-term debt scaled by market value of total assets, (5) operating leverage (OPLEV), defined as the percentage change in firm’s EBIT 
scaled by percentage in sales, (6) research and development (RND), defined as research and development expenditure scaled by total assets, (7) capital expenditure (CAPEX), defined as total capital expenditure 
scaled by total assets, (8) segment sales-based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HERF), defined as sum of square of business segment sales scaled by the square of firm total sales, and (9) number of business 
segments (NUM_SEG), defined as the number of business segments within which the firm operates. The state variable — GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as follows. I add one point if the succession is 
characterized by male replacing female/ young replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 years age difference/ U.S. CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry specialist/ CEO with a 
technical educational background replacing one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to five, with the minimum value indicating a successor aligning closely to the predecessor with regard 
to their risk-taking tendency as measured by personal traits and backgrounds, and the maximum value suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably higher than his/ her predecessor. FORCED is 
a dummy variable equals to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF 
takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-succession firm financial performance and stock return are lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at 
the two-digit SIC code level. OUTSIDER takes the value of one if the successor was employed by the firm for less than one year before he/ she assumed office and zero otherwise. Firm Characteristic control 
variables (suppressed) include: profitability (ROA), firm size (SIZE), firm age (FIRM_AGE), market-to-book ratio (MTB), annual sales growth rate (SALES_GROWTH), book leverage (LEV_TDA) and lagged 
dependent variable one-year before the succession event happens. Corporate governance control variables (suppressed) include: board size (BOARDSIZE) and board independence (BOARD_IND). CEO incentive 
control variables (suppressed) include: CEO pay-performance sensitivity (LOG_DELTA) and CEO risk-taking incentives (LOG_VEGA). In the regressions using financial leverage and operating leverage as 
dependent variables, the control variable book leverage (LEV_TDA) is replaced with R&D intensity (RND). All control variables are at the time when the succession event takes place (time t). Panel A reports 
estimates of risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk-taking policies. Panel B reports estimates of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and forced removal on subsequent firm risk-taking policies. 
Panel C reports estimates of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and poor past performance on subsequent firm risk-taking policies. Meanwhile Panel D reports estimates of the interaction effect of risk-
taking gap index and external succession on subsequent firm risk-taking policies. Control variables definitions are provided in Appendix E. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable  LEV_TDA  LEV_LDA  LEV_TDM  LEV_LDM  OPLEV  RND  CAPEX  HERF  NUM_SEG 
Panel A: Risk-Taking Gap Index and 
Subsequent Firm Risk-Taking Policies 
                  
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.004  -0.007  0.038**  0.024*  29.687***  0.020  0.003  -0.012  -0.063 
  (-0.267)  (-0.533)  (2.324)  (1.847)  (2.850)  (1.633)  (0.966)  (-0.342)  (-0.096) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  371  371  357  357  366  370  493  493  493 
R-squared  0.096  0.111  0.043  0.046  0.268  0.126  0.096  0.060  0.119 
Panel B: the Interaction Effect of Risk-
Taking Gap Index and Forced Removal 
on Subsequent Firm Risk-Taking 
Policies 
                  
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.037*  -0.037**  0.001  -0.002  44.743***  -0.020  0.006*  -0.023  0.543 
  (-1.794)  (-2.185)  (0.031)  (-0.106)  (3.520)  (-1.335)  (1.653)  (-0.537)  (0.683) 
FORCED  -0.016  -0.041  -0.080**  -0.073**  3.721  0.061*  0.015*  -0.104  1.326 
  (-0.365)  (-1.154)  (-1.999)  (-2.274)  (0.140)  (1.961)  (1.906)  (-1.140)  (0.797) 
FORCED*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.101**  0.110***  0.160***  0.123***  -45.139  0.079**  -0.020**  0.104  -2.763 
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  (2.246)  (2.974)  (3.711)  (3.548)  (-1.606)  (2.406)  (-2.325)  (1.046)  (-1.525) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  371  371  357  357  366  370  493  493  493 
R-squared  0.108  0.126  0.067  0.067  0.273  0.166  0.103  0.061  0.122 
Panel C: the Interaction Effect of Risk-
Taking Gap Index and Poor Past 
Performance on Subsequent Firm Risk-
Taking Policies 
                  
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.025  -0.015  -0.003  -0.001  33.071***  0.009  0.004  -0.054  0.439 
  (-1.420)  (-1.007)  (-0.191)  (-0.069)  (2.972)  (0.687)  (1.287)  (-1.391)  (0.622) 
POOR_PRE_PERF  -0.012  -0.010  -0.018  -0.015  7.075  0.006  0.004  0.004  -0.243 
  (-0.850)  (-0.837)  (-1.309)  (-1.341)  (0.779)  (0.590)  (1.478)  (0.149)  (-0.474) 
POOR_PRE_PERF*GAP_INDEX_RIS
K 
 0.160***  0.054  0.303***  0.182***  -22.716  0.105***  -0.007  0.332***  -4.201** 
  (3.316)  (1.353)  (6.844)  (5.034)  (-0.749)  (2.872)  (-0.843)  (3.206)  (-2.216) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  371  371  357  357  366  370  493  493  493 
R-squared  0.113  0.114  0.119  0.089  0.269  0.139  0.099  0.072  0.125 
Panel D: the Interaction Effect of Risk-
Taking Gap Index and External 
Succession on Subsequent Firm Risk-
Taking Policies 
                  
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.033*  -0.023  -0.000  -0.002  30.743***  0.023*  0.005  -0.023  -0.075 
  (-1.893)  (-1.585)  (-0.022)  (-0.154)  (2.799)  (1.776)  (1.617)  (-0.610)  (-0.107) 
OUTSIDER  0.001  0.013  0.030  0.019  -1.147  0.045**  0.009*  -0.064  1.137 
  (0.030)  (0.561)  (1.165)  (0.935)  (-0.064)  (2.151)  (1.756)  (-1.125)  (1.089) 
OUTSIDER*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.259***  0.143***  0.430***  0.293***  -9.827  -0.025  -0.019**  0.089  0.327 
  (5.265)  (3.489)  (8.678)  (7.215)  (-0.313)  (-0.654)  (-2.088)  (0.817)  (0.163) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  371  371  357  357  366  370  493  493  493 
R-squared  0.138  0.130  0.162  0.131  0.268  0.133  0.104  0.062  0.121 
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Table 3. 7 CEO Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent Firm Risk-Taking, Controlling 
for CEO Overconfidence 
Table 3.7 presents the results from PSM regression of CEO succession risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk. The dependent 
variable, TE is the difference in subsequent firm risk-taking between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the matching group 
(non-succession matched peers) one year following the succession event. Firm risk measurements include: (1) total risk (STKVOL), 
defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns, (2) systematic risk (SYSVOL), defined as the standard deviation 
of the product of the firm’s beta (calculated by using the market model and regressing the firm’s monthly stock return on CRSP value-
weighted market return) times market monthly returns, and (3) idiosyncratic risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard 
deviation of monthly stock return residuals. The state variable — GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as follows. I add one point if 
the succession is characterized by male replacing female/ young replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 years age difference/ U.S. 
CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry specialist/ CEO with a technical educational background replacing 
one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to five, with the minimum value indicating a successor aligning closely 
to the predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as measured by personal traits and backgrounds, and the maximum value 
suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably higher than his/ her predecessor. FORCED is a dummy variable equals 
to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the 
method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-succession firm financial performance and 
stock return are lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at the 
two-digit SIC code level. OUTSIDER takes the value of one if the successor was employed by the firm for less than one year before 
he/ she assumed office and zero otherwise. Panel A reports estimates of risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk. Panel B reports 
estimates of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and forced removal on subsequent firm risk. Panel C reports estimates of 
the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and poor past performance on subsequent firm risk. Meanwhile Panel D reports estimates 
of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and external succession on subsequent firm risk. The models include all control 
variables from Table 3.2 (suppressed) and OVERCONFIDENCE. Control variables definitions are provided in Appendix E. All 
regressions include firm and year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable  Total Risk  Systematic Risk  Idiosyncratic Risk 
Panel A: Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent 
Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.009*  0.003  0.008* 
  (1.835)  (1.045)  (1.828) 
OVERCONFIDENCE  -0.001  0.001  0.002 
  (-0.233)  (0.163)  (0.410) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 
R-squared  0.182  0.251  0.145 
Panel B: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking 
Gap Index and Forced Removal on Subsequent 
Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.001  -0.004  -0.002 
  (-0.214)  (-1.009)  (-0.414) 
FORCED  0.007  -0.009  0.009 
  (0.483)  (-1.040)  (0.731) 
FORCED*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.023  0.025***  0.020* 
  (1.645)  (2.886)  (1.707) 
OVERCONFIDENCE  -0.002  0.000  0.001 
  (-0.401)  (0.144)  (0.204) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 
R-squared  0.195  0.266  0.162 
Panel C: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking 
Gap Index and Poor Past Performance on 
Subsequent Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.002  -0.000  -0.003 
  (-0.413)  (-0.089)  (-0.683) 
POOR_PRE_PERF  -0.006  -0.006**  -0.001 
  (-1.408)  (-2.113)  (-0.301) 
POOR_PRE_PERF*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.066***  0.019**  0.064*** 
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  (5.144)  (2.338)  (5.991) 
OVERCONFIDENCE  -0.001  0.001  0.002 
  (-0.139)  (0.222)  (0.528) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 
R-squared  0.225  0.264  0.204 
Panel D: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking 
Gap Index and External Succession on 
Subsequent Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.003  -0.002  -0.005 
  (-0.608)  (-0.640)  (-1.155) 
OUTSIDER  0.012  0.008  -0.002 
  (1.403)  (1.374)  (-0.228) 
OUTSIDER*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.106***  0.048***  0.102*** 
  (8.025)  (5.544)  (9.319) 
OVERCONFIDENCE  -0.002  0.000  0.001 
  (-0.371)  (0.096)  (0.251) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 





Table 3. 8 CEO Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent Firm Risk-Taking, Controlling 
for CEO Total Pay 
Table 3.8 presents the results from PSM regression of CEO succession risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk. The dependent 
variable, TE is the difference in subsequent firm risk-taking between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the matching group 
(non-succession matched peers) one year following the succession event. Firm risk measurements include: (1) total risk (STKVOL), 
defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns, (2) systematic risk (SYSVOL), defined as the standard deviation 
of the product of the firm’s beta (calculated by using the market model and regressing the firm’s monthly stock return on CRSP value-
weighted market return) times market monthly returns, and (3) idiosyncratic risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard 
deviation of monthly stock return residuals. The state variable — GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as follows. I add one point if 
the succession is characterized by male replacing female/ young replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 years age difference/ U.S. 
CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry specialist/ CEO with a technical educational background replacing 
one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to five, with the minimum value indicating a successor aligning closely 
to the predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as measured by personal traits and backgrounds, and the maximum value 
suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably higher than his/ her predecessor. FORCED is a dummy variable equals 
to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the 
method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-succession firm financial performance and 
stock return are lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at the 
two-digit SIC code level. OUTSIDER takes the value of one if the successor was employed by the firm for less than one year before 
he/ she assumed office and zero otherwise. Panel A reports estimates of risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk. Panel B reports 
estimates of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and forced removal on subsequent firm risk. Panel C reports estimates of 
the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and poor past performance on subsequent firm risk. Meanwhile Panel D reports estimates 
of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and external succession on subsequent firm risk. The models include all control 
variables from Table 3.2 (suppressed) and TOTAL_PAY. Control variables definitions are provided in Appendix E. All regressions 
include firm and year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Variable  Total Risk  Systematic Risk  Idiosyncratic Risk 
Panel A: Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent 
Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.010*  0.003  0.008* 
  (1.844)  (1.022)  (1.834) 
TOTAL_PAY  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
  (0.059)  (-0.276)  (0.080) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 
R-squared  0.182  0.251  0.143 
Panel B: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking 
Gap Index and Forced Removal on Subsequent 
Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.001  -0.004  -0.002 
  (-0.177)  (-1.020)  (-0.424) 
FORCED  0.006  -0.009  0.009 
  (0.463)  (-1.046)  (0.758) 
FORCED*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.023*  0.025***  0.020* 
  (1.665)  (2.881)  (1.713) 
TOTAL_PAY  0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.107)  (-0.279)  (0.142) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 
R-squared  0.195  0.266  0.160 
Panel C: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking 
Gap Index and Poor Past Performance on 
Subsequent Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.002  -0.000  -0.003 
  (-0.394)  (-0.098)  (-0.686) 
POOR_PRE_PERF  -0.006  -0.006**  -0.001 
  (-1.467)  (-2.123)  (-0.302) 
POOR_PRE_PERF*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.067***  0.019**  0.064*** 
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  (5.209)  (2.309)  (6.022) 
TOTAL_PAY  0.002  -0.001  0.002 
  (0.322)  (-0.188)  (0.409) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 
R-squared  0.226  0.264  0.202 
Panel D: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking 
Gap Index and External Succession on 
Subsequent Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.003  -0.002  -0.005 
  (-0.568)  (-0.658)  (-1.157) 
OUTSIDER  0.012  0.008  -0.002 
  (1.400)  (1.403)  (-0.223) 
OUTSIDER*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.106***  0.048***  0.102*** 
  (8.044)  (5.535)  (9.343) 
TOTAL_PAY  -0.001  -0.002  -0.000 
  (-0.169)  (-0.463)  (-0.105) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  645  645  645 




Table 3. 9 CEO Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent Long-Term Firm Risk-Taking 
Table 3.9 presents the results from PSM regression of CEO succession risk-taking gap index on subsequent long-term firm risk. The 
dependent variable, TE is the difference in three-year average firm risk-taking between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the 
matching group (non-succession matched peers) following the succession event. Firm risk measurements include: (1) total risk 
(STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns, (2) systematic risk (SYSVOL), defined as the 
standard deviation of the product of the firm’s beta (calculated by using the market model and regressing the firm’s monthly stock 
return on CRSP value-weighted market return) times market monthly returns, and (3) idiosyncratic risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined as 
the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return residuals. The state variable — GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as 
follows. I add one point if the succession is characterized by male replacing female/ young replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 
years age difference/ U.S. CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry specialist/ CEO with a technical 
educational background replacing one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to five, with the minimum value 
indicating a successor aligning closely to the predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as measured by personal traits and 
backgrounds, and the maximum value suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably higher than his/ her predecessor. 
FORCED is a dummy variable equals to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession 
events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-
succession firm financial performance and stock return are lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and 
zero otherwise, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. OUTSIDER takes the value of one if the successor was employed 
by the firm for less than one year before he/ she assumed office and zero otherwise. Panel A reports estimates of risk-taking gap index 
on subsequent firm risk. Panel B reports estimates of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and forced removal on subsequent 
firm risk. Panel C reports estimates of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and poor past performance on subsequent firm 
risk. Meanwhile Panel D reports estimates of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and external succession on subsequent 
firm risk. The models include all control variables from Table 3.2 (suppressed). Note that all the control variables now defined as the 
average value of each variable through time t+1 to t+3 following the succession event (time t). Control variables definitions are 
provided in Appendix E. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable  Total Risk  Systematic Risk  Idiosyncratic Risk 
Panel A: Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent 
Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.020***  0.016***  0.014** 
  (2.926)  (3.000)  (2.480) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  390  390  390 
R-squared  0.228  0.249  0.121 
Panel B: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking Gap 
Index and Forced Removal on Subsequent Firm 
Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.004  0.003  -0.004 
  (0.471)  (0.442)  (-0.553) 
FORCED  -0.033**  -0.023**  -0.028** 
  (-2.553)  (-2.356)  (-2.556) 
FORCED*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.076***  0.058***  0.077*** 
  (4.546)  (4.562)  (5.533) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  390  390  390 
R-squared  0.285  0.305  0.216 
Panel C: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking Gap 
Index and Poor Past Performance on Subsequent 
Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.003  0.007  -0.004 
  (0.441)  (1.226)  (-0.633) 
POOR_PRE_PERF  0.003  -0.001  0.004 
  (0.585)  (-0.185)  (1.104) 
POOR_PRE_PERF*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.079***  0.040***  0.086*** 
  (5.375)  (3.444)  (7.154) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  390  390  390 
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R-squared  0.311  0.282  0.280 
Panel D: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking Gap 
Index and External Succession on Subsequent Firm 
Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.009  -0.004  -0.014** 
  (-1.241)  (-0.725)  (-2.384) 
OUTSIDER  0.018  0.015*  0.008 
  (1.514)  (1.688)  (0.850) 
OUTSIDER*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.101***  0.068***  0.100*** 
  (7.520)  (6.559)  (9.074) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  390  390  390 
R-squared  0.378  0.369  0.341 
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Table 3. 10 Two-Stage Least Square Regressions 
Table 3.10 presents the results from two-stage least squares regression of CEO succession risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm 
risk. The dependent variable, TE is the difference in subsequent firm risk-taking between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the 
matching group (non-succession matched peers) one year following the succession event. Firm risk measurements include: (1) total 
risk (STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns, (2) systematic risk (SYSVOL), defined as the 
standard deviation of the product of the firm’s beta (calculated by using the market model and regressing the firm’s monthly stock 
return on CRSP value-weighted market return) times market monthly returns, and (3) idiosyncratic risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined as 
the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return residuals. The state variable — GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as 
follows. I add one point if the succession is characterized by male replacing female/ young replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 
years age difference/ U.S. CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry specialist/ CEO with a technical 
educational background replacing one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to five, with the minimum value 
indicating a successor aligning closely to the predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as measured by personal traits and 
backgrounds, and the maximum value suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably higher than his/ her predecessor. 
FORCED is a dummy variable equals to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession 
events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-
succession firm financial performance and stock return are lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample and 
zero otherwise, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. OUTSIDER takes the value of one if the successor was employed 
by the firm for less than one year before he/ she assumed office and zero otherwise. Panel A reports estimates of risk-taking gap index 
on subsequent firm risk. Panel B reports estimates of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and forced removal on subsequent 
firm risk. Panel C reports estimates of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and poor past performance on subsequent firm 
risk. Meanwhile Panel D reports estimates of the interaction effect of risk-taking gap index and external succession on subsequent 
firm risk. The models include all control variables from Table 3.2 (suppressed). Control variables definitions are provided in Appendix 
E. Regressions include year and firm fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Total Risk  Systematic Risk  Idiosyncratic Risk 
Variable  1st Stage  2nd Stage  1st Stage  2nd Stage  1st Stage  2nd Stage 
Panel A: Risk-Taking 
Gap Index and 
Subsequent Firm Risk 
            
GAP_INDEX_RISK    -0.019    -0.016    -0.030 
    (-0.347)    (-0.553)    (-0.631) 
NUM_CHILD  -0.153***    -0.153***    -0.153***   
  (-3.64)    (-3.64)    (-3.64)   
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  244  244  244  244  244  244 
R-squared  0.317  0.198  0.317  0.337  0.317  0.088 
Panel B: the 
Interaction Effect of 
Risk-Taking Gap 
Index and Forced 
Removal on 
Subsequent Firm Risk 
            
GAP_INDEX_RISK    -0.002    -0.021*    -0.006 
    (-0.117)    (-1.844)    (-0.337) 
FORCED* 
GAP_INDEX_RISK 
   0.122***    0.100***    0.097*** 
    (3.189)    (4.908)    (2.966) 
NUM_CHILD  -0.502***    -0.502***    -0.502***   
  (-17.27)    (-17.27)    (-17.27)   
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  244  244  244  244  244  244 
R-squared  0.852  0.400  0.852  0.498  0.852  0.361 
Panel C: the 
Interaction Effect of 
Risk-Taking Gap 
Index and Poor Past 
Performance on 
Subsequent Firm Risk 
            
GAP_INDEX_RISK    0.025    0.004    0.013 
    (0.682)    (0.204)    (0.439) 
POOR_PRE_PERF* 
GAP_INDEX_RISK 
   0.142***    0.064***    0.142*** 
    (3.293)    (2.683)    (3.901) 
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NUM_CHILD  -0.205***    -0.205***    -0.205***   
  (-6.01)    (-6.01)    (-6.01)   
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  244  244  244  244  244  244 
R-squared  0.568  0.376  0.568  0.452  0.568  0.364 
Panel D: the 
Interaction Effect of 
Risk-Taking Gap 
Index and External 
Succession on 
Subsequent Firm Risk 
            
GAP_INDEX_RISK    0.025    0.004    0.013 
    (0.715)    (0.191)    (0.457) 
OUTSIDER* 
GAP_INDEX_RISK 
   0.141***    0.063***    0.140*** 
    (3.467)    (2.793)    (4.162) 
NUM_CHILD  -0.204***    -0.204***    -0.204***   
  (-5.99)    (-5.99)    (-5.99)   
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  244  244  244  244  244  244 





Table 3. 11 Pre-Succession Firm-Level Determinant of CEO Risk-Taking Gap Index 
Table 3.11 presents the results from the logit regression of firm conditions prior to the succession event on CEO succession risk-
taking gap index. The dependent variable — HIGH_GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as follows. I add one point to 
GAP_INDEX_RISK if the succession is characterized by male replacing female/ young replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 years 
age difference/ U.S. CEO replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry specialist/ CEO with a technical educational 
background replacing one who does not. The risk-taking gap index ranges from zero to five, with the minimum value indicating a 
successor aligning closely to the predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as measured by personal traits and backgrounds, 
and the maximum value suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably higher than his/ her predecessor. 
HIGH_GAP_INDEX_RISK equals one if the firm has a GAP_INDEX_RISK greater than the median value of 1 and zero otherwise. 
Control variables include: product substitutability (SUBSTITUTABILITY), strategic instability (SI), strategic difference (SD), poor 
past performance indicator (POOR_PRE_PERF), stock return volatility (STKVOL), dividend coverage (DIV_COVERAGE), interest 
coverage (INTEREST_COVERAGE), market-to-book (MTB), firm size (SIZE), firm age (FIRM_AGE), industry-median adjusted 
firm leverage (LEV_TDA_ADJ), industry-median adjusted capital expenditure (CAPEX_ADJ), industry-median adjusted R&D 
intensity (RND_ADJ), board size (BOARDSIZE) and board independence (BOARD_IND). Control variables are all measured in the 
year prior to the succession event. Regression includes firm and year fixed effects. Control variables definitions are provided in 
Appendix E. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable  HIGH_GAP_INDEX_RISK 
SUBSTITUTABILITY  -0.0571 
  (-0.02) 
SI  0.160* 
  (1.77) 
SD  -0.262 
  (-0.80) 
POOR_PRE_PERF  0.478 
  (1.38) 
STKVOL  2.094 
  (0.41) 
DIV_COVERAGE  -0.0702* 
  (-1.79) 
INTEREST_COVERAGE  -0.00236 
  (-0.76) 
MTB_LEV  -0.201 
  (-0.63) 
SIZE  -0.382 
  (-0.61) 
FIRM_AGE  0.602 
  (0.26) 
LEV _ADJ  0.0171 
  (0.01) 
CAPEX_ADJ  -0.528 
  (-0.06) 
RND_ADJ  -4.072 
  (-0.65) 
BOARDSIZE  0.190* 
  (1.72) 
BOARD_IND  -1.741 
  (-0.95) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes 
Observations  687 







Chapter 4 CEO Succession Gaps and Shareholder Reaction 
4.1. Introduction 
On 1st October 2018, General Electric saw a 7 percent surge in its share price, 
following the announcement that Danaher’s former leader Lawrence Culp would replace 
its incumbent CEO John Flannery.45 The strong positive stock price response suggests 
that the market regarded this CEO-shakeup as a move in the right direction for the 
struggling firm, and hence priced in the potential for the successor to now steer the firm 
along a profitable strategic direction by bringing in new ideas. In sharp contrast, Intel 
received a cold welcome from the market on 1st February 2019, following the 
appointment of its former CFO Robert Swan as the new CEO, a decision that was made 
against the wishes of the investors, not only because this was an internal appointment, but 
also because the successor had no technical background, which is deemed essential for a 
technology firm.46 In a similar vein, Hewlett Packard’s stock price slumped upon the 
appointment of a female successor, Meg Whitman, stemming from the common belief 
that a feminine leadership style characterized by empathy, effective communication and 
sharing of information and power, could only be effective at the mid-management levels 
and may not work effectively when serving as CEOs of S&P 500 companies.47 
Unlike any other position in an organization, chief executive officers (CEOs) play 
a pivotal role in shaping the future of the firm (Brady & Helmich, 1984; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Chaganti & Sambharya, 1987) and consequently the welfare of its 
stakeholders. CEO successions, unlike other lower level turnovers, will trigger a series of 
changes within the organization such as structural and strategic changes, top management 
team turnovers, and disturbance in traditional patterns of behavior and company norms 
(Friedman & Saul, 1991; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). As such, it is not surprising that CEO 
succession and the market’s reaction around the succession event has been the subject of 
intense academic research in the finance and management literatures alike.48 
My interest in studying the impact of a turnover-driven shift in corporate culture 
is motivated by the recent burgeoning literature that links CEO personal characteristics 
                                                                
45  See online news article: https://www.businessinsider.com.au/ge-stock-price-ceo-larry-culp-contract-details-2018-
10?r=US&IR=T 
46 See online news article: https://articles.marketrealist.com/2019/02/intel-stock-falls-on-q4-earnings-miss-and-new-
ceo-announcement/ 
47  See online news article: https://www.scpr.org/news/2011/09/22/29003/meg-whitman-become-new-ceo-hewlett-
packard/ 
48 Examples include: Reinganum (1985); Beatty and Zajac (1987); Furtado and Rozeff (1987); Warner et al. (1988); 
Weisbach (1988); Bonnier and Bruner (1989); Friedman and Singh (1989); Davidson III et al. (1990); Davidson III et 
al. (1993); Denis and Denis (1995); Borokhovich et al. (1996); Davidson III et al. (2001); Davidson et al. (2002); Rhim 
et al. (2006); Adams and Mansi (2009); He et al. (2014); Gangloff et al. (2016); Quigley et al. (2017). 
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to firm policy choices and performance. There is considerable literature that investigates 
how a CEO’s past experience and characteristics translate into corporate policy choices.49 
Surprisingly, however, the literature has limited its attention to examining shareholders’ 
reactions to different types of succession events (e.g. forced removals versus voluntary 
turnovers, planned versus unplanned successions, firms with poor versus good pre-
succession performance, outsiders versus insiders, etc). To the best of my knowledge, 
almost none focuses on the price effects surrounding CEO succession announcements of 
the differences in personal traits between the predecessor and successor. Given that gaps 
in CEO personal traits brought about by a change in top leadership are likely to impact 
firm performance (i.e. Chapter 2) and risk (i.e. Chapter 3), a succession that induces such 
changes is likely to have a bearing on a firms’ stock performance. Such associations 
between CEO personal traits/ experiences and stock returns are likely to provide boards 
with invaluable insight into hiring the right person to safeguard shareholders’ interests.50  
To address this, I propose and test hypotheses that relate succession-induced gaps 
in CEO traits to stock price response around the announcement using a sample of CEO 
successions in S&P 500 companies spanning the period 1992 to 2016. I construct an index 
of CEO characteristics (CEO gender, age, career variety, cultural background, highest 
education level, and social status (‘eliteness’) of undergraduate school) that have been 
individually shown to impact firm performance in prior literature. I construct the index 
by adding one point for every difference between the predecessor and the successor with 
regard to the aforementioned six attributes. Index values therefore range from zero to six, 
with zero indicating close alignment between the personal traits/ experiences of the 
successor and the predecessor while six suggests that the outgoing and incoming CEOs 
are totally different along these six dimensions. Succession firms were divided into High 
Gap and Low Gap groups where incoming CEOs are considered to have high succession 
gaps if the GAP_INDEX is greater than two (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 3/4/5/6) and zero 
otherwise (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 0/1/2). I employ an event study methodology to compute 
                                                                
49 CEO military experience and firm risk-taking (Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; Benmelech & Frydman, 2015); CEO 
early-life experience and professional behaviors (Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; Custódio et al., 2013; Bernile et al., 
2017); CEO fitness and firm profitability (Limbach & Sonnenburg, 2014); CEO golfing and firm performance 
(Biggerstaff et al., 2016); and pilot CEO and innovation (Cain & McKeon, 2016; Sunder et al., 2017). 
50 The change in stock price surrounding CEO succession events depends largely on market participants’ perceptions 
of how well the predecessor did and how capable the successor is in taking the firm forward. As my central interest lies 
in the market’s reactions to the CEO succession gaps, it makes more sense to focus on the date when market participants 
first identify who the incoming CEO is, rather than the date when the outgoing CEO announces his/ her departure or 
when the succession event actually happens. I am interested in the price effect of the shift in corporate culture that is 
brought about by the differences between the predecessor and the successor.  
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abnormal returns associated with the revelation of information regarding incoming CEOs 
with different levels of succession gaps.  
My main findings can be summarized as follows. 51  In general, cumulative 
abnormal returns over the [-5,+5] event window were not statistically significant for firms 
with successions bringing in either High Gap or Low Gap successors. As my original 
sample is heterogeneous with reference to pre-event firm conditions, it is possible that 
the market reactions to a radical shift in CEO characteristics differ across subsamples but 
get annulled in a portfolio analysis. To address this possibility, I next disaggregate the 
original sample into firms that were the subject of a turbulent environment leading up to 
the succession event (i.e. forced successions and/ or successions following poor 
performance) and those that were not (i.e. non-forced successions and/ or successions 
following good performance). Consistent with conjecture, I find that the market reacts 
favorably to successors with high gaps only under forced successions and when 
successions follow poor firm performance with the magnitude of CARs for the High Gap 
group under forced succession (poor pre-performance) being 2.64% (4.35%). Although 
the revelation of tapping successors sharing similar personal traits under forced removals 
is also associated with positive abnormal returns, the magnitude of cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) over the eleven-day event window is just half of what is produced by 
appointing successors with high succession gaps, and the CARs diminish after three days 
following the revelation date.  
On the contrary, non-forced successions and successions following good 
performance are not associated with any abnormal returns regardless of the level of CEO 
succession gaps, as such events do not provide investors with any new information about 
firm future perspectives. Similarly, I do not find any abnormal returns associated with the 
revelation of low succession gaps following poor performance as such events do not 
signal future firm structural and/ or strategic changes. Overall, I find that investors tend 
to only respond to high CEO succession gaps when the event is disruptive in nature. 
Empirical findings in this study have strong implications for how firms use succession 
events as an investor management tool. Particularly, my findings suggest that under 
forced successions or when pre-succession performance has been poor, appointing 
successors with drastically different personal traits could be exploited by the firm to 
restore shareholder confidence.  
                                                                
51 The interpretation of my results are largely based on [-5,+5] unless stated otherwise. 
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My research is associated with the growing body of literature that examines the 
price effect of CEO successions and the associated implications for firms’ hiring 
decisions. There has been prior literature on market reactions to changes in individual 
CEO characteristics, such as CEO gender (Lee & James, 2007; Martin et al., 2009) and 
age (Serfling, 2014; Eduardo & Poole, 2016). However, no one has looked at market 
reactions to a comprehensive set of differences between the outgoing and incoming CEOs. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that examines the price effect of the 
revelation of CEO succession gaps by considering the combined effect of different 
aspects in CEO characteristics between the predecessor and successor simultaneously in 
a succession context. This is also the first paper that looks at the date of the revelation of 
incoming CEOs’ identity and the associated succession gaps, rather than the official 
announcement date of successions and/ or the actual date when succession events takes 
place. 
 
4.2. Hypothesis Development 
Since the Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests that stock prices reflect all 
publicly available information, revelation of new information will trigger an update in 
beliefs (Fama, 1991) and a consequent change in stock prices at the announcement.52 
Among the studies that examine announcement returns around events, the historical 
debate over how investors react to CEO succession enjoys a well-trodden path and there 
is a growing literature built around the CEO succession topic. For example, Worrell and 
Davidson III (1987) examine the price effect of CEO sudden deaths and asserts that the 
market favors internal promotion than external successions. Hayes and Schaefer (1999) 
observe an average of -1.51% abnormal returns associated with CEO-initiated 
successions, and an average abnormal return of +3.82% for firms following CEO sudden 
deaths. They argue that CEOs who resign to accept similar positions outside their current 
                                                                
52 For example the market responds either positively or negatively to events such as dividend announcements (Healy 
& Palepu, 1988; Michaely et al., 1995; Yoon & Starks, 1995; Lonie et al., 1996), share repurchases (Lakonishok & 
Vermaelen, 1990; Grullon & Michaely, 2004), seasoned equity offerings (Smith Jr, 1986; Corwin, 2003), share splits 
(Lamoureux & Poon, 1987; McNichols & Dravid, 1990), debt issuance (Smith Jr, 1986; Shyam-Sunder, 1991; Akhigbe 
et al., 1997), earnings surprises (Ball & Kothari, 1991; Greene & Watts, 1996; Kothari, 2001; Vega, 2006), restatements 
(Callen et al., 2006; Neuhierl et al., 2013), M&A (Franks et al., 1991; Andrade et al., 2001; Capron & Pistre, 2002; 
Moeller et al., 2005; Cai & Sevilir, 2012), spin-offs (Hite & Owers, 1983; Schipper & Smith, 1983; Veld & Veld‐
Merkoulova, 2009), product-related news (Woolridge & Snow, 1990; Chaney et al., 1991; Austin, 1993; Bosch & Lee, 
1994; Barber & Darrough, 1996), customer- and partnership-related news (McConnell & Nantell, 1985; Woolridge & 
Snow, 1990; Neuhierl et al., 2013), lawsuits (Bhagat et al., 1994; Bizjak & Coles, 1995; Griffin et al., 2004), company 
awards (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996), initial public offering (Ritter & Welch, 2002), executive sudden deaths (Johnson 
et al., 1985; Worrell et al., 1986; Bennedsen et al., 2006; Borokhovich et al., 2006; Salas, 2010) and others (McConnell 




companies possess stronger management abilities and more intense human capital than 
CEOs who experience sudden death. Shen and Cannella Jr (2003) find that the market 
does not react to the initiation of relay successions – the appointment of an heir apparent. 
They argue that the market reacts positively to heir promotion when firm performance 
has been good and/ or heir exit when performance has been bad, whilst responding 
negatively to heir promotion when firm performance has been poor and/ or heir exit when 
firm performance has been good. They also find evidence of positive abnormal returns 
following outsider successions and negative stock market reactions to non-heir insider 
successions.  
Tian et al. (2011) observe positive market reaction to successors with more 
intensive human and social capital. Elsaid et al. (2011) find evidence of positive market 
reactions to incoming CEOs with past CEO experience. Intintoli (2013) shows that 
marathon succession announcements under forced removals are generally associated with 
positive cumulative abnormal returns. He et al. (2014) use data on Chinese publicly listed 
firms and claim that market participants favor incoming CEOs with stronger political 
connections, and the results are stronger for outsider successors, poorly performing firms, 
firms not belonging to the high-tech industries, firms located in less developed regions, 
and privately controlled firms. As such, market reactions to CEO succession events 
depend on many factors and it would be difficult to assess investors’ perceptions on 
leadership changes without distinguishing between different situations. 
In this paper, I seek to look at investors’ reactions to successors who differ 
drastically from their predecessors given the varied organizational contexts (i.e. forced 
versus non-forced successions, and successions following poor versus good pre-
succession performance). Under non-forced successions or when pre-succession financial 
performance has been good, the succession process tends to be smooth and organized, 
and there is a premium on continuity (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Shen & Cannella, 2002). 
Regardless of the level of succession gaps, incoming CEOs under such circumstances are 
not expected to initiate any changes and will therefore have little discretion in altering 
firm directions. Non-forced turnovers and successions following good prior performance 
as a whole do not provide investors with any new information regarding how this change 
could take the business forward. As such, I expect investors will not react under such 
circumstances. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
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H1: Under non-forced successions, or when pre-succession firm performance has 
been good, the announcement of a CEO change with gaps in personal traits will not 
impact the abnormal returns around the succession announcement. 
However, under forced succession or when pre-succession financial performance 
of the company has been poor, things could be different. Past literature suggests that, 
compared to other types of successions, forced successions represent the greatest 
probability of adaptive strategic changes (Friedman & Singh, 1989), especially when the 
successor differs considerably from his/ her predecessor. However, it is also possible that 
forced removals could have stemmed from political turmoil within the organization 
(Friedman & Singh, 1989). If the change in leadership cannot be justified by the 
predecessor’s failure to act in the best interests of the firm, then it is highly likely that the 
incoming CEO with high succession gaps may not be welcome.  
Several papers have examined stock performance in the context of forced 
successions. For instance, Denis and Denis (1995) assert that forced management 
resignations are preceded by negative abnormal stock performance whilst enjoying 
positive market reactions following the announcement. In contrast, voluntary retirements 
are not associated with any abnormal stock performance both before and after 
management changes. Huson et al. (2004) find evidence of substantial shareholder wealth 
losses in the three-year pre- and post-succession window for forced removals, while 
three-year abnormal returns preceding and post non-forced successions are not 
statistically different from zero. Although the evidence is inconclusive, previous findings 
do indicate that market participants react differently to forced successions versus non-
forced successions.  
Another situation that is likely to elicit varying stock market response surrounding 
the succession events is prior firm performance. Studies in the past have asserted that 
poor pre-succession performance is associated with greater probabilities of CEO 
turnovers (Brady & Helmich, 1984; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Schwartz & Menon, 
1985; Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Kesner & Dalton, 1994; Parrino, 1997). 
Farrell and Whidbee (2002) observe that firms experiencing forced-succession are more 
closely monitored by The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and are subject to increased news 
frequency about ‘bad decisions’ and/ or poor performance up to two years prior to CEO 
successions. They argue that greater scrutiny of poor performance by the financial press 
would actually increase the probability of forced removals. Jenter and Kanaan (2015) not 
only assert that CEOs face a greater risk of being fired when the firm does poorly when 
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compared to its rivals, they also contend that poorly performing CEOs are much more 
likely to be dismissed following poor industry and market performance even if they have 
little control over the factors leading to the performance decline. Their findings indicate 
that company boards fail to filter out observable exogenous shocks that might affect firm 
performance and mistakenly blame their CEOs for poor firm performance that is driven 
by an industry/ economic downturn. There are, however, a small number of studies such 
as Samuelson et al. (1985), asserting that the relationship between a firm’s prior 
performance and the probability of managerial change is inconclusive given that the 
mixed results produced using different performance measures. 
Apart from studying the relationship between poor past performance and the 
probability of top management change, past literature also sheds light on the price effect 
of poor performance preceding CEO successions. Friedman and Singh (1989) find that 
the market reacts positively when pre-succession performance has been poor and under 
the condition that the succession events are either board- or CEO-initiated, while a 
negative market reaction is observed when pre-succession firm performance has been 
good. Lubatkin et al. (1989) find that investors react favorably to external successors 
when performance leading up to the succession has been poor. Similarly, Davidson III et 
al. (1993) assert that CEO successions near bankruptcy are generally associated with 
positive abnormal returns, and the positive effect is more pronounced around appointment 
of outsider successors. These studies collectively suggest that pre-succession firm 
performance wields a significant influence on the market’s reaction to the succession. 
There are at least three theoretical hypotheses regarding investors’ perception on 
CEO succession gaps under such circumstances. First, the Scapegoating Hypothesis, 
states that a succession event is a method for providing a target when firm performance 
declines (see, for e.g., Gamson and Scotch (1964); Mirrlees (1976); Holmstrom (1979); 
Rowe et al. (2005), among others). As suggested by the model in Kim (1996), all 
managers generally possess equivalent skills and talents, and that they are highly fungible. 
Under such circumstances, firm performance is considered to be the product of random 
factors called ‘pure luck’ and management efforts. Managers, therefore, are at risk of 
being replaced if they fail to deliver full effort to manage their firms. Barker III and 
Patterson Jr (1996) in their study assert that top managers who are scapegoated are often 
replaced by someone sharing similar views who would eventually maintain the status quo. 
As such, when successors have relatively low levels of succession gaps under forced 
successions or successions following poor performance, CEO succession events are seen 
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to be used by the firm as an investor management tool. Such events fail to signal any 
management quality improvements and provide no new information to market 
participants on firm future prospects, and would therefore be associated with no abnormal 
returns. Forced removals or successions following poor performance, under the scapegoat 
hypothesis, are used by boards to give the investing public an illusion that a change in 
leadership will turn around the company.53 The visibility of a scandal and the public 
perception of mismanagement should act as a threat to executive office holders, and thus 
create opportunities for appointments of CEOs with succession gaps. Therefore, the 
hiring of CEOs with succession gaps might merely be symbolic, especially under the 
aforementioned two circumstances. If investors are perceptive enough to see through the 
firm’s intentions, then there should be no abnormal returns associated with forced 
successions or successions following poor performance, no matter how different the 
incoming CEO is from the departing CEO. 
Second, the Information Hypothesis (the information effect), suggests that forced 
removals or successions following poor performance serve as an indication of internal 
instability, bad management choices, and the firm in a worse state than what the market 
had already built into their expectations. Picking a successor who is drastically different 
from his/ her predecessor would actually strengthen such thoughts among investors and 
hence, negative abnormal returns would be expected following the revelation of CEO 
succession gaps under forced removals or when pre-succession performance has been 
poor (see, for e.g., Bonnier and Bruner (1989) and Huson et al. (2004).  
Finally, the Ability Hypothesis (the real effect), argues that succession events 
serve as a means to breaking the past momentum within an organization, and successors 
with gaps are more likely to ascend to leadership positions, especially under unstable or 
turbulent conditions (Ryan & Haslam, 2005; Haslam & Ryan, 2008). When company 
performance improves, traditional hiring and promotion norms that have historically 
tended to favor successors with similar characteristics would be expected. In contrast, a 
crisis (deteriorating organizational performance, plummeting stock price, fraud, scandal, 
restatement of financial statements, etc.) could provide opportunities for firms to break 
away from the current enterprise habitus and alter hiring and promotion practices (Reskin 
                                                                
53 For instance, a firm’s corporate social responsibility may be called into question following a scandal. As a response, 
female executives may be installed strategically as a signal that the firm is attempting to become more ‘socially 
responsible’ (Brady et al., 2011). Skaggs (2009) also asserts that after a racial discrimination lawsuit, firms respond to 




& McBrier, 2000; Khurana, 2004). Under this hypothesis, CEO abilities and skillsets are 
different from one another and are not directly observable. Boards act in the best interests 
of their shareholders and look for the most suitable candidate. Successors with high 
succession gaps, therefore, are expected to be more competent than their predecessors, 
especially when there is documented evidence of poor performance under the departing 
CEO’s leadership. Moreover, CEOs with high succession gaps are more likely to initiate 
structural and strategic changes within the organization, which is closely in line with 
shareholders’ interests. As a result, positive market reaction would be expected following 
the revelation of CEO succession gaps under forced removals or when the firm suffered 
deteriorating performance. 
When the information on the extent of CEO succession gaps is being revealed, I 
expect scapegoating, information effect, and real effect, will all play a role in determining 
investors’ reactions to succession event. The scapegoating effect will be associated with 
no abnormal returns when market participants feel that tapping an incoming CEO with 
high succession gaps is simply a means to scapegoat the outgoing CEO. The ‘information 
effect’, on the other hand, will result in negative abnormal returns around the revelation 
of CEO succession gaps, as the event itself signals to investors that the firm is performing 
worse and is experiencing higher levels of organizational instability than the market has 
anticipated. Finally, the ‘real effect’ will produce positive abnormal returns, as the market 
expects the incoming CEO to possess greater level human capital than the outgoing CEO. 
As my sample consists of S&P 500 companies which are heavily followed by analysts, I 
expect that the degree of information asymmetry is relatively low (Frankel & Li, 2004). 
Therefore, the information effect will have little effect on investor reactions. Because 
forced removals and CEO successions following poor performance generally align with 
shareholders’ interests (Warner et al., 1988), especially in S&P 500 firms whose boards 
are much more effective when compared to other firms, market reactions to high CEO 
succession gaps under such circumstances are expected to be generally positive. This 
leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2: Under forced successions or when pre-succession performance has been 
poor, CEO succession gap will exert a positive effect on firm’s cumulative abnormal 
returns.  
 




My starting sample comprises all S&P 500 firms between 1992 and 2016. CEOs’ 
basic information (including name, gender, age, stock ownership, compensation structure, 
and tenure) was extracted from Compustat’s ExecuComp database. Additional 
demographic information (including career history, education background, and cultural 
background) was hand-collected from the S&P Capital IQ database, Bloomberg’s online 
executive profile webpage, NNDB.com, Ancestry, and Wikipedia in the last instance. The 
classification of succession events into forced and non-forced follows the method 
described in Parrino (1997), which has been widely adapted in recent CEO succession 
studies (Huson et al., 2004; Hazarika et al., 2012; Guo & Masulis, 2015; Jenter & Kanaan, 
2015).54 The demographic information on S&P 500 top executives was then merged with 
Compustat’s annual fundamental data and BoardEx’s Director and Director Legacy 
database, with the latter containing information on board size and board independence. I 
dropped financial services firms and utilities from the sample (two-digit SIC Code 60-69 
and 49) given that firms in these sectors are heavily regulated which may lead to 
performance and risk outcomes and therefore shareholder reactions following a 
succession that differs from those of non-regulated companies for reasons not necessarily 
related to the variable of interest. I also excluded all cases followed by merger & 
acquisition or spin-offs, since it is difficult to separate the impact of leadership change 
from a major organizational restructure on shareholder reactions under the succession 
context. After dropping firms without the CEO’s full name in the given fiscal year, the 
final sample contains 7,141 firm-year observations. 
 
4.3.2. Variable Construction 
To construct my primary explanatory variable, a measure for the succession-
induced gap in CEO characteristics, I draw upon prior literature which has demonstrated 
that firm performance and shareholder reactions following CEO successions are affected 
                                                                
54 Related news articles, whether published in the mainstream media or industry-specific journals and magazines, were 
retrieved through Factiva. The classification takes the following steps: (1) if the press clearly states that the outgoing 
CEO is forced out, being fired by the board of directors, or the departure is caused by policy differences or pressure 
imposed by stakeholders, then the succession event is classified as forced. (2) All other departures for CEOs above and 
including age 64, succession events caused by death or health-related disability and CEO-initiated successions are 
classified as non-forced. (3) Departures for CEOs under 64 are re-examined further and classified as forced if there are 
no signs of decease or health-related disability announced by the press, the press does not report an acceptance of 
another position (either external positions or chairmanship of the company’s board) by the outgoing CEO, or the press 
does not announce the retiring of the predecessor at least six months before the event. (4) If a CEO serves as interim 
CEO and is replaced later, I classify it as non-forced. (5) Cases classified as forced are reclassified if the reports 
convincingly state that the succession event has nothing to do with the company’s activities. 
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by the following: CEO’s gender, age, career variety, cultural background, highest 
education level, and social status (eliteness) of undergraduate school. First, as suggested 
by Adams and Funk (2012), women on boards of publicly listed companies emphasize 
different values such as female directors are generally more open to change and less 
conservative than both male directors and women in the general population. Moreover, 
female directors are particularly stakeholder-oriented (Adams et al., 2011; Matsa & 
Miller, 2013). Carol (1982) documents that men tend to address rules, justice, and 
individual rights when considering moral dilemmas whereas women are more likely to 
consider the impact of relationships when facing such issues. However, a feminine 
leadership style characterized by empathy, effective communication, and sharing of 
information and power could be effective in mid-level management, but may not 
necessarily work when serving as CEOs of large companies. Past literature has produced 
conflicting evidence with regard to the market’s perception of female CEO appointments. 
For example,  Lee and James (2007) find evidence that investors react negatively to 
female successors, and the negative effect becomes more evident when the female CEO 
is appointed outside of the company. On the other hand, Kang et al. (2010) assert that the 
market reacts positively to women appointed to director positions in Singapore public-
listed firms. Furthermore, they argue that investors respond differently to different 
positions; the appointment of female independent directors provokes the strongest 
response while appointment of female CEOs causes minimal reactions amongst all top 
leadership positions. Martin et al. (2009), however, claim that the market does not react 
differently between male and female successors. To further examine the price impact of 
gender gap in my study, I create a dummy variable, GENDER_GAP, which takes the 
value of one if there is a gender difference between the predecessor and successor, and 
zero otherwise. 
Second, I argue that the age difference between the predecessor and successor 
would impact on firm value since younger CEOs emphasize things differently compared 
to older managers. Previous studies provide contradictory theoretical predictions on how 
CEO age would influence business performance resulting in abnormal stock returns 
surrounding CEO successions. Younger CEOs are more energetic in terms of their 
physical and mental states (Child, 1974) and subsequently, are more capable of grasping 
new ideas and learning new behaviors (Chown, 1961). Moreover, younger managers tend 
to be less risk-averse as they put less emphasis on career and financial security (Barker 
& Mueller, 2002). Also, innovative and risky strategies are more likely to be considered 
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by young leaders (Serfling, 2014) leading to higher growth and variability in profitability 
compared with their older counterparts in the same industry (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
On the other hand, younger leaders may be more conservative and may not deviate 
from industry benchmarks since they have greater reputational and job concerns at stake 
(Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992; Zwiebel, 1995; Holmström, 1999). Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999), and Hong et al. (2000) find evidence that due to a more sensitive termination-
performance relationship, younger managers are less encouraged to take on unsystematic 
risk, and generally tend to exhibit higher levels of career concern-motivated herding 
behavior. In addition, older CEOs may have higher intellectual capabilities and make 
corporate policies based on experience, skills, and knowledge gained from the position 
and/ or advanced education (Sitthipongpanich & Polsiri, 2015). Literature shows that 
investors take CEO’s age into consideration when they build their expectations on future 
firm performance. Cline and Yore (2016) claim that the market reacts positively to the 
increase in the departing CEO’s age - a one standard deviation increase in the 
predecessor’s age is associated with a 1.30% increase in cumulative abnormal returns 
over the five days [-2,+2] surrounding the announcement. Serfling (2014) takes a step 
further by looking at the age difference between predecessors and successors and shows 
that firms with lower stock return volatility and/ or higher levels of diversification (i.e. 
firms that have less tendency to take on risk) generally receive a warm response from the 
stock market when they hire younger CEOs. To test for this effect, I calculate the standard 
deviation of the age distribution of all CEO in my sample and create a dummy variable 
AGE_GAP which takes the value of one when there are at least two standard deviations 
of age difference between the predecessor and the successor, and zero otherwise.55 
Third, career variety can also impact on firm value, since it represents personal 
biases favoring experimentation and change and is positively related to personality traits 
such as extraversion and openness to new experiences (Judge et al., 2002; Judge et al., 
2004). A multi-industry career experience could possibly contribute to future feasible 
strategic and social novelty within a company and thereby direct the firm down innovative 
paths. However, replacing an ‘industry specialist’ with a ‘general manager’ might not 
necessarily be beneficial, since job hopping could result in superficial cognitive breadth 
instead of deep proficiency. In addition, too much variety in a career may be positively 
                                                                
55 In my case, there is an age gap if the predecessor is at least 13.84 years older or younger than the successor. My 
definition of age gap is consistent with the definition offered by Serfling (2014): ‘successors are 13 to 40 years younger 
than incumbents’ as ‘much younger’ and ‘successors are 6 to 12 years younger than incumbents’ as ‘younger’. 
105 
 
related to a person’s degree of anxiety, avoidance of commitment, and/ or lack of 
contentment (Mowday & Spencer, 1981; Barrick & Mount, 1996; Judge & Bono, 2001).  
Davidson et al. (2002) find evidence that the market reacts favorably to outsider 
successors coming from related industries when compared to those who have no previous 
industry experience. Also, Custódio and Metzger (2013) find that acquirer CEOs who 
possess extensive experience in target firms’ industries enjoy higher abnormal returns 
around M&A announcements. It, therefore, appears that a CEO’s career history indeed 
plays an indispensable role in affecting shareholders’ perceptions of a company’s 
business decisions. As such, the price impact of the difference between the predecessor 
and the successor’s career variety would be non-negligible. To test for this, I create a 
dummy variable, CAREER_VARIETY_GAP, which takes the value of one if either one 
of the outgoing and the incoming CEOs is a ‘general manager’ (i.e., had previously 
worked in another GICS sector and/ or moved across different functional areas), while 
the other one is an ‘industry specialist’ (had spent his/ her entire career in one industry 
and/ or even in just one company), and zero otherwise. 
Fourth, CEOs with different ethnicities or cultural backgrounds may see things 
differently compared to CEOs born and raised in the United States, especially regarding 
knowledge of global markets and generally the skills required under different cultural 
settings. Similar to career variety, cultural variety also helps to shape managers’ cognitive 
map and generally conveys an experiential stock which the CEO could draw upon. In 
addition, multicultural experience has been shown to be positively associated with 
creativity (Maddux & Galinsky, 2009; Tadmor et al., 2009). On the other hand, Graham 
et al. (2013) argue that compared with their native American counterparts, non-US CEOs 
are more conservative when referring to sure losses, less optimistic, and less willing to 
take chances. Furthermore, the potential clash between global economic interests and 
local political interests and the loss of connection to local political parties/ suppliers/ 
business partners could be challenging when a non-US CEO takes charge of the firm. 
Assuming that price reactions following the revelation of the successor’s identity signal 
market participants’ beliefs about the successor’s potential to take the firm forward, a 
change in cultural background in the top leadership becomes significant with regard to 
investors’ reaction to CEO successions. I capture this effect through a dummy variable, 
CULTURAL_GAP, which equals one if either one of the predecessor or the successor is 




Finally, the last two attributes regarding the quality of education serve as 
components of a person’s cognitive ability and are a signal of a person’s ability to 
persevere in challenging intellectual activities. I differentiate between high education gap 
from the ‘eliteness’ education gap given that the former gap measure emphasizes the 
difference between knowledge base and mind-set, while the latter emphasizes social 
capital. Bhagat et al. (2010) finds evidence that the market reacts favorably to CEOs with 
stronger education qualifications. Similarly, based on a sample of U.S. publicly-listed 
banks spanning the period 1992 to 2011, King et al. (2016) finds that CEOs with MBA 
and CEOs graduating from top-20 U.S. universities outperform their counterparts. Kish-
Gephart and Tochman Campbell (2015) postulate that for CEOs with highly placed 
parentage, an elite education makes them better connected to people across different 
industries, gives them exposure to new business opportunities, and provides easier access 
to cutting-edge technologies which encourages risk-taking behavior. Their assertion is 
consistent with Cao et al. (2015) who assert that while both internal and external social 
capital matters, CEOs’ outside connections (‘bridging capital’) function better than their 
internal network (‘bonding capital’) in promoting entrepreneurial innovation and firms’ 
strategic risk-taking. Moreover, wider connections create a safety net for potential failure, 
which allows CEOs to take on more risks and therefore influence subsequent firm 
performance.  
Conversely, Antonakis et al. (2017) document that CEOs with high IQs tend to 
implement less effective leadership methods, and generally exhibit poorer 
transformational and instrumental leadership skills. Furthermore, CEOs with lower 
education qualifications would over-compensate through superior performance when 
compared to their counterparts with more prestigious education backgrounds. A higher 
education profile may make it easier for someone to win a CEO slot due to a stronger 
social network and the board’s perception of a superior education as an appropriate proxy 
for managerial ability. Executives with no advanced degree, however, must work their 
way up through a hierarchy in a process that does better at weeding out good CEOs from 
bad than any other superior education ever could. As such, I create two dummy variables 
associated with CEO education background, the first HIGHEST_EDUCATION_GAP, 
has four levels: I set ‘level’ to zero if the CEO does not attend university or college, to 
one if the CEO’s highest qualification is ‘LLB/ Bachelor’, to two if the CEO has ‘LLM/ 
Master/ MBA’ degree, and to three if he/ she has achieved a qualification of ‘Juris 
Doctorate/ PhD’. HIGHEST_EDUCATION_GAP takes the value of one if there is a 
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difference in the level of education qualification between the predecessor and the 
successor. The second dummy, ELITE_EDUCATION_GAP, takes the value of one if 
either one of the predecessor’s or successor’s undergraduate school is in the top-20 list of 
the Best National/ Global University rankings as defined by U.S. News & World Report’s 
2016 rankings, while the other’s undergraduate school does not feature on the list.56  
I divided all succession firms into High Gap and Low Gap groups by creating the 
HIGH_GAP dummy according to the GAP_INDEX (Mean: 1.82; Median: 2), where 
HIGH_GAP equals one if the firm has a GAP_INDEX greater than two (i.e. 
GAP_INDEX = 3/4/5/6) and zero otherwise (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 0/1/2). 
I further distinguish CEO succession events into forced/ non-forced and those 
with poor/ good prior performance. The first is a dummy variable, FORCED, that equals 
one if the predecessor was forced out (board-initiated succession) and zero otherwise 
(customary, CEO-initiated, or death/ health-related disability-initiated succession). The 
second variable, POOR_PRE_PERF, is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the firm’s pre-succession firm performance is poorer than its two-digit SIC code industry 
median and zero otherwise. Out of 659 succession events, 179 are forced turnovers 
(27.2%)57 and 309 are turnovers characterized by pre-succession firm performance below 
the industry median (46.9%). According to hypotheses, I expect positive CARs in 
successions where the outgoing CEO is forced out and/ or when the succession was 
preceded by poor firm performance, more so in successions involving high levels of gaps 
in personal traits. No market response is expected for non-forced successions and/ or in 
firms that enjoy good performance prior to the change of leadership, especially when the 
successor is very similar to his/ her predecessor in terms of visible personal traits. 
Compustat only provides the date on which the predecessor leaves as CEO 
(LEFTOFC) and the date on which the successor takes charge (BECAMECEO). As such, 
the information provided is not sufficient for me to conduct the analysis. Since the focus 
of my research is on market participants’ response to succession gaps between the 
predecessor and the successor, the date when market participants first know who the 
                                                                
56 I use the latest U.S. News & World Report university rankings, as top-20 national/ global university rankings largely 
remain stable over time. (e.g., U.S. News National University Rankings) spanning the period 2008–2015. These can 
be found at the following URL: http://publicuniversityhonors.com/2015/06/13/u-s-news-national-university-rankings-
2008-present/).  
57 The forced turnover ratio is close to that reported by Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004) for all COMPUSTAT listed 
manufacturing firms for the 1993-1998 period and Guo and Masulis (2015) for all listed firms in RiskMetrics database 
spanning the period 1996-2010. 
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successor is (‘Earliest-known date’ hereafter) becomes extremely important.58 I hand-
collected information on the ‘Earliest-known date’ by retrieving related news articles 
published either in the mainstream media (for e.g., The Wall Street Journal ) or industry-
specific journals and magazines, through Factiva. When determining the ‘Earliest-known 
date’, I disregard dates that are based on pure speculation or dates when the media offers 
a candidate list of more than one person. 59  Successions initiated by pre-established 
agreements/ rules are often well-planned. In such cases, if the predecessor is approaching 
the firm’s mandatory retirement age, I dig into the firm’s promotion channel and combine 
it with related media coverage to see who is likely to be seen by market participants as 
the outgoing CEO’s heir apparent. In this case, the date when the incoming CEO was 
promoted as the outgoing CEO’s heir apparent is considered to be the ‘Earliest-known 
date’. 60  By contrast, board-initiated, CEO-initiated, deceased or disability-related 
turnovers take place unexpectedly and a change in the guard conveys new information to 
market participants. For the above-mentioned three circumstances, the ‘Earliest-known 
date’ in most cases is the date that the company officially announces leadership 
appointments through its press release. If not, I take the date when the news articles first 
reveal the successor as the date of interest. In some special cases where the interim leader 
                                                                
58 For example, on 1st August 2000, carpet manufacturer Mohawk Industries Inc. said its Chairman and CEO David 
Kolb would retire effective on 1st January 2001, and the board had elected Jeffrey Lorberbaum, its then president and 
COO to succeed Kolb as CEO. Compustat records 1st January 2001 as LEFTOFC for David Kolb’s entry and the same 
date as BECAMECEO for Jeffrey Lorberbaum. However, 1st August 2000 is the actual date when new information 
about succession gaps enters the market. 
59 For example, on 3rd April 2007, Associated Press Newswires reported that Cooper Companies CEO Tom Bender 
would leave his post by the year’s end but who would be the next leader was not certain. They reported that Larry 
Biegelsen, an analyst with Prudential Equity Group, speculated that Bob Weiss was the likely successor based on the 
change in the press release commentary. “But he may not be the CEO. That is the decision the board will make by the 
end of the year”, said Bender. Four months later, on 23rd August 2007, Robert S. Weiss was officially appointed CEO 
of Cooper Companies. In this case, I take 23rd August 2007 as the date of interest. Another example is the succession 
event of Ebay. On 22nd January 2008, EBay’s CEO Meg Whitman announced her intention to retire from the online 
auctioneer, Reuters New reported that John Donahoe was the leading candidate to succeed Whitman, his assignment 
of running the Ebay marketplace business when he joined Ebay in 2005 appeared to sideline other internal candidates 
such as Bill Cobb, the head of Ebay’s North America business. On 23rd January 2008, Whitman confirmed she was to 
be replaced by executive John Donahoe. Although there is only one-day’s difference, I still take 23rd January 2008 as 
the ‘Earliest-known date’, as there were other candidates on the waiting list and the level of succession gaps was not 
clear prior to Ebay’s confirmation that Donahoe would be taking charge. 
60 For example, on 19th Sep 2010, The Wall Street Journal carried the headline ‘Verizon names president, COO; carrier 
taps wireless chief McAdam for roles, revealing likely succession plan for CEO Seidenberg’. Several months later, on 
4th Mar 2011, the Dow Jones News Service convincingly reported that Verizon took another step in cementing Lowell 
McAdam’s position as VZ’s next leader by electing him to the board. Subsequently, he was designated the successor 
to Chairman/ CEO Ivan Seidenberg when he was promoted to his then position as President and COO in October. On 
22nd Jul 2011, Verizon announced a leadership change through its press release, named Lowell McAdam as CEO and 
Seidenberg to remain chairman. Here, although 22nd Jul 2011 is the firm’s official announcement date of the successor, 
19th Sep 2010 is the ‘Earliest-known date’ for market participants to process all information and digest the gaps between 
the predecessor and the potential successor. 
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finally becomes the permanent successor,61 I take the date that the firm first taps the 
incoming CEO as an interim leader to be the event date.62 
 
4.4. Event Study Methodology 
In this section, I describe my methodology to measure market participants’ 
reaction to the succession event. I am, however, not only interested in just the 
unconditional stock market reaction to the succession event, but rather on how the market 
response varies across successions involving varying degrees of gaps between the 
predecessor and the successor. As shown in Figure 1, I use an estimation window 
(ESTPERIOD) of 200 trading days (i.e., t=-245 to -46 relative to the date of interest), 
which specifies the length of time used to estimate the expected return and residual return 
variance. The 40-day pre-announcement period (INTERVAL) between the end of the 
estimation period and the beginning of the event window (EVTSTART) serves to capture 
the effect of information leakage well before the event announcement date. I employ an 
11-day event window [-5,+5] to address the uncertainty of the exact timing at which 
market participants first receive relevant information regarding the succession event 
(Brown & Warner, 1985; O'hara & Shaw, 1990; Malmendier & Tate, 2009). A relatively 
short five days post-succession event period mitigates confounding the announcement 
period returns with those in response to any policy changes introduced immediately post 
succession. Finally, to limit the impact of missing observations, every firm in the analysis 
has to have 30 non-missing return observations over the 200-trading day estimation 
period. 
 
Figure 1 Event time period 
Succession announcements that fall on non-trading days are replaced with the next 
closest trading following the announcement. Ordinary least squares coefficients (𝛼?̂? and 
                                                                
61 For instance, on 1st Sep 2009, CA Inc. CEO John Swainson announced his plan to retire by year-end and Bill 
McCracken was named interim executive chairman to assist in the transition. McCracken’s performance during his 
stay was so good that the firm decided to make him permanent chief several months later (28th Jan 2010). 
62 In the aforementioned case, 1st Sep 2009. 
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𝛽?̂?) of the market model regression were estimated over the estimation period (t=-245 to 
t=-46) and the returns generated were adjusted for delisting. Daily abnormal returns for 
each stock were then computed as 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡= (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) − [𝛼?̂? + 𝛽?̂?(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡)] 
Three additional models are implemented in this paper for robustness checking, 
namely: (1) the Market-Adjusted Model, which produces abnormal returns defined 
according to CRSP value-weighted market return by assuming a market beta of one 
(𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡= (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 -𝑅𝑓,𝑡) − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)); (2) the Fama-French three factors (FF3F) model, which 
generates abnormal returns in excess of FF3F model ( 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑅𝑓,𝑡) − [𝛼?̂? +
𝛽1,?̂?(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2,?̂? ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3,?̂? ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡]); and (3) the Carhart (1997) Model, 
which adds the momentum factor on top of the Fama-French three factors (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 
(𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑅𝑓,𝑡) −[𝛼?̂? + 𝛽1,?̂?(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽2,?̂? ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3,?̂? ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4,?̂? ∗ 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑖,𝑡]). 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) were computed using the following 
equation: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1, 𝑇2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
                                                                                           (4.1) 
In event studies, the assumption of no event-induced changes in the variance of 
the abnormal returns during the event period is often violated. Thus, the ordinary cross-


















                                                                                     (4.2) 
where M denotes the number of stocks and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents the abnormal return for the 
i𝑡ℎ  stock in time t. However, the ordinary cross-sectional t-statistic still assumes that 
abnormal returns are cross-sectionally independent, which is usually not the case when 
CEO succession events tend to cluster in a specific calendar time, for example when 
successions take place during an economic downturn. Boehmer et al. (1991) introduce 
the standardized cross-sectional t-statistics (t𝑆𝐶𝑆) by using standardized abnormal returns 
(SAR) as the replacement of abnormal returns (AR). The t𝑆𝐶𝑆 not only accounts for event-
induced variance of abnormal returns, but also considers information coming from both 


















                                                                                                 (4.3) 
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where 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡/√𝑉𝐴𝑅( 𝐴𝑅𝑖). 𝐴𝑅𝑖  is the residual produced by the risk model 
estimation for stock i. In doing so, I am able to control for the impact of high variance on 
test statistics. 
 
4.5. Market reactions to Succession Gaps 
4.5.1. Summary Statistics 
 Table 4.1 presents the number of event firms under different levels of succession 
gaps. As shown in Panel A, the starting sample of 521 succession firms with identifiable 
‘Earliest-known date’ over the period 1992 to 2016, consisted of 150 (28.79% of the 
overall cases) forced removals, 369 (70.83%) non-forced succession events, 63  133 
(25.53%) successions following poor performance and 388 (74.47%) successions 
following good performance. The majority of CEO succession gaps fall into 1-3 
categories. I then excluded firms with less than 30 non-missing return observations within 
the 200-trading day estimation period resulting in a final sample, as shown in Panel B, 
consisting of 99 (27.27% of the overall cases) forced removals out of 363 CEO 
successions and 263 (72.45%) non-forced succession events, 95 (26.17%) successions 
following poor performance and 268 (73.83%) successions following good performance. 
Among forced (non-forced) successions, 73 (195) cases are characterized by incoming 
CEOs with a succession gap of less than three, and 26 (68) cases are characterized by 
incoming CEOs with a succession gap of equal or greater than three. For successions 
under poor (good) pre-succession firm performance, 75 (194) cases are characterized by 
incoming CEOs with a succession gap of less than three, and 20 (74) cases are 
characterized by incoming CEOs with a succession gap greater than or equal to three. 
<Insert Table 4.1 here> 
 
4.5.2. Event Study Results 
Table 4.2 shows the average daily abnormal returns, the standardized cross-
sectional t-statistics for daily abnormal returns, the average daily cumulative abnormal 
returns, the standardized cross-sectional t-statistics for cumulative abnormal returns, and 
the number of positive and negative abnormal returns for the entire sample during the 
period -5 to +5 relative to the event date, respectively. Panel A shows the statistics for 
                                                                
63 Note that 150 and 369 do not add up to 521. There’re two cases that I am unable to identify whether they’re forced 
removals or voluntary turnovers due to lack of information. 
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firms with relatively low levels of succession gaps (i.e. the Low Gap group), while Panel 
B demonstrates results for the firms with relatively high levels of succession gaps (i.e. 
the High Gap group). 
As shown in Panel A, the announcement of succession events with relatively low 
succession gaps are associated with positive yet insignificant abnormal returns on the 
event date (t=0), and the day after investors first discover who the successor is (t=1) (a 
0.32% positive abnormal return with a standardized cross-sectional t-value of 1.57). The 
market self-corrects in the following few days (from t=2 to t=4), with the fourth post-
event day’s abnormal return being significantly negative at -0.19%. Similarly, as shown 
in Panel B, for the High Gap group, market participants only react positively on the event 
date. The abnormal return for the High Gap group on the ‘Earliest-known date’ is 0.45% 
with a standardized cross-sectional t-value of 1.73. The market continues to react 
positively one day following the revelation of relatively high levels of succession gaps 
(t=1). A reasonable pull back in abnormal returns can be seen over the [+2,+3] event 
window although the daily abnormal performance during those two days is not 
statistically different from zero. The cumulative abnormal returns over the [-5,+5] event 
window for High Gap firms and Low Gap firms are 0.95% and 0.36%, respectively. 
However, none of the figures are statistically significant at any conventional levels. 
<Insert Table 4.2 here> 
 
4.5.2.1. Forced Succession versus Non-forced Succession 
Notwithstanding the full-sample results in Table 4.2, given that my original 
sample is heterogeneous with regard to pre-event firm conditions, it is possible that the 
market’s reaction resulting from a radical shift in CEO characteristics may differ across 
subsamples which gets annulled in a portfolio analysis. To test for this possibility, I next 
analyze the full-sample results further by disaggregating the original sample into firms 
that were the subject of a turbulent environment leading up to the succession event and 
those that were not.  
Table 4.3 shows the average daily abnormal returns, the standardized cross-
sectional t-statistics for daily abnormal returns, the average daily cumulative abnormal 
returns, the standardized cross-sectional t-statistics for cumulative abnormal returns, and 
the number of positive and negative abnormal returns for forced (Panel A) and non-forced 
(Panel B) successions over the [-5,+5] event window, respectively. 
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As shown in Panel A, market participants react positively to relatively high levels 
of differences between the predecessor and the successor under forced successions, but 
not when the incoming and departing CEO share similar easily observable personal traits. 
Firms belonging to the High Gap group under forced removals on average experience 
significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns of 2.64% over the [-5,+5] event 
window. In sharp contrast, tapping successors with relatively low levels of succession 
gaps is associated with positive cumulative abnormal returns only for the intervals [-5,0] 
and [-5,+1]. Nonetheless, the daily abnormal returns for the Low Gap group under forced 
removals turns from positive to negative from two days following the event date (t=2) 
onwards, while returns for the entire [-5,+5] event window indicate no statistical 
significance suggesting that investors give too much weight to recent events compared to 
prior beliefs when making forecasts (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), which could trigger 
an overreaction to forced successions.  
The real effect seems to take precedence over the information effect as forced 
successions reveal the boards’ intention to grant successors with a wider latitude of 
discretions to introduce adaptive changes (Friedman & Singh, 1989). While forced 
successions are in investors’ interests, replacing the departing CEO with a 
demographically similar (i.e. with similar age, function, experience, education, etc.) 
successor does not convey any information about the firm’s intention to address the 
underlying problems, as well as the potential for the successor to affect real changes in 
the future. The dispersion of stock prices from firm fundamentals will then be quickly 
reversed when the market realizes that instead of affecting effective changes, tapping a 
successor sharing similar personal traits with his/ her predecessor will simply indicate 
organizational inertia and may convey no information about future performance. Forced 
successions accompanied by relatively low levels of succession gaps are seen by the 
market as merely ritualistic that scapegoat the outgoing CEO. High succession gaps, on 
the other hand, convey to the market a mandate for change and the firm’s willingness to 
give the successor abundant discretion to affect personnel and strategic changes. Investors’ 
confidence is restored and they react favorably to high succession gaps under forced 
removals, as such movements point toward an improvement in the firm’s future 
performance.  
For non-forced successions, as shown in Panel B, the Low Gap group produces a 
0.37% abnormal returns one day following (t=+1) the ‘Earliest-known date’ with a 
standardized cross-sectional t-statistic of 1.69. Other than that, the daily abnormal returns 
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during the [-5,+5] event window for non-forced successions with ‘demographically 
similar’ successors are not statistically different from zero. Interestingly, the market does 
not seem to react to non-forced succession events even if the incoming and the outgoing 
CEOs differ considerably (i.e., Gap Index falls into the 3-6 category) post-succession. 
Overall, the cumulative abnormal returns following the unveiling of CEO succession is 
not statistically different from zero during the [-5,+5] event period for both the low gap 
and the high gap groups. This is because the event itself does not convey any new 
information to investors. 
To conclude, consistent with Hypothesis 1, non-forced successions are not 
associated with abnormal returns during the [-5,+5] event window, no matter how 
different the successor is from his/ her predecessor. The market, however, reacts 
significantly and positively to successions when the outgoing CEO is forced out and the 
incoming CEO possesses personal traits that turn out to be nothing like his/ her 
predecessor. The revelation of tapping CEOs sharing similar characteristics and personal 
backgrounds under forced successions is also associated with positive abnormal returns 
that are, however, small and relatively short-lived. 
<Insert Table 4.3 here> 
 
4.5.2.2. Poor Pre-succession Performance versus Good Pre-succession Performance 
CEO successions following poor prior performance are another set of successions 
that could potentially influence investors’ reactions to the differences between the 
incoming and outgoing CEOs. As shown in Table 4.4, when pre-succession performance 
has been poor, firms with low succession gaps experience a positive yet insignificant 
abnormal returns during the [0,+2] event window, followed by a price reversal of a 
significant -0.33% on the third day (t=+3). However a significant 1.23% surge in 
abnormal returns on the event date and a continuous increase of 1.97% on the following 
day (albeit not statistically significant) could be observed for firms whose successors 
differed considerably from their predecessors. In the context of good pre-succession 
performance, however, the revelation of CEO succession gaps is generally associated 
with no abnormal returns. 
Overall, firms with high succession gaps under poor pre-succession performance 
enjoy significant positive cumulative abnormal returns of 4.35% over the [-5,+5] event 
window. This finding supports the previous perception that market participants respond 
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favorably when they perceive firms which perform poorly have the opportunity to recover 
(Katz et al., 1985; Queen & Roll, 1987; Davidson III et al., 1993). The lack of statistical 
significance for CARs over the event period for firms enjoying good pre-succession 
performance (regardless of the level of gaps between the predecessor and the successor), 
and for firms with low succession gaps under poor pre-succession performance, does not 
come as a surprise given the aforementioned two circumstances not helping raise 
investors’ expectations regarding a firm’s future prospects. 
<Insert Table 4.4 here> 
 
4.5.3. Robustness Tests 
To test for the robustness of findings based on the primary indicator of event date 
– the ‘Earliest-known date’ – I next use the ‘Official announcement date’ as an alternative 
event date. This is the day when the company officially announces leadership 
appointments through its press release. Similar to the ‘Earliest-known date’, I hand-
collected the information on the ‘Official announcement date’ through Factiva by 
retrieving related news articles, which are either published in the mainstream media or 
industry-specific journals and magazines. For non-forced turnovers or firms enjoying 
good pre-succession performance, the ‘Earliest-known date’ might differ from the 
‘Official announcement date’ in the existence of succession planning. For instance, relay 
successions usually include a grooming period for the heir apparent, who is often a 
candidate from within the firm (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004) and then promoted to the 
position of President or COO when the outgoing CEO approaches the mandatory 
retirement age, to fill the outgoing CEO’s position. In this case, the ‘Earliest-known date’ 
should be the date on which the market knows who the heir apparent is, and related news 
articles convincingly state that the person is going to take charge after the retirement of 
the outgoing CEO. The ‘Earliest-known date’, under such circumstances, might come 
several months, or even one or two years, before the ‘Official announcement date’. In 
other cases, board members can set up a ‘horse race’, let the candidates (mainly from 
within the firm) compete against one another and thus identify the best person for the 
leadership position. Market participants are therefore not sure which person from the 
candidate list would be the eventual ‘winner’ until the official announcement is made. 
Under such circumstances, the ‘Earliest-known date’ is most often identical to the 
‘Official announcement date’. 
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For forced successions or successions following poor performance, on the other 
hand, since the event is unplanned and unexpected, even if the board had thought about 
getting the predecessor removed long before the succession event actually happens, or in 
some circumstances, speculations about the potential candidates might be given by 
industrial analysts well ahead of firm’s announcement, who is ultimately going to take 
charge is often not clear until the firm makes an official announcement. Thus, in most 
cases, the ‘Earliest-known date’ is identical to the ‘Official announcement date’ and 
produces results consistent with each other. 
As shown in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, results produced by ‘Official announcement 
date’ are qualitatively similar to results presented in sections 4.5.2, 4.5.2.1 and 4.5.2.2 by 
using the ‘Earliest-known date’ as the event date. Overall, results using the primary event 
date remain robust. 
<Insert Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 here> 
I have conducted additional robustness checks by: (1) changing the length of the 
estimation window (ESTPERIOD); (2) changing the length between the end of the 
estimation period and the beginning of the event window (INTERVAL); and (3) adopting 
different estimation models. Results are not sensitive to any of these additional tests.64  
 
4.5.4. Cross-sectional Regression Analysis 
Compared to univariate analysis, multivariate tests provide us with the partial 
effect of CEO succession gaps after taking various influential factors into consideration. 
To get a better understanding of the price effects of CEO succession gaps, I estimate the 
coefficient on HIGH_GAP variable by using the following regression equation: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(−5,+5) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻 𝐺𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐶𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑅 𝑃𝑅𝐸 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 + 𝛽4 ∗
𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐹𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀 𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                       (4.4) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(−5,+5) is the cumulative abnormal return over the 11-day period [-5,+5] days 
centered on the event date. HIGH_GAP equals one if the firm has a GAP_INDEX 
between the predecessor and the successor greater than two (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 3/4/5/6) 
and zero otherwise (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 0/1/2). FORCED is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise.  
                                                                
64 These additional results are not reported for brevity but are available upon request. 
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The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method 
used in Parrino (1997). POOR_PRE_PERF takes the value of one if the firm’s pre-
succession firm performance is lower than its two-digit SIC code industry median in a 
given fiscal year in my sample and zero otherwise. OUTSIDER, a dummy variable 
indicating successor origin, equals one if the new CEO is an external candidate and zero 
otherwise. DUALITY is a dummy equals one when a firm’s CEO serves as chairman of 
the board of directors and zero otherwise. FOUNDER is a dummy variable set equal to 
one if the CEO is the founder of the company, and zero otherwise. FAMILY_MEMBER 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is a family member of the 
original founders, and zero otherwise. FIRM_AGE denotes the number of years since the 
firm’s foundation. SIZE takes the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. LEV 
is the firm’s total debts divided by its total assets. MTB is market capitalization divided 
by book value of total assets. TANG is calculated as the firm’s net property, plant and 
equipment over total assets. I include two-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity across different industries and years. 
Table 4.8 presents the results from ordinary least squares regressions examining 
the effect of high succession gaps on firm’s subsequent cumulative abnormal returns. 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the effect of High Gap, the interaction effect of High Gap and 
forced turnover, and the interaction effect of High Gap and Poor pre-succession firm 
performance on firm cumulative abnormal returns during the [-5,+5] event window, 
respectively. In model 1, I do not find any meaningful relationship between high 
succession gaps and the eleven-day cumulative abnormal returns when news first leaks 
out regarding the identity of the successor. These results are not surprising given that my 
sample is heterogeneous with respect to the nature of the succession events. Given this 
possibility, I next study results in subsamples by successively interacting the HIGH_GAP 
dummy with both the FORCED succession dummy and the POOR_PRE_PERF dummy.  
In model 3, the coefficient on HIGH_GAP is 0.00367, which is neither 
economically nor statistically significant, suggesting that the market does not react to 
appointment of CEOs with high succession gaps in firms with good pre-succession 
performance. The insignificant coefficient on POOR_PRE_PERF in model 3 shows that 
under poor pre-succession performance, successors with relatively low levels of 
succession gaps are associated with no abnormal returns. As shown by the significantly 
positive coefficient on the interaction between HIGH_GAP and POOR_PRE_PERF, 
consistent with my previous empirical analysis, investors react more positively to 
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incoming CEOs with high succession gaps in firms with poor performance leading up to 
the succession event than in those enjoying good pre-succession performance. 
Interestingly, the interaction term between HIGH_GAP and FORCED shows a positive 
sign albeit one that is not statistically significant at any conventional level. Investors do 
not respond differently for successors with high levels of succession gaps between forced 
removals and non-forced turnovers. This might be due to the problem of small sample 
size associated with high CEO succession gaps under forced successions. Small samples 
usually produce results with low statistical power and generally non-significant results. 
<Insert Table 4.8 here> 
For a robustness check, I repeat my analysis by incorporating industry fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and the interactions between industry dummies and year 
dummies, to rule out the potential effect of industry-specific fixed effects during a 
particular year. Including the industry-year interaction term makes the succession gap 
variable and the measures of firm cumulative abnormal returns comparable across 
industries in any given year. Results for this analysis are presented in Table 4.9 and are 
qualitatively similar to those reported earlier.  
<Insert Table 4.9 here> 
I next repeat analysis in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 by using the ‘Official 
announcement date’ rather than the ‘Earliest-known date’. Results are presented in Table 
4.10 and once again the earlier results using the primary event date remain robust. 
<Insert Table 4.10 here> 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
In this study, I employ an event study approach to examine the price effects of 
CEO succession gaps. Focusing on the differences in personal traits/ past experiences 
between the outgoing and incoming CEOs in S&P 500 companies spanning the period 
1992-2016, I do not find any relationship between the level of CEO succession gaps and 
firm cumulative abnormal returns over the 11 days [-5,+5] surrounding the event window. 
However, when the sample is split into subsamples based on the nature of the succession 
events, results are dramatically different. Under forced removals and when pre-
succession firm performance has been poor, market participants react favorably to 
successors with relatively high levels of succession gaps. For firms tapping successors 
with relatively low levels of succession gaps under forced removals or successions 
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following poor performance, returns for the entire [-5,+5] event window indicate no 
statistical significance. Although some short-lived positive cumulative abnormal returns 
could be observed, the dispersion of stock prices from firm fundamentals is quickly 
reversed when the market realizes that instead of affecting effective changes, tapping a 
successor sharing similar personal traits with his/ her predecessor will simply indicate 
organizational inertia and may convey no information about management quality 
improvements and/ or firm future performance. 
Under non-forced successions or when pre-succession performance has been good, 
cumulative abnormal returns following the revelation of CEO succession gaps is not 
statistically different from zero for incoming CEOs with both high and/ or low succession 
gaps. This is due to the event itself not conveying any new information to investors. 
Overall, the evidences presented in this study suggest that firms may use CEO succession 
events and easily observable personal traits differences between the incoming and the 
outgoing CEOs as an investor management tool to restore investor confidence. This is 
especially the case when firms force out their predecessors and/ or when firms experience 




Table 4. 1 Summary Statistics 
This table presents the number of succession firms in this paper spanning the period 1992-2016 with different levels of CEO succession 
gaps under specific settings. The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows: For every difference between the predecessor 
and the successor with regard to their gender, age, career variety, cultural background, highest education level, and eliteness of 
undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. Forced (Non-forced) Succession group is defined as one where the firm’s 
predecessor is forced out (not forced out) during the succession event. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced 
follows the method used by Parrino (1997). Poor (Good) Pre-Performance groups are defined as entities in which a firm’s pre-
succession firm performance is lower (higher) than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample, with industry defined at 
the two-digit SIC code level.  
Gap Index  Full Sample  Forced Non-Forced Poor Performance Good Performance 
Panel A: Starting Sample 
0 63 17 45 17 46 
1 144 35 109 36 108 
2 176 52 123 46 130 
3 103 35 68 25 78 
4 31 8 23 8 23 
5 3 2 1 1 2 
6 1 1 0 0 1 
Total 521 150 369 133 388 
Panel B: Final Sample 
0 47 12 34 14 33 
1 101 25 76 26 75 
2 121 36 85 35 86 
3 70 18 52 14 56 
4 21 5 16 5 16 
5 2 2 0 1 1 
6 1 1 0 0 1 
Total  363 99 263 95 268 
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Table 4. 2 Event Study – Full Sample 
Table 4.2 shows the average daily abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional T-values for daily abnormal returns, average daily 
cumulative abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional t-statistics for cumulative abnormal returns, and the number of positive and 
negative abnormal returns for the entire sample during the period -5 to +5 relative to the ‘earliest-known date’, respectively. Panel A 
shows the statistics for firms with relatively low levels of succession gaps (i.e. the Low Gap group), while Panel B demonstrates 
results for the firms with relatively high levels of succession gaps (i.e. the High Gap group).  
Panel A: Firms with low succession gaps 
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  0.01%  -0.50   0.01%  -0.50  132: 145  
-4  -0.01%  -0.63   0.00%  -0.80   134: 143  
-3  0.01%  0.06   0.01%  -0.66   142: 135  
-2  0.16%  1.11   0.17%  0.05   142: 135  
-1  0.04%  -0.03   0.21%  0.04   132: 145  
0  0.16%  0.45   0.37%  0.33   140: 137  
1  0.32%  1.57   0.70%  1.23   146: 131  
2  -0.12%  -0.97   0.57%  0.86   130: 147  
3  -0.02%  -0.68   0.55%  0.64   125: 152  
4  -0.19%  -2.04   0.36%  0.03   123: 154  
5  0.00%  0.04   0.36%  0.04   143: 134  
Panel B: Firms with high succession gaps 
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  -0.07%  -0.19   -0.07%  -0.19   51: 46  
-4  0.28%  1.41   0.21%  0.94   54: 43  
-3  -0.12%  -1.01   0.09%  -0.03   45: 52  
-2  -0.05%  0.46   0.04%  0.19   48: 49  
-1  -0.11%  0.03   -0.07%  0.18   43: 54  
0  0.45%  1.73   0.38%  1.10   51: 46  
1  0.49%  0.45   0.87%  1.12   46: 51  
2  -0.09%  -0.17   0.78%  1.03   51: 46  
3  -0.23%  -1.49   0.55%  0.56   42: 55  
4  0.00%  0.10   0.55%  0.58   47: 50  
5  0.39%  1.44   0.95%  0.91   54: 43  
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Table 4. 3 Event Study – Forced vs. Non-forced Successions 
Table 4.3 shows the average daily abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional T-values for daily abnormal returns, average daily cumulative abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional t-statistics for 
cumulative abnormal returns, and the number of positive and negative abnormal returns for forced succession firms and non-forced succession firms over the [-5,+5] event window, respectively. Panel A shows 
the statistics for firms which force out their predecessors, while Panel B demonstrates results for firms that experienced non-forced successions. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced 
follows the method used by Parrino (1997). 
Panel A: Forced successions 
Low Gap            High Gap          
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  -0.03%  -0.50   -0.03%  -0.50   34: 41  0.34%  1.01   0.34%  1.01   17: 10  
-4  0.08%  -0.06   0.05%  -0.31  40: 35  0.55%  2.20   0.88%  2.18   17: 10  
-3  0.24%  0.63   0.29%  0.07   43: 32  0.10%  0.11   0.99%  1.92  15: 12  
-2  0.05%  0.12   0.34%  0.11   41: 34  -0.14%  -0.41   0.84%  1.40   12: 15  
-1  0.45%  2.07   0.80%  1.04   43: 32  0.22%  0.74   1.06%  1.66   12: 15  
0  0.88%  1.28   1.67%  1.78   47: 28  0.58%  0.94   1.65%  1.99   15: 12  
1  0.22%  0.51   1.89%  1.85   38: 37  1.20%  0.95   2.84%  1.97   13: 14  
2  -0.28%  -1.20   1.62%  1.52   31: 44  -0.23%  -0.03   2.61%  1.81   13: 14  
3  -0.10%  -0.75   1.51%  1.22   34: 41  -0.50%  -1.28   2.11%  1.46   8: 19  
4  -0.43%  -2.15   1.08%  0.62   29: 46  -0.03%  0.10   2.08%  1.39   14: 13  
5  0.00%  -0.40   1.08%  0.46   35: 40  0.56%  2.00   2.64%  1.76   19: 8  
Panel B: Non-forced successions 
Low Gap            High Gap          
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  0.03%  -0.30   0.03%  -0.30   98: 103  -0.22%  -0.98   -0.22%  -0.98   34: 36  
-4  -0.04%  -0.72   -0.01%  -0.73   94: 107  0.17%  0.49   -0.05%  -0.17   37: 33  
-3  -0.08%  -0.36   -0.09%  -0.84   98: 103  -0.21%  -1.08   -0.26%  -0.87   30: 40  
-2  0.21%  1.19   0.11%  -0.02   100: 101  -0.02%  0.72   -0.27%  -0.54   36: 34  
-1  -0.12%  -1.24   0.00%  -0.63   89: 112  -0.24%  -0.36   -0.51%  -0.57   31: 39  
0  -0.11%  -0.57   -0.11%  -0.83   92: 109  0.40%  1.47   -0.11%  0.18   36: 34  
1  0.37%  1.69   0.26%  0.21   108: 93  0.21%  -0.23   0.11%  0.07   33: 37  
2  -0.07%  -0.37   0.19%  0.07   99: 102  -0.03%  -0.20   0.08%  0.01   38: 32  
3  0.00%  -0.46   0.19%  -0.07   90: 111  -0.12%  -0.93   -0.05%  -0.24   34: 36  
4  -0.10%  -1.04   0.09%  -0.37   94: 107  0.01%  0.05   -0.04%  -0.24   33: 37  




Table 4. 4 Event Study – Poor Pre-performance vs. Good Pre-performance 
Table 4.4 shows the average daily abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional T-values for daily abnormal returns, average daily cumulative abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional t-statistics for 
cumulative abnormal returns, and the number of positive and negative abnormal returns for firms with poor past performance and firms with good pre-succession performance over the [-5,+5] event window, 
respectively. Panel A shows the statistics for firms experiencing poor pre-succession performance, while Panel B demonstrates results for firms that enjoy good pre-succession performance). Poor (Good) Pre-
Performance groups are defined whereby a firm’s pre-succession firm performance is lower (higher) than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code 
level. 
Panel A: Successions following poor performance 
Low Gap            High Gap          
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  -0.09%  -0.36   -0.09%  -0.36   37: 39  0.48%  1.20   0.48%  1.20   14: 8  
-4  0.04%  -0.16   -0.04%  -0.34   39: 37  0.35%  0.75   0.83%  1.38   11: 11  
-3  0.11%  1.34   0.07%  0.53   43: 33  -0.27%  -1.04   0.56%  0.72   11: 11  
-2  -0.05%  0.13   0.02%  0.51   33: 43  0.27%  0.91   0.83%  1.05   16: 6  
-1  -0.02%  -0.32   0.00%  0.31   35: 41  0.25%  0.32   1.08%  1.04   9: 13  
0  0.46%  0.42   0.46%  0.54   41: 35  1.23%  1.78   2.31%  2.14   15: 7  
1  0.66%  1.44   1.12%  1.42   43: 33  1.97%  1.36   4.27%  2.27   12: 10  
2  0.16%  0.38   1.28%  1.57   35: 41  -0.03%  -0.72   4.24%  1.86   11: 11  
3  -0.33%  -3.00   0.94%  0.77   30: 46  -0.37%  -1.03   3.87%  1.61   10: 12  
4  -0.11%  -1.17   0.83%  0.36   35: 41  0.24%  1.66   4.11%  2.00   13: 9  
5  0.15%  1.39   0.99%  0.74   41: 35  0.24%  0.59   4.35%  1.97   13: 9  
Panel B: Successions following good performance 
Low Gap            High Gap          
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  0.05%  -0.38   0.05%  -0.38   95: 106  -0.23%  -1.02   -0.23%  -1.02  37: 38  
-4  -0.03%  -0.67   0.02%  -0.73   95: 106  0.26%  1.20   0.03%  0.35   43: 32  
-3  -0.03%  -0.80   -0.01%  -1.10   99: 102  -0.08%  -0.69   -0.05%  -0.23   34: 41  
-2  0.25%  1.22   0.23%  -0.27   109: 92  -0.14%  0.18   -0.20%  -0.14   32: 43  
-1  0.06%  0.17   0.29%  -0.16   97: 104  -0.22%  -0.12   -0.41%  -0.16   34: 41  
0  0.05%  0.30   0.34%  0.09   99: 102  0.23%  0.80   -0.18%  0.23   36: 39  
1  0.19%  0.88   0.54%  0.58   103: 98  0.05%  -0.60   -0.13%  -0.01   34: 41  
2  -0.23%  -1.41   0.31%  0.08   95: 106  -0.10%  0.20   -0.23%  0.05   40: 35  
3  0.10%  0.69   0.40%  0.29   95: 106  -0.19%  -1.13   -0.42%  -0.28   32: 43  
4  -0.22%  -1.67   0.18%  -0.18   88: 113  -0.07%  -0.67   -0.49%  -0.44   34: 41  
5  -0.06%  -0.76   0.12%  -0.39   102: 99  0.44%  1.30   -0.05%  -0.05   41: 34  
124 
 
Table 4. 5 Robustness Check - Event Study using ‘Official Announcement Date’, Full 
Sample 
Table 4.5 shows the average daily abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional T-values for daily abnormal returns, average daily 
cumulative abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional t-statistics for cumulative abnormal returns, and the number of positive and 
negative abnormal returns for the entire sample during the period -5 to +5 relative to the ‘official announcement date’, respectively. 
Panel A shows the statistics for firms with relatively low levels of succession gaps (i.e. the Low Gap group), while Panel B 
demonstrates results for the firms with relatively high levels of succession gaps (i.e. the High Gap group). 
Panel A: Firms with low succession gaps 
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  0.01%  -0.73   0.01%  -0.73  124: 155  
-4  0.07%  -0.50   0.08%  -0.89   134: 145  
-3  -0.10%  -0.55   -0.02%  -1.10   139: 140  
-2  0.14%  0.48   0.12%  -0.68   143: 136  
-1  0.02%  0.03   0.13%  -0.61   133: 146  
0  0.20%  0.82   0.33%  0.04   146: 133  
1  0.42%  1.79   0.75%  1.13   148: 131  
2  -0.03%  -0.68   0.72%  0.84   130: 149  
3  0.07%  -0.12   0.79%  0.78   132: 147  
4  -0.20%  -1.69   0.59%  0.27   123: 156  
5  -0.02%  -0.12   0.57%  0.22   148: 131  
Panel B: Firms with high succession gaps  
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  -0.05%  0.13   -0.05%  0.13   49: 48  
-4  0.29%  1.39   0.24%  1.16   55: 42  
-3  -0.20%  -1.61   0.04%  -0.11   47: 50  
-2  -0.10%  0.27   -0.06%  0.04   45: 52  
-1  -0.13%  -0.10   -0.18%  -0.00   45: 52  
0  0.30%  1.38   0.12%  0.78   52: 45  
1  0.69%  1.25   0.81%  1.22   50: 47  
2  -0.08%  -0.09   0.72%  1.15   50: 47  
3  -0.18%  -1.32   0.54%  0.71   43: 54  
4  0.02%  0.24   0.57%  0.77   49: 48  
5  0.14%  0.46   0.70%  0.80   54: 43  
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Table 4. 6 Robustness Check - Event Study using ‘Official Announcement Date’, Forced vs. Non-forced Successions 
Table 4.6 shows the average daily abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional T-values for daily abnormal returns, average daily cumulative abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional t-statistics for 
cumulative abnormal returns, and the number of positive and negative abnormal returns for forced succession firms and non-forced succession firms over the [-5,+5] event window using the ‘official announcement 
date’, respectively. Panel A shows the statistics for firms who force out their predecessors, while Panel B demonstrates results for firms that experienced non-forced successions. The classification of succession 
events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). 
Panel A: Forced successions 
Low Gap            High Gap          
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  0.10%  -0.31   0.10%  -0.31   35: 40  0.36%  1.00   0.36%  1.00   16: 11  
-4  0.38%  0.54   0.48%  0.28   40: 35  0.30%  1.52   0.66%  1.82   17: 10  
-3  0.08%  0.45   0.56%  0.54   43: 32  0.23%  0.54   0.88%  1.76   16: 11  
-2  0.20%  -0.12   0.76%  0.39   40: 35  -0.01%  0.05   0.87%  1.44   13: 14  
-1  0.35%  2.11   1.11%  1.41   44: 31  0.13%  0.32   1.00%  1.58   11: 16  
0  0.80%  1.37   1.91%  2.13   47: 28  0.54%  0.89   1.55%  1.89   15: 12  
1  0.32%  0.51   2.23%  2.14   38: 37  1.08%  0.72   2.62%  1.79   13: 14  
2  -0.07%  -0.79   2.17%  1.93   31: 44  -0.18%  0.10   2.45%  1.67   13: 14  
3  0.12%  -0.37   2.29%  1.67   36: 39  -0.46%  -1.17   1.99%  1.35   8: 19  
4  -0.38%  -1.62   1.91%  1.25   29: 46  -0.03%  0.19   1.96%  1.30   14: 13  
5  -0.10%  -0.52   1.82%  0.99   36: 39  0.59%  2.11   2.56%  1.69   21: 6  
Panel B: Non-Forced successions 
Low Gap            High Gap          
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  -0.02%  -0.64   -0.02%  -0.64   89: 114  -0.21%  -0.56   -0.21%  -0.56   33: 37  
-4  -0.05%  -1.09   -0.07%  -1.31  94: 109  0.29%  0.79   0.08%  0.31   38: 32  
-3  -0.17%  -0.98   -0.24%  -1.67   95: 108  -0.36%  -1.90   -0.29%  -0.97   31: 39  
-2  0.12%  0.60   -0.12%  -1.11   102: 101  -0.13%  0.28   -0.41%  -0.80   32: 38  
-1  -0.11%  -1.26   -0.23%  -1.62   89: 114  -0.23%  -0.29   -0.64%  -0.77   34: 36  
0  -0.03%  -0.30   -0.25%  -1.52  98: 105  0.21%  1.05   -0.43%  -0.19   37: 33  
1  0.47%  2.00   0.22%  -0.16   110: 93  0.53%  1.01   0.10%  0.29   37: 33  
2  -0.02%  -0.29   0.20%  -0.25   99: 104  -0.04%  -0.20   0.06%  0.23   37: 33  
3  0.04%  -0.02   0.24%  -0.25   95: 108  -0.07%  -0.80   -0.01%  -0.03   35: 35  
4  -0.14%  -0.94   0.10%  -0.51   94: 109  0.04%  0.16   0.03%  0.01   35: 35  





Table 4. 7 Robustness Check - Event Study using ‘Official Announcement Date’, Poor Pre-performance vs. Good Pre-performance 
Table 4.7 shows the average daily abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional T-values for daily abnormal returns, average daily cumulative abnormal returns, standardized cross-sectional t-statistics for 
cumulative abnormal returns, and the number of positive and negative abnormal returns for firms with poor past performance and firms with good pre-succession performance over the [-5,+5] event window using 
the ‘official announcement date’, respectively. Panel A shows the statistics for firms experiencing poor pre-succession performance, while Panel B demonstrates results for firms that enjoy good pre-succession 
performance. Poor (Good) Pre-Performance groups are defined whereby a firm’s pre-succession firm performance is lower (higher) than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample, with industry 
defined at the two-digit SIC code level. 
Panel A: Successions following poor performance 
Low Gap            High Gap          
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  -0.07%  -0.73   -0.07%  -0.73   34: 43  0.47%  1.13   0.47%  1.13   13: 9  
-4  0.29%  0.06   0.22%  -0.31   38: 39  0.07%  0.15   0.54%  0.90   10: 12  
-3  -0.26%  0.26   -0.05%  -0.11   42: 35  -0.23%  -1.03   0.32%  0.16   11: 11  
-2  0.10%  0.08   0.05%  -0.05   35: 42  0.35%  1.25   0.67%  0.79   16: 6  
-1  -0.18%  -0.65   -0.13%  -0.36   34: 43  0.23%  0.27   0.90%  0.80   8: 14  
0  0.27%  0.52   0.14%  0.01   40: 37  1.26%  1.85   2.16%  2.03   16: 6  
1  0.82%  1.59   0.96%  1.11   43: 34  1.91%  1.20   4.07%  2.09   13: 9  
2  0.31%  0.30   1.27%  1.18   36: 41  0.04%  -0.51   4.12%  1.78   12: 10  
3  -0.02%  -1.77   1.25%  0.67   34: 43  -0.40%  -1.09   3.72%  1.52   10: 12  
4  -0.14%  -0.94   1.10%  0.39   35: 42  0.23%  1.64   3.95%  1.89   13: 9  
5  0.06%  1.36   1.16%  0.73   43: 34  0.24%  0.51   4.19%  1.85   14: 8  
Panel B: Successions following good performance 
Low Gap            High Gap          
Event Day  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  AR  TAR  CAR  TCAR  Positive: Negative  
-5  0.04%  -0.48   0.04%  -0.48   90: 112   -0.21%  -0.57   -0.21%  -0.57  36: 39  
-4  -0.02%  -0.70   0.03%  -0.85   96: 106  0.35%  1.48   0.15%  0.83   45: 30  
-3  -0.04%  -0.83   -0.01%  -1.23   97: 105  -0.19%  -1.29   -0.04%  -0.17   36: 39  
-2  0.15%  0.51   0.14%  -0.79   108: 94  -0.23%  -0.12   -0.27%  -0.23   29: 46  
-1  0.09%  0.45   0.23%  -0.49   99: 103  -0.24%  -0.24   -0.50%  -0.29   37: 38  
0  0.17%  0.65   0.41%  0.04   106: 96  0.02%  0.24   -0.48%  -0.14   36: 39  
1  0.27%  1.04   0.68%  0.64   105: 97  0.33%  0.63   -0.15%  0.15   37: 38  
2  -0.16%  -1.15   0.52%  0.24   94: 108  -0.12%  0.17   -0.27%  0.21   38: 37  
3  0.11%  0.79   0.62%  0.49   98: 104  -0.12%  -0.91   -0.39%  -0.09   33: 42  
4  -0.23%  -1.41   0.40%  0.05   88: 114  -0.04%  -0.49   -0.43%  -0.22   36: 39  
5  -0.05%  -0.96   0.35%  -0.21   105: 97  0.11%  0.24   -0.32%  -0.14   40: 35  
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Table 4. 8 OLS Regression 
Table 4.8 shows the OLS regression results of CEO succession gaps on firm cumulative abnormal returns over the [-5,+5] event 
window. The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows: For every difference between the predecessor and the successor 
with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added 
to the index. HIGH_GAP equals one if the firm has a GAP_INDEX greater than the median value of 2 (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 3/4/5/6) 
and zero otherwise (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 0/1/2). Forced (Non-forced) Succession group is defined whereby the predecessor of the firm 
is forced out (not forced out) during the succession event. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the 
method used by Parrino (1997). Poor (Good) Pre-Performance groups are defined whereby a firm’s pre-succession firm performance 
is lower (higher) than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. 
Regressions include industry and year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 
HIGH_GAP 0.014 0.011 0.004 
 (1.46) (1.00) (0.33) 
HIGH_GAP*FORCED  0.010  
  (0.47)  
HIGH_GAP*POOR_PRE_PERF   0.046* 
   (1.92) 
FORCED 0.005 0.003 0.002 
 (0.56) (0.27) (0.16) 
POOR_PRE_PERF 0.022** 0.021** 0.013 
 (2.20) (2.13) (1.16) 
OUTSIDER 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 (1.37) (1.37) (1.40) 
DUALITY 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.73) (0.70) (0.71) 
FOUNDER 0.016 0.016 0.018 
 (0.65) (0.65) (0.72) 
FAMILY_MEMBER 0.010 0.009 0.002 
 (0.31) (0.26) (0.07) 
FIRM_AGE -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* 
 (-1.88) (-1.83) (-1.83) 
SIZE -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.66) 
LEV 0.051* 0.053* 0.053* 
 (1.66) (1.70) (1.71) 
MTB 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.55) (0.59) (0.67) 
TANG -0.023 -0.023 -0.028 
 (-1.07) (-1.07) (-1.29) 
Constant 0.003 0.005 0.003 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 314 314 314 





Table 4. 9 Robustness Check – OLS Regression Including Industry-Year Fixed Effects 
Table 4.9 shows the OLS regression results of CEO succession gaps on firm cumulative abnormal returns over the [-5,+5] event 
window. The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows: For every difference between the predecessor and the successor 
with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added 
to the index. HIGH_GAP equals one if the firm has a GAP_INDEX greater than the median value of 2 (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 3/4/5/6) 
and zero otherwise (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 0/1/2). Forced (Non-forced) Succession group is defined if the predecessor of the firm is 
forced out (not forced out) during the succession event. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the 
method used by Parrino (1997). Poor (Good) Pre-Performance groups are defined if the firm’s pre-succession firm performance is 
lower (higher) than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. 
Regressions include industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and industry-year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 
HIGH_GAP 0.008 0.004 -0.005 
 (0.66) (0.25) (-0.33) 
HIGH_GAP*FORCED  0.011  
  (0.44)  
HIGH_GAP*POOR_PRE_PERF   0.047* 
   (1.67) 
FORCED 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.30) (-0.08) (-0.10) 
POOR_PRE_PERF 0.021* 0.019 0.011 
 (1.70) (1.51) (0.82) 
OUTSIDER 0.016 0.017 0.018 
 (1.17) (1.18) (1.29) 
DUALITY 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.33) 
FOUNDER -0.005 -0.010 -0.007 
 (-0.16) (-0.32) (-0.24) 
FAMILY_MEMBER -0.010 -0.015 -0.017 
 (-0.28) (-0.40) (-0.49) 
FIRM_AGE -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 
 (-1.28) (-1.23) (-1.32) 
SIZE -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.87) (-0.75) (-0.58) 
LEV 0.031 0.030 0.028 
 (0.77) (0.74) (0.70) 
MTB 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 (0.74) (0.81) (0.92) 
TANG -0.011 -0.010 -0.015 
 (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.54) 
Constant -0.091 -0.087 -0.077 
 (-0.81) (-0.78) (-0.69) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 314 314 314 





Table 4. 10 Robustness Check – OLS Regression using ‘Official Announcement Date’ 
Table 4.10 shows the OLS regression results of CEO succession gaps on firm cumulative abnormal returns over the [-5,+5] event 
window using the ‘official announcement date’ instead of the ‘earliest-known date’. The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed 
as follows: For every difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ 
highest education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. HIGH_GAP equals one if the firm has 
a GAP_INDEX greater than the median value of 2 (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 3/4/5/6) and zero otherwise (i.e. GAP_INDEX = 0/1/2). 
Forced (Non-forced) Succession group is defined if the predecessor of the firm is forced out (not forced out) during the succession 
event. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). Poor (Good) Pre-
Performance groups are defined whereby a firm’s pre-succession firm performance is lower (higher) than its industry median in the 
given fiscal year in my sample, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the estimates 
controlling for industry and year fixed effects; while Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the estimates controlling for industry fixed effects, 
year fixed effects, and industry-year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
HIGH_GAP 0.006 0.002 -0.006 0.002 -0.006 -0.013 
 (0.59) (0.17) (-0.53) (0.15) (-0.39) (-0.98) 
HIGH_GAP*FORCED  0.013   0.018  
  (0.65)   (0.72)  
HIGH_GAP*POOR_PRE_PERF   0.050**   0.061** 
   (2.15)   (2.13) 
FORCED 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.014 0.008 0.008 
 (0.67) (0.29) (0.23) (1.21) (0.59) (0.70) 
POOR_PRE_PERF 0.020** 0.019* 0.010 0.024* 0.022* 0.011 
 (2.04) (1.95) (0.92) (1.95) (1.80) (0.84) 
OUTSIDER 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.013 0.013 0.014 
 (1.69) (1.69) (1.73) (0.88) (0.90) (0.99) 
DUALITY 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (0.69) (0.65) (0.67) (0.27) (0.23) (0.20) 
FOUNDER 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.003 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.41) (0.10) (-0.08) (0.03) 
FAMILY_MEMBER 0.016 0.014 0.008 0.016 0.012 0.008 
 (0.51) (0.44) (0.24) (0.46) (0.33) (0.21) 
FIRM_AGE -0.012* -0.011* -0.011* -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 
 (-1.85) (-1.78) (-1.79) (-1.57) (-1.46) (-1.63) 
SIZE -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 
 (-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.71) (-1.34) (-1.16) (-0.96) 
LEV 0.055* 0.057* 0.057* 0.054 0.049 0.05 
 (1.85) (1.91) (1.91) (1.35) (1.23) (1.28) 
MTB 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 
 (1.24) (1.30) (1.38) (0.93) (1.03) (1.12) 
TANG 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.004 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.05) (0.39) (0.37) (0.16) 
Constant -0.027 -0.025 -0.027 -0.070 -0.066 -0.049 
 (-0.40) (-0.38) (-0.41) (-0.63) (-0.59) (-0.44) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 314 314 314 314 314 314 
R-Squared 0.169 0.170 0.183 0.446 0.445 0.460 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
This thesis investigates how CEO succession gaps (i.e. the difference in personal 
traits between the predecessor and the successor) affect subsequent firm performance, 
firm risk-taking, and shareholders’ value. 
Chapter 2 seeks to identify characteristics of succession events when the impact 
of hiring a CEO with radically different personal traits could benefit the firm and 
conditions when such differences could potentially be harmful to firm value. For the full 
sample (S&P 500 data over the period 1996 to 2016) of CEO successions, I do not find 
evidence that the succession gap index impacts on future firm performance. Shifts in 
cultural mores can be beneficial or harmful to performance, and in a portfolio, the positive 
effect in some firms is neutralized by the adverse effect in others. I then split the sample 
into firms that were the subject of disruptive changes leading up to the succession event 
and those that were not. For firms that suffer from disruptive conditions (i.e. forced 
removals and successions preceded by poor firm performance) before succession events, 
an attempt to further shake up the status quo through a radical shift in the personal traits/ 
experiences of the CEO leads to worse subsequent firm performance. The negative 
relation between CEO succession gaps and subsequent firm performance is even stronger 
when adopting a longer three-year post-succession window. However, the adverse impact 
of the succession is limited only to the set of successions that are already reeling under 
disruptive conditions while firms in the complementary subsample (i.e. non-forced 
successions and firms enjoy good pre-succession performance) showed significant 
improvement in performance in the years following the succession event. Further, 
successors who differ considerably from their predecessors tend to co-opt a greater 
proportion of the board of directors one year after assuming office, have greater discretion 
to make far-reaching changes regarding downsizing and business divesting, and lead 
firms characterized by higher levels of post-succession strategic instability. This suggests 
that successor-induced personnel, structural and strategic alterations are likely to be 
higher when the event itself signals a change in firm policy or post-succession redirection. 
Overall, the empirical findings in Chapter 2 have strong implications for how firms 
manage CEO successions especially when the succession event is disruptive in nature. 
Rather than appointing successors with high succession gaps trying to stamp a mark on 
the firm by being different, firms under disruptive conditions should seek candidates with 
in-depth industry-specific knowledge, implementing an incremental approach to reform 
in company operations rather than demanding drastic changes. In this manner, the 
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incoming CEO could enhance rather than disturb existing internal and external 
relationships, and proactively seek help from incumbent board members and the top 
management team to successfully implement value-adding reforms. 
Chapter 3 examines whether an index that captures differences in personal risk-
taking attributes of the incoming and outgoing CEOs can explain post-succession firm 
risk. The main findings are as follows. In the baseline regression model, the risk-taking 
gap index contributes positively to firm total risk and its idiosyncratic components after 
controlling for firm and year fixed effects. However, the risk-taking gap index does not 
substantially lead to higher systematic risk. By further investigating the channels through 
which disruptions happen, results suggest that under forced removals, poor pre-
succession firm performance, and external successions, incoming CEOs with higher risk-
taking gap index generally lead to higher firm total risk and its systematic and 
idiosyncratic components in the subsequent year when compared to their non-succession 
matched pairs, even after controlling for CEO compensation incentives and CEO 
psychological traits (CEO overconfidence). The results further show that the increase in 
subsequent firm risk comes from increased financial and operating leverage (which leads 
to higher systematic risk), higher R&D intensity, lower capital expenditure and increased 
firm focus (which leads to higher idiosyncratic risk). Collectively, empirical findings in 
Chapter 3 suggest that the association between the differences in personal risk-
preferences of the incoming and outgoing CEOs is particularly strong when the 
succession event indicates a mandate for change thereby giving the successor greater 
latitude in imprinting his/ her personal risk preferences on subsequent firm policy choices. 
Traditional finance argues that investors are rational. In sharp contrast, however, 
behavioral finance suggests that investors are subjective performers who are not fully 
rational and make biased decisions driven by emotions and sentiment, among other things 
(Hirshleifer, 2001; Daniel et al., 2002; Peng & Xiong, 2006; Bodie et al., 2013). For 
instance, Cooper et al. (2001) document a significant increase in cumulative abnormal 
returns for firms adding ‘.com’ to their original names. They assert that the announcement 
effect can result in a permanent firm value increase and is similar across firms with 
different degrees of involvement with the internet industry. In a related study, Cooper et 
al. (2005) argue that market participants generally favor mutual funds which make a style 
name change to reflect current trends, regardless of their actual investing styles and/ or 
performance. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) find a positive relation between the 
magnitude of sunshine and stock returns. As such, short-term announcement effects could 
132 
 
bear no relation to company fundamentals and could be very different from subsequent 
financial performance. Although forced successions and successions following poor pre-
succession performance are generally disruptive (Friedman & Saul, 1991; 
Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012) and may result in a decrease in firm integration (Miller, 
1993) especially when the successor differs significantly from his/ her predecessor, past 
literature finds that the market generally reacts favorably to board-initiated successions 
or successions preceded by poor performance (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Lubatkin et al., 
1989; Davidson III et al., 1993; Denis & Denis, 1995).  
In Chapter 4, I focus on the price impact of CEO succession gaps and see whether 
investor reactions around revelation of CEO succession gaps fully anticipated future firm 
performance. Using the event study approach, I find that investors tend to respond only 
to high CEO succession gaps when the event is disruptive in nature. Low levels of CEO 
succession gaps, non-forced successions or successions following good firm performance 
are generally associated with no abnormal returns during the [-5,+5] event window. 
Empirical findings in Chapter 4 suggest that under forced successions or when pre-
succession performance has been poor, appointing successors with radically different 
personal traits from their predecessors could be used by firms as an investor management 
tool to restore shareholder confidence. 
However, this thesis inevitably suffers from several limitations. First, given the 
time constraint, my samples are limited to S&P 500 companies. Second, CEO succession 
planning (or lack of) seems to be of great importance regarding firm performance and 
shareholders value (Shen & Cannella Jr, 2003; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004; Behn et al., 
2005; McConnell & Qi, 2018). Not being able to collect and include such information in 
the empirical models may lead to omitted variable bias, as such dimension is likely to be 
correlated with CEO succession gap index.  
Overall, this thesis constructs an index of differences based on gender, age, career 
variety, cultural and educational background of the outgoing and incoming CEOs and 
examines the impact this index has on firm prospects. In other words, this thesis provides 
empirical evidence that the difference in several easily observable personal traits between 
the predecessor and the successor have a substantive effect on firm operational 
performance, firm’s future policy choices, and market perceptions on the succession 
event under different succession contexts. This research provides valuable insights into 
firms’ hiring and firing decisions in the labour market. Potential extensions to this 
research include incorporating the process of CEO succession and investigating whether 
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CEO succession gaps contribute differently under different succession processes (for 




Appendix A: Description of Variables 
Variables Definition 
ROA Return on total assets, defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization over total assets. 
PRE_PERFORMANCE For succession firms, pre-succession performance is measured as ROA (return on 
total assets) in the year prior to the succession for short-term measurement. For 
non-succession matched pairs, PRE-PERFORMANCE denotes ROA measured 
at time (t-1). I take the three-year average pre-succession ROA measured at time 
(t-1) as long-term pre-performance measure for robustness check. 
FIRM_AGE Number of years since the firm’s foundation. 
LEV Total debts divided by total assets. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
MTB Market capitalization divided by book value of total assets. 
CAPEX Capital expenditures divided by sales. 
FCF Free cash flow ratio, which equals free cash flow divided by the total assets of 
the company, where Free Cash Flow = EBITDA – CAPEX – change in working 
capital. 
TANG Fixed tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) divided by total assets.  
BOARD_SIZE Total number of directors. 
BOARD_IND The proportion of independent directors on the board. 
TOTAL_PAY Natural logarithm of CEO’s total annual compensation. 
OWNERSHIP The percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO. 
EQUITY_INTENSITY The proportion of total annual CEO compensation that comes from option grants 
and stocks. This is the value of annual option awards plus the value of annual 
stock grants scaled by the amount of total annual compensation. The specific 
calculation formula is as follows: [option_awards_blk_value + rstkgrnt]/tdc1 
(before 2006) and [option_awards_fv + stock_awards_fv]/tdc1 (after 2006). 
DUALITY A dummy variable indicating the board’s structure, which equals one when a 
firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) also serves as chairman of the board of 
directors, and zero otherwise. 
FOUNDER A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the founder of the company, and 
zero otherwise. 
FAMILY_MEMBER A dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is a family member of the original 
founders, and zero otherwise. 
OUTSIDER A dummy variable indicating successor origin, which equals one if the new CEO 
is an external candidate, and zero otherwise. 
  
RND Research and development expenditure over lagged revenue. 
STKVOL Annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return over the given year. 
IND_SALES_GROWTH The median three-year growth rate for aggregate sales for an industry defined by 
its two-digit SIC code.  
LOW_DEBT_CAPACITY A dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a long-term debt ratio (as measured 
by long-term debt divided by total assets) above the median industry long-term 
debt ratio and has a liquidity ratio (as measured by current assets divided by 
current liabilities) below the median industry liquidity ratio, and zero otherwise 
for firms matched by two-digit SIC code.   
DIV_COVERAGE Dividend coverage ratio, net income divided by common dividends. 
DIV_CUT A dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm decreases its annual dividend, 
and zero otherwise. 
INTEREST_COVERAGE Interest coverage ratio, operating earnings (EBITDA) divided by interest 
expense. 
NUM_SEGMENTS Number of business segments in which the firm operates. 
HERF Sale-based Herfindahl Index ranging from zero to one, calculated as the sum of 
the squares of each segment’s sales as a proportion of total sales. A sale-based 
Herfindahl Index close to one indicates that the firm is concentrated with regard 





Appendix B: Pre-Succession Firm Characteristics Mean Comparison Tests between the 
High-Gap Group and the Low-Gap Group 
This table presents the difference in pre-succession firm characteristics between the high gap-succession group and low gap-succession 
group that are used in this paper for PSM matching spanning the period 1996-2016. The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as 
follows. For every difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest 
education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. HIGH_GAP is a dummy equal to one if the 
firm has a GAP_INDEX greater than the mean value of 1.82 and zero otherwise. PRE_PERFORMANCE_ST, is defined as ROA 
(return on total assets) one year prior to the succession event while PRE_PERFORMANCE is the three-year average pre-succession 
ROA. PRE_FIRM_AGE is the number of years since the firm was established one year prior to the succession event, PRE_SIZE is 
the firm size (natural log of total assets) one year prior to the succession event, PRE_LEV is the firm’s book leverage (total debt) one 
year prior to the succession event, PRE_MTB is the firm’s market-to-book ratio one year prior to the succession event, PRE_TANG 
is the firm’s tangibility (calculated as fixed tangible assets divided by total assets) one year prior to the succession event. 
PRE_BOARDSIZE is the firm’s number of directors one year prior to the succession event, while PRE_BOARD_IND is the 
proportion of independent directors on the board one year prior to the succession event. PRR_AGE denotes the age of the predecessor. 
PRE_OWNERSHIP is the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the predecessor and PRE_DUALITY is a dummy variable 










High Gap  Low Gap   
PRE_PERFORMANCE_ST  0.164  0.169  -0.005  -0.757  0.450 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  0.161  0.167  -0.006  -0.573  0.567 
PRE_FIRM_AGE  3.915  4.160  -0.246  -3.697  0.000 
PRE_SIZE  8.891  9.116  -0.226  -1.964  0.050 
PRE_LEV  0.576  0.598  -0.022  -1.293  0.197 
PRE_MTB  2.315  2.345  -0.030  -0.249  0.803 
PRE_TANG  0.417  0.476  -0.059  -2.689  0.008 
PRE_BOARDSIZE  10.602  10.791  -0.189  -0.910  0.364 
PRE_BOARD_IND  0.730  0.746  -0.015  -1.032  0.303 
PRE_AGE  60.691  59.900  0.791  1.598  0.111 
PRE_OWNERSHIP  0.064  0.053  0.011  1.140  0.255 
PRE_DUALITY  0.722  0.787  -0.066  -1.842  0.066 
Observations  449  210       
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Appendix C: PSM Regression of Gap Index on Subsequent Firm Performance, 
Controlling for CEO Total Pay 
This table presents the results from PSM regression of CEO succession gaps on subsequent firm performance controlling for CEO 
total pay. The dependent variable, PERFORMANCE is the difference in subsequent performance between the treatment firm 
(succession firm) and the average subsequent performance of the matching group (non-succession matched peers), where subsequent 
performance is defined as ROA (return on total assets) in the year following the succession event. The state variable GAP_INDEX is 
constructed as follows. For every difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural 
background/ highest education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. FORCED is a dummy 
variable equals to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-
forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). Poor (Good) Pre-Performance groups are defined if the firm’s pre-succession firm 
performance is lower (higher) than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my sample, with industry defined at the two-digit 
SIC code level. Panel A reports estimates of gap index on subsequent firm performance. Panel B reports sub-sample estimates of gap 
index on subsequent firm performance for forced/ non-forced succession firms while Panel C reports sub-sample estimates of gap 
index on subsequent firm performance for poor pre-succession performance/ good pre-succession performance firms. Columns 1, 2 
and 3 report the estimates of treatment effect on subsequent performance controlling for industry and year fixed effects, for industry, 
year and industry-year fixed effects and for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. The models include all control variables from 
Table 2.2 (suppressed) and TOTAL_PAY. Definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Firm Performance 
Variable   1   2   3 
Panel A: PSM Regression of Gap Index on 





               
GAP_INDEX  -0.000  0.004  -0.002 
  (-0.04)  (1.04)  (-0.55) 
FORCED  -0.005  -0.011  0.005 
  (-0.35)  (-0.82)  (0.35) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.396***  -0.416***  -0.157*** 
  (-10.80)  (-11.97)  (-2.89) 
TOTAL_PAY  0.000  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.10)  (0.34)  (-0.17) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
R-Squared  0.376  0.425  0.506 
Observations  605  605  605 
Panel B: PSM Regression of Gap Index on 
Subsequent Firm Performance – Forced vs. 
Non-Forced 
 Forced  Non-Forced 
 1  2  3  1  2  3 
GAP_INDEX   -0.011**   -0.010**   -0.012**   0.007*   0.012***   0.005 
  (-2.44)  (-2.20)  (-2.44)  (1.78)  (3.01)  (1.32) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.425***  -0.458***  -0.145***  -0.383***  -0.423***  -0.060 
  (-12.14)  (-13.71)  (-2.84)  (-10.37)  (-12.24)  (-1.10) 
TOTAL_PAY  0.000  0.001  -0.003  0.001  0.001  -0.002 
  (0.06)  (0.49)  (-0.67)  (0.26)  (0.57)  (-0.45) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R-Squared  0.457  0.493  0.551  0.406  0.458  0.520 
Observations  175  175  175  430  430  430 
Panel C: PSM Regression of Gap Index on 
Subsequent Firm Performance – Poor Pre-
Succession Performance vs. Good Pre-
Succession Performance 
 Poor Pre-Succession Performance  Good Pre-Succession Performance 
 1  2  3  1  2  3 
GAP_INDEX   -0.022***   -0.021***   -0.025***   0.014***   0.019***   0.012*** 
  (-3.80)  (-3.44)  (-4.07)  (3.12)  (4.41)  (2.69) 
FORCED  0.001  -0.003  0.005  0.050***  0.043**  0.068*** 
  (0.05)  (-0.14)  (0.25)  (2.73)  (2.36)  (3.56) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.411***  -0.452***  -0.129***  -0.406***  -0.447***  -0.067 
  (-11.73)  (-13.68)  (-2.59)  (-11.15)  (-13.14)  (-1.24) 
TOTAL_PAY  -0.000  0.001  -0.003  0.001  0.002  -0.003 
  (-0.08)  (0.40)  (-0.66)  (0.32)  (0.73)  (-0.76) 
Other Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No 
Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R-Squared  0.464  0.503  0.559  0.425  0.479  0.527 
Observations   298   298   298   307   307   307 
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Appendix D: PSM Regression of Individual Gap Measures on Subsequent Firm Performance 
This table presents the results from PSM regression of each CEO attributes used in the CEO succession gap index on subsequent firm performance. The dependent variable, PERFORMANCE is the difference in subsequent 
performance between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the average subsequent performance of the matching group (non-succession matched peers), where subsequent performance is defined as ROA (return on total assets) 
in the year following the succession event. The state variable GAP_INDEX is constructed as follows. For every difference between the predecessor and the successor with regard to their gender/ age/ cultural background/ highest 
education level and eliteness of undergraduate school, one point is added to the index. FORCED is a dummy variable equals to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero otherwise. The classification of succession events into 
forced/ non-forced follows the method used by Parrino (1997). Poor (Good) Pre-Performance groups are defined if the firm’s pre-succession firm performance is lower (higher) than its industry median in the given fiscal year in 
my sample, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. Panel A reports estimates of individual gap measures on subsequent firm performance. Panel B reports sub-sample estimates of individual gap measures on 
subsequent firm performance for forced succession firms. Panel C reports sub-sample estimates of individual gap measures on subsequent firm performance for non-forced succession firms. Panel D reports sub-sample estimates 
of individual gap measures on subsequent firm performance for poor pre-succession performance firms while Panel E reports sub-sample estimates of individual gap measures on subsequent firm performance for good pre-
succession performance firms. Regression includes firm and year fixed effects. The models include all control variables from Table 2.2 (suppressed). Definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Firm Performance 
Panel A: PSM Regression of Individual Gap Measures on 
Subsequent Firm Performance 
 Full-Sample 
 GENDER_GAP  AGE_GAP  CAREER_VARIETY_GAP  CULTURAL_GAP  HIGHEST_EDU_GAP  ELITE_EDU_GAP 
GAP_MEASURE   0.063**   -0.013   -0.006   0.030**   -0.021**   -0.049*** 
  (2.56)  (-0.86)  (-0.64)  (1.97)  (-2.13)  (-3.69) 
FORCED  -0.003  -0.001  0.001  -0.011  0.015  0.014 
  (-0.29)  (-0.06)  (0.09)  (-0.84)  (1.11)  (1.12) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.085  -0.080  -0.084  -0.166***  -0.075  -0.070 
  (-1.60)  (-1.50)  (-1.57)  (-3.07)  (-1.41)  (-1.32) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.465  0.462  0.459  0.506  0.468  0.510 
Observations  605  605  605  605  605  605 
Panel B: PSM Regression of Individual Gap Measures on 
Subsequent Firm Performance – Forced Succession Firms 
 Forced Succession Firms 
 GENDER_GAP  AGE_GAP  CAREER_VARIETY_GAP  CULTURAL_GAP  HIGHEST_EDU_GAP  ELITE_EDU_GAP 
GAP_MEASURE   -0.072   -0.058**   -0.031**   -0.022   -0.021*   -0.089*** 
  (-1.09)  (-2.17)  (-2.04)  (-1.27)  (-1.70)  (-4.88) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.181***  -0.177***  -0.179***  -0.169***  -0.161***  -0.160*** 
  (-3.72)  (-3.64)  (-3.68)  (-3.40)  (-3.23)  (-3.24) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.535  0.541  0.536  0.554  0.518  0.560 
Observations  175  175  175  175  175  175 
Panel C: PSM Regression of Individual Gap Measures on 
Subsequent Firm Performance – Non-Forced Succession 
Firms 
 Non-Forced Succession Firms 
 GENDER_GAP  AGE_GAP  CAREER_VARIETY_GAP  CULTURAL_GAP  HIGHEST_EDU_GAP  ELITE_EDU_GAP 
GAP_MEASURE   0.076***   0.004   0.003   0.070***   -0.015   -0.021 
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  (3.12)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (3.72)  (-1.40)  (-1.41) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.002  -0.001  -0.007  -0.078  0.009  0.009 
  (-0.03)  (-0.02)  (-0.12)  (-1.44)  (0.16)  (0.17) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.516  0.509  0.504  0.529  0.512  0.512 
Observations  430  430  430  430  430  430 
Panel D: PSM Regression of Individual Gap Measures on 
Subsequent Firm Performance – Poor Pre-Succession 
Performance Firms 
 Poor Pre-Succession Performance Firms 
 GENDER_GAP  AGE_GAP  CAREER_VARIETY_GAP  CULTURAL_GAP  HIGHEST_EDU_GAP  ELITE_EDU_GAP 
GAP_MEASURE   -0.043   -0.052**   -0.068***   -0.002   -0.076***   -0.058*** 
  (-1.26)  (-2.47)  (-4.80)  (-0.08)  (-5.40)  (-3.23) 
FORCED  -0.055***  -0.046***  -0.026*  -0.047***  0.000  -0.033** 
  (-4.08)  (-3.28)  (-1.81)  (-2.77)  (0.03)  (-2.14) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.068  -0.066  -0.062  -0.158***  -0.049  -0.040 
  (-1.41)  (-1.36)  (-1.27)  (-3.22)  (-0.99)  (-0.81) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.537  0.541  0.553  0.554  0.558  0.548 
Observations  298  298  298  298  298  298 
Panel E: PSM Regression of Individual Gap Measures on 
Subsequent Firm Performance –Good Pre-Succession 
Performance Firms 
 Good Pre-Succession Performance Firms 
 GENDER_GAP  AGE_GAP  CAREER_VARIETY_GAP  CULTURAL_GAP  HIGHEST_EDU_GAP  ELITE_EDU_GAP 
GAP_MEASURE   0.155***   0.025   0.030**   0.059***   0.027**   -0.020 
  (5.32)  (1.38)  (2.53)  (3.23)  (2.30)  (-1.20) 
FORCED  0.097***  0.095***  0.085***  0.071***  0.085***  0.099*** 
  (5.61)  (5.41)  (4.61)  (3.80)  (4.73)  (5.75) 
PRE_PERFORMANCE  -0.091*  -0.087*  -0.095*  -0.076  -0.082  -0.084 
  (-1.76)  (-1.66)  (-1.82)  (-1.40)  (-1.58)  (-1.62) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.539  0.518  0.520  0.528  0.525  0.522 
Observations   307   307   307   307   307   307 
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Appendix E: Description of Variables 
Variables Definition 
ROA Return on total assets, defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization over total assets. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
FIRM_AGE Natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was established. 
MTB Market capitalization over book value of total assets, where market capitalization 
is calculated as: annual close price*common shares outstanding + total debt in 
current liabilities + total long-term debt + preferred stock (liquidating value) - 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit. 
SALES_GROWTH Annual percentage increase in sales. 
LEV_TDA Book leverage of total debt, defined as the sum of the firm’s debt in current 
liabilities and long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets. 
RND Research and development, defined as research and development expenditure 
scaled by sales. 
CAPEX Capital expenditure over total assets.  
LOG_DELTA Natural logarithm of the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth associated with a 1% 
change in the firm’s stock price (in $000s) 
LOG_VEGA Natural logarithm of the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth associated with a 1% 
change in the standard deviation of the firm’s returns (in $000s) 
BOARDSIZE Total number of directors. 
BOARD_IND The proportion of independent directors on the board. 
OVERCONFIDENCE OVERCONFIDENCE is a dummy variable equal to one if a CEO fails to exercise 
options when the average moneyness is over 100% in the succession year or in 
the fiscal year following the succession event. The latter is where the average 
moneyness of the CEO’s unexercised exercisable options is calculated as the per-
option realizable value (defined as the estimated value of in-the-money 
unexercised exercisable options over the number of unexercised exercisable 
options) divided by the estimated average strike price (defined as the fiscal year-
end stock price less per-option realizable value). 
TOTAL_PAY Natural logarithm of CEO’s total annual compensation. 
FORCED A dummy variable equal to one if the predecessor is forced out and zero 
otherwise. The classification of succession events into forced/ non-forced follows 
the method used by Parrino (1997). 
POOR_PRE_PERF A dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s pre-succession financial performance 
and stock return are lower than its industry median in the given fiscal year in my 
sample and zero otherwise, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. 
OUTSIDER A dummy variable indicating successor origin, which is equal to one if the new 
CEO was employed by the firm for less than one year before he/ she assumed 
office and zero otherwise. 
SUBSTITUTABILITY Product substitutability, defined as the the sum of industry sales divided by the 
sum of the industrial segment operating cost for a given firm, using data points 
from sample firms only, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. 
Where, operating cost is the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS), selling, general 
and administrative expense (SGA) and depreciation and amortization (DA). 
SI Strategic instability. Four individual strategic measures are used: (1) plant and 
equipment newness (net PPE/gross PPE), (2) nonproduction overhead (selling, 
general and administrative expenses/sales), (3) inventory level 
(inventories/sales), and (4) financial leverage (total debt/common equity). I first 




 for each of the 
aforementioned strategic dimensions. Then I standardize the variance for each 
dimension by industry at the four-digit SIC code level, using data points from 
sample firms only. Finally the strategic instability measure is generated by 
summing the four standardized variance scores.    
SD Strategic difference. Four individual strategic measures are used: (1) plant and 
equipment newness (net PPE/gross PPE), (2) nonproduction overhead (selling, 
general and administrative expenses/sales), (3) inventory level 
(inventories/sales), and (4) financial leverage (total debt/common equity). Each 
strategic dimension are standardized by industry at the four-digit SIC code level, 
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using data points from sample firms only at the given fiscal year. Then, absolute 
difference for each strategic dimension between a firm and its competitor in the 
same industry is calculated by subtracting industrial mean from the firm’s score. 
Finally, the strategic difference measure is generated by summing the four 
absolute differences for each of the strategic dimension. 
DIV_COVERAGE Dividend coverage ratio, net income divided by common dividends. 
INTEREST_COVERAGE Interest coverage ratio, operating earnings (EBITDA) divided by interest 
expense. 
LEV_TDA_ADJ Firm i’s total debt ratio (as measured by the sum of the firm’s debt in current 
liabilities and long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets) less the industry 
median total debt ratio, with industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level. 
CAPEX_ADJ Firm i’s capital expenditure (as measured by capital expenditure over total assets) 
less the industry median capital expenditure, with industry defined at the two-
digit SIC code level. 
RND_ADJ Firm i’s R&D (as measured by research and development expenditure over sales) 
less the industry median R&D intensity, with industry defined at the two-digit 





Appendix F: CEO Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent Firm Risk-Taking Using Daily 
Stock Returns  
This table presents the results from PSM regression of CEO succession risk-taking gap index on subsequent firm risk. The dependent 
variable, TE is the difference in subsequent firm risk-taking between the treatment firm (succession firm) and the matching group 
(non-succession matched peers) one year following the succession event. Firm risk measurements include: (1) total risk (STKVOL), 
defined as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns, (2) systematic risk (SYSVOL), defined as the standard deviation 
of the product of the firm’s beta (calculated by using the market model and regressing the firm’s monthly stock return on CRSP value-
weighted market return) times market daily returns, and (3) idiosyncratic risk (IDIO_STKVOL), defined as the annualized standard 
deviation of daily stock return residuals. The state variable — GAP_INDEX_RISK is constructed as follows. I add one point if the 
succession is characterized by male replacing female/ young replacing old with a minimum of 13.84 years age difference/ U.S. CEO 
replacing non-U.S. CEO/ general manager replacing industry specialist/ CEO with a technical educational background replacing one 
who does not. The risk gap index ranges from zero to five, with the minimum value indicating a successor aligning closely to the 
predecessor with regard to their risk-taking tendency as measured by personal traits and backgrounds, and the maximum value 
suggesting that the successor’s risk propensity is considerably higher than his/ her predecessor. All regressions include firm and year 
fixed effects. The models include all control variables from Table 2 (suppressed). Control variables definitions are provided in 
Appendix E. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 






Panel A: Risk-Taking Gap Index and Subsequent Firm 
Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.002**  0.002**  0.001 
  (2.183)  (2.200)  (1.403) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  633  633  633 
R-squared  0.301  0.334  0.239 
Panel B: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking Gap 
Index and Forced Removal on Subsequent Firm Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.000  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.032)  (1.423)  (-1.153) 
FORCED  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.444)  (-0.627)  (-0.320) 
FORCED*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.006**  0.002  0.006*** 
  (2.322)  (0.808)  (2.908) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  633  633  633 
R-squared  0.313  0.335  0.261 
Panel C: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking Gap 
Index and Poor Past Performance on Subsequent Firm 
Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.000  0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.024)  (1.520)  (-1.366) 
POOR_PRE_PERF  -0.000  -0.001  0.000 
  (-0.469)  (-0.965)  (0.132) 
POOR_PRE_PERF*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.013***  0.002  0.013*** 
  (5.117)  (1.082)  (6.813) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  633  633  633 
R-squared  0.337  0.337  0.308 
Panel D: the Interaction Effect of Risk-Taking Gap 
Index and External Succession on Subsequent Firm 
Risk 
      
GAP_INDEX_RISK  -0.001  0.000  -0.001 
  (-0.520)  (0.301)  (-1.528) 
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OUTSIDER  0.002  0.001  0.001 
  (0.999)  (0.529)  (1.092) 
OUTSIDER*GAP_INDEX_RISK  0.023***  0.011***  0.019*** 
  (8.840)  (5.894)  (9.602) 
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  633  633  633 
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